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I. INTRODUCTION 
A. 	 A Definition of Discrimination as Different Treatment 
W hile none of the numerous statutes that proscribe discrimi­nation define the term "discrimination,"1 they do suggest at 
1. Writing in I 966, then-Professor Sovern observed that there are "uncertainties in 
the very meaning of discrimination, a term the statutes do not define." M. SoVERN, LEGAL 
REsTRAINTS ON RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT 42-43 (1966). His observation, reit­
erated by courts in the ensuing years, remains true. The Supreme Court has noted that 
"Title VII does not define the term discrimination." Newport News Shipbuilding Co. v. 
EEOC, 462 U.S. 669, 676 (1983). With respect to Title VI, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1982), the 
Court has recognized that the term "discrimination" is inherently ambiguous, Guardians 
Ass'n. v. N.Y. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 463 U.S. 582,592 (1983), and is "susceptible of varying 
interpretations." Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 284 (1978). In Balli, 
Justice Powell quoted an observation ofJustice Holmes in order to describe the concept of 
discrimination: "[a] word is not a crystal, transparent and unchanged, it is the skin of a 
living thought and may vary greatly in color and content according to the circumstances 
and time in which it is used." Bakke, 438 U.S. at 284 (quoting Town v. Eisner, 245 U.S. 
418, 425 (1918)). State statutes are similarly general. See, e.g., CAL Gov'T CoDE § 12940 
(West Supp. 1986); MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN.§ 37.2202 (West 1985). Those statutes that do 
attempt a definition provide instead a tautology, ILL ANN. STAT. ch. 68, § I-103(Q) (Smith· 
Hurd Supp. 1985) ("'Unlawful discrimination' means discrimination against a person be· 
cause of his or her race ...."),or a synonym, MINN. STAT. ANN.§ 363.01(1) (West Supp. 
1985) ("[D]iscriminate includes segregate or separate •..."). See generally Bonfield, The 
Substance ofAmerican Fair Employment Practice Legislation 1: Employees, 61 Nw. U.L. REV. 907 
(1967). The oldest statutes, the Civil Rights Acts of 1866 and 1871, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 & 
1982 (1982), do not use the term discrimination and more clearly specify the right estab­
lished by the law. The statutes give "[a]ll persons" or "[a]ll citizens" the same identified 
right "as is enjoyed by white citizens." See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 & 1982 (1982). Even these 
more specific descriptions, however, have required extensive elaboration by the courts. See, 
e.g., General Bldg. Contractors Ass'n v. Pennsylvania, 458 U.S. 375 (1982). See generally 
Brown, Givelber & Subrin, Treating Blacks as if They Were White: Problems of Dtjinition and 
Proof in Section 1982 Cases, 124 U. PA. L. REv. 1 (1975). 
Professor Jones' recent comment on Title VII provides an apt summary of all the laws 
against discrimination: 
The[ir] general terms of definition use the concept of discrimination in defining 
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least one meaning. Their operative language typically provides 
that it shall be unlawful to "discriminate" "because of'2 race and 
other specified criteria.3 Using the generally accepted definitions 
discrimination. Inevitably under such circumstances, it is the process of admin­
istration that must give content to the terminology. Title VII adjudication is 
largely still concerned with establishing the metes and bounds of the law, in­
cluding the legal content of the concept 'discrimination.' 
Jones, Some Recollections on Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 at Twenty, 36 MERCER L. 
REV. 8I3, 823 (1985). 
2. Title VII uses the standard "because of' terminology, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a)(l), 
(2) (I982), as do many of the other laws against discrimination. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. §§ 
623(a)(I), (2) (1982) (Age Discrimination in Employment Act). Some statutes use slightly 
different language: the Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. § 206(A)(l) (1982) prohibits unequal pay 
"on the basis of sex"; the federal public accommodation statute, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-l 
(1982) and the Revenue Sharing Act, 31 U.S.C. § 6716(a) (1982), forbid discrimination 
"because of race ... .'' 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-l (I982); 31 U.S.C. § 6716(a) (1982). Title 
VIII uses three different causal connectors in the same statute: "because ·of," 42 U.S.C. § 
3604(a), (b), (d),§ 3605, § 363l(a) (1982); "based on," 42 U.S.C. § 3604(c) (1982); and "on 
account of," 42 U.S.C. §§ 3606, 3617, 363l(b) (1982). "No Court has yet indicated that 
any significance is to be attached to these variations in the way Title VIII expresses its 
'because of requirement." R. SCHWEMM, FAIR HOUSING LAW 48 n.29 (1983). 
3. This Article will use the statutory prohibitions against race discrimination as the 
primary basis for the presentation of non-determinative discrimination. Each statute identi­
fies the criteria which it is unlawful to use. Some statutes forbid only one type of discrimi­
nation: See, e.g., Title VI, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d to 2000d-6 (1982) (prohibiting only race 
discrimination); the Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1982), and Title IX, 20 U.S.C. §§ 
1681-1686 (1982) (proscribing only sex discrimination); and the Age Discrimination in Em­
ployment Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1982) (barring only age discrimination). The Reha­
bilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-794 (1982 & Supp. 1984), is a single-criterion 
statute in the sense that it prohibits only discrimination on the basis of handicap. 29 U.S.C. 
§§ 791-794a (1982 & Supp. 1985). However, the definition of"handicapped individual" is 
broad and varied. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 706(7), 791-794a (1982 & Supp. 1985); Affirmative 
Action Obligations of Contractors and Subcontractors for Handicapped Workers, 4I 
C.F.R. §§ 60-741 (1985); Wegner, The Anti-Discrimination Model Reconsidered: Ensuring 
Equal Opportunity With Respect to Handicap Under§ 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 69 
CORNELL L. REV. 401 (1984). 
Usually, a statute makes unlawful several types of discrimination, most typically race, 
color, religion, sex and national origin. The discriminatory use of these categories is pro­
hibited by Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1982), and a majority of state laws. There has 
been a trend toward expanding the protected classes. Some states now forbid discrimina­
tion on the basis of marital status or status as a welfare recipient. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS 
ANN. ch. 151B, § 4(10) (West 1982) (unlawful to discriminate against "recipient offederal, 
state or local assistance.''); N.Y. ExEC. LAw § 296(a) (McKinney 1983) (marital status). Cur­
rent federal bills would prohibit discrimination under Title VII against cancer victims. See 
H.R. 370, 99th Gong., 1st Sess., 131 GoNG. REc. HI04 (daily ed.Jan. 7, 1985); H.R. 1294, 
99th Gong., 1st Sess., 131 CoNG. REc. Hl837 (daily ed. Apr. 2, 1985). Most statutes also 
prohibit retaliation against a person because he or she has filed a complaint, or assisted 
someone with a complaint. See, e.g., Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a)(l982); Title Vlll, 42 
U.S.C. § 3631 (1982). For an example of truly omnibus protection, see D.C. CoDE ANN.§ 1­
2501 (1981) (prohibiting discrimination based on, but not limited to, "race, color, reli­
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of these statutory terms, unlawful racial discrimination can be de­
fined as the different treatment of a person caused by that per­
son's race." This different treatment is both "the most easily un­
derstood type of discrimination [and] the most obvious evil that 
[the legislatures] had in mind when [they] enacted ..." laws 
against discrimination.6 Indeed, the prohibition against different 
treatment because of race is the central prohibition of the antidis­
crimination principle,6 which in turn provides a major theoretical 
gions, national origin, sex, age, marital status, personal appearance, sexual orientation, 
family responsibilities, matriculation, political affiliation, physical handicap, source of in­
come and place of residence or business."). See also NEw CoLUMBIA CoNST. art. I, § 3 (pro­
posed May 29, 1982) (freedom from discrimination), reprinted in Oulahan, The Proposed 
New Columbia Constitution: Creating a "Manacled State", 32 AM. U.L. REV. 635, 650-51 (1983). 
4. The verb "discriminate" means to "treat differently." WEBSTER's NEW THIRD INTER• 
NATIONAL DICTIONARY 648 (1967). See also Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 
PHIL. & PuB. AFF. 107, 109 (1976) ("once divested of its emotional connotation, ["to dis­
criminate"] simply means to distinguish or to draw a line.") [hereinafter Fiss, Groups]. The 
phrase "because of' means "by cause" or "caused by." WEBSTER's NEW THIRD INTERNA· 
TIONAL DICTIONARY 194 (1976). Different treatment (which is commonly called "disparate 
treatment" in the case law, e.g., International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 
324, 335 n.15 (1977), and literature, e.g., B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMI· 
NATION LAw 13 (2d ed. 1981)) is not the only definition of discrimination. Under the dispa· 
rate impact theory, discrimination is defined as the use of "practices that are facially neu­
tral in their treatment of different groups but that in fact fall more harshly on one group 
than another and cannot be justified by business necessity." Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 335 
n.15. 
5. Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 335 n.15. The Court stated that a defendant discriminates 
when it "simply treats some people less favorably than others because of their race, color, 
religion, sex or national origin.'' /d. Senator Clark, one of the floor managers of the 1964 
Civil Rights Act, responded to the lack of definition of the term "discrimination" by 
stating: 
It has been suggested that the concept of discrimination is vague. In fact it is 
clear and simple and has no hidden meanings. To discriminate is to make a 
distinction, to make a difference in treatment or favor, and those distinctions or 
differences in treatment or favor which are prohibited by [section 703] are 
those which are based on any five [six] of the forbidden criteria: [age,] race, 
color, religion, sex, and national origin. Any other criterion or qualification for 
employment is not affected by this Title. 
H.R. 7152, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., 110 CoNG. REC. 7213 (1964); see also H.R. 7152, 88th 
Cong., 2d Sess., 110 CoNG. REC. 7218 (1964). 
6. The antidiscrimination principle is "the general principle disfavoring classifications 
and other decisions and practices that depend upon the race • . . of the parties affected.'' 
Brest, Foreword: In Defense of the Antidiscrimination Principle, 90 HARV. L. REV, 1, 1 (1976) 
[hereinafter Brest, Foreword]. This Article uses Professor Brest's definition and description 
of the principle, and also draws significantly from two works of Professor Fiss, A Theory of 
Fair Employment Laws, 38 U. CHI. L. REV. 235 (1971)[hereinafter Fiss, Theory] and Fiss, 
Groups, supra note 4, and the more realistic elaboration and critique of the principle by 
Professor Bell in D. BELL, RACE, RACtsM AND AMERICAN LAW 39-47, 589-600 (2d ed. 1980) 
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underpinning for the laws against discrimination.7 
B. Two Types of Different Treatment 
This Article addresses one aspect of this "most easily under­
stood type of discrimination" that has often been overlooked. It 
elaborates a simple observation: there are two types of different 
treatment embraced within the concept of discrimination,8 out­
come-determinative discrimination and non-outcome-determina­
tive discrimination (described in this Article as non-determinative 
discrimination).9 Most contemporary discrimination cases involve 
claims of outcome-determinative discrimination, where the focus 
[hereinafter D. BELL, RAcE]. Professor Brest's definition of the antidiscrimination principle 
is said to be a specific application of a broader, more generic principle. See Eisenberg, Dis­
proportionate Impact and Illicit Motive: Theories ofConstitutional Adjudication, 52 N.Y.U. L. REv. 
36 (1977); O'Fallon, Adjudication and Contested Concepts: The Case of Equal Protection, 54 
N.Y.U. L. REv. 19, 51 n.I21 (1979) (Brest's use is "narrow"). 
7. Brest, Foreword, supra note 6, at I ("The antidiscrimination principle lies at the 
core of most state and federal civil rights legislation .•.."); Fiss, Groups, supra note 4, at 
122 ("antidiscrimination principle was adopted by the legislative branch"). The antidis­
crimination principle primarily supports the disparate treatment theory of discrimination 
and is not the only principle reflected in the statutes. The disparate impact theory of dis­
crimination, see supra note 4, while possibly supported by the antidiscrimination principle, 
see Brest, Foreword, supra note 6, at 52; Fiss, Groups, supra note 4, at 141-44, is more di­
rectly buttressed by a group-disadvantaging theory. See Chamallas, Evolving Conceptions of 
Equality Under Title VII: Disparate Impact Theory and the Demise ofthe Bottom Line Principle, 31 
UCLA L. REV. 305 (1983) [hereinafter Chamallas, Equality]; Fiss, Groups, supra note 4, at 
144-46; Smith, Alternatives to Paralysis: A Working Paper Precipitated by the Affirmative Action 
Cases, 61 OR. L. REV. 317, 327-29 (1982). The antidiscrimination principle is not always 
favored. Its application yields awkward and arguably unacceptable results in cases involving 
"physical sexual reproductive characteristic and the pervasive social system of ascribed sex­
ual characteristics derived from those differences." Kay, Models ofEquality, 1985 U. Iu.. L. 
REV. 39, 78-79. See also Chamallas, Exploring the "Entire Spectrum" of Disparate Treatment 
Under Title VII: Rules Governing Predominately Female jobs, 1984 U. ILL. L. REv. 1 [hereinaf­
ter Chamallas, Spectrum]; Law, Rethinking Sex and the Constitution, 132 U. PA. L. REv. 955, 
965-68, 1008-12 (1984). 
8. The two "types" of one concept is analogous to Professor Dworkin's use of concept 
and conception. R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 134-35 (1977). He differentiates 
between a concept, which is a general principle or idea, and a conception, which is one 
version or specific application of that principle or idea. Professor Chamallas has used 
Dworkin's terminology in describing the two conceptions of equality (equality of opportu­
nity and equality of results) on which the disparate treatment and disparate impact theories 
of discrimination are based. Chamallas, Equality, supra note 7, at 316 n.60. 
9. Because such discrimination does determine something (it determines not only the 
defendant's decision to treat or consider the plaintiff differently, but also the different 
treatment that flows from that decision), "non-determinative discrimination" is an admit­
tedly imprecise term, perhaps an oxymoron. It was chosen over the more accurate term, 
non-outcome-determinative discrimination, for esthetic reasons. 
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is on the result of the challenged decision - the failure to hire or 
to promote, the denial of the apartment, the sale of the house, or 
the discharge from employment. Typically, the plaintiff (P) at­
tempts to prove that the different treatment caused the result, the 
defendant (D) tries to show that the decision was made for nondis­
criminatory reasons, and the factfinder must decide whether law­
ful or unlawful reasons determined the outcome.10 In a non-deter­
minative discrimination claim, P also alleges that D discriminated 
because of race, by treating P differently than if he or she were 
white. However, unlike the outcome-determinative claim, the dif­
ferent treatment did not determine the outcome of the particular 
transaction at issue. Non-determinative discrimination is a sepa­
rate but related theory of discrimination that supplements the 
traditional outcome-determinative claim. 
Because non-determinative discrimination has gone largely 
unrecognized by courts and commentators,11 and because there 
are several versions of these claims, it may be helpful to begin the 
discussion with brief examples. The subsequent sections of this in­
troduction will then summarize the limited recognition of non-de­
terminative discrimination claims provided by current law, the 
problems presented if such claims are adopted, and the general 
limits on the coverage of the laws against discrimination. Sections 
II and III will then turn to a detailed discussion of discriminatory 
outcome and non-determinative discrimination claims. 
C. Examples of Non-Determinative Discrimination 
The following examples illustrate four varieties of non-deter­
minative discrimination claims: (1) initially determinative discrimi­
10. See infra text accompanying notes 66-134 for a more complete treatment of the 
proof and causation issues involved in an outcome-determinative discrimination claim. 
11. Judge Richard Posner, sitting by designation as a district court judge, wrote that 
he had found "less authority on this question than one would expect." Shanley v. Youngs­
town Sheet & Tube, 552 F. Supp. 4, 7 (N.D. Ind. 1982). Professor Larson stated in his 
treatise that these claims presented "[a]n interesting question ••• [which] has received 
little attention from the courts. 3 A. LARSON & L. LARSON, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION § 
70.00, at 13-26 (1984). One aspect of non-determinative discrimination, the mixed motive 
claim, has received some attention. See j. KUSHNER, FAIR HousiNG 81-83 (1983); R. 
SCHWEMM, HOUSING DISCRIMINATION LAW 54-58 {1983); Brodin, The Standard ofCausation in 
the Mixed-Motive Title VII Action: A Social Policy Perspective, 82 CoLUM. L. REV. 292 (1982); 
Mandelker, Combating Housing Discrimination in the 1980's (Book Review), 20 HARV. C.R.­
C.L. L. REV. 537, 540-42 (1985) (reviewing j. KusHNER, FAIR HousiNG (1983)). 
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nation; (2) process discrimination; (3) language discrimination; 
and (4) mixed motive discrimination.12 In each hypothetical, the 
plaintiffs are 25-year old black women seeking employment as 
salespersons with defendant companies, all small computer distrib­
utors in a major metropolitan area. Each plaintiff is denied em­
ployment, and each files a complaint alleging race discrimination. 
Each plaintiff brings and loses, for one reason or another, a claim 
of outcome-determinative discrimination. 
I. Initially Determinative Discrimination. In this type of dis­
crimination, the defendant bases its adverse decision on the race 
of the applicant. However, it later turns out that, even if the de­
fendant had not used race as a criterion, it would not have se­
lected the plaintiff. 
DI has three criteria for selecting its salespeople: race (only 
whites), two years of experience in sales, 13 and the date of applica­
tion.u PI, P2, and P3 all apply and are rejected at the outset be­
cause of their race. PI meets all the requirements except the ra­
cial one. P2 has only one year of sales experience. P3 has three 
years of sales experience but was the twenty-fifth qualified appli­
cant for the three available openings. 
Pl, P2, and P3 were all rejected because of their race. If DI 
had considered their applications in a nondiscriminatory manner, 
PI would have been hired, and she will prevail on her discrimina­
tory outcome claim.111 However, even if DI 's hiring practices were 
race-neutral, P2's application would have been rejected for not 
meeting DI's experience qualification, and P3's would have been 
rejected for being too far down the list.16 P2 and P3 each have a 
12. Each of these varieties of non-determinative discrimination is more fully described 
and analyzed infra Sections III A,B,C, and D, respectively. These four types do not exhaust 
the category of non-determinative discrimination claims. There are others, most notably 
claims of a discriminatory work environment, discussed infra notes 312-14. 
13. The experience requirement could itself be subject to a disparate impact challenge 
on the grounds that it has a disparate impact on blacks. Cf Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 
U.S. 424 (1971). For purposes of this Article, it is assumed that the requirement has no 
such impact. 
14. The date of application criterion refers to sequence. From the applicants who sat­
isfy the first two criteria, D2 makes its selections serially by date of application. 
15. The term "discrimination claim" is a synonym for "outcome-determinative dis­
crimination claim." It will be frequently used in place of the latter phrase because it is 
shorter and provides some relief from the incessant use of the word "determinative." 
16. See Patterson v. Greenwood School Dist. 50, 696 F.2d 293 (4th Cir. 1982); Jordan 
v. Dellway Villa of Tenn. Ltd., 661 F.2d 588, 594 (6th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 
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non-determinative discrimination, but not a discriminatory out­
come, claim. 
2. Process Discrimination. In this type of non-determinative 
discrimination, the defendant does not immediately reject black 
applicants because of race. However, the defendant does treat 
black applicants differently than white applicants in the process or 
processes used to reach its decision. Some black applicants receive 
no personal interview, while others are given a very short inter­
view,17 or one with objectionable questions.18 The process dis­
crimination may or may not determine the outcome of the final 
decision. P4, although treated differently in the process, might 
nevertheless be hired; P5, also treated differently in the process, 
might not be hired because she was not fully qualified. Both P4 
and P5 suffer process discrimination but not outcome-determina­
tive discrimination (although for different reasons). 19 
3. Language Discrimination. If the defendant makes a racist 
remark to a black applicant during the interview,20 the racial 
statement could be used as evidence to establish the plaintiff's dis­
criminatory outcome claim of racial discrimination in the denial of 
the job.21 However, even if she loses th~ outcome claim, she may 
still present the discriminatory statement as an unlawful act in and 
of itself, a separate type of non-determinative discrimination. 
4. Mixed Motive Discrimination. This type of non-determina­
tive discrimination addresses the situation where a defendant has 
1008 (1982). 
17. See Ostroffv. Employment Exch., Inc., 683 F.2d 302 (9th Cir. 1982) (per curiam). 
18. See Robinson v. 12 Lofts Realty, Inc., 610 F.2d 1032, 1041 (2d Cir. 1979). 
19. Process discrimination can also cause discriminatory outcomes. For example, fail­
ure to grant a plaintiff an interview might deprive a defendant of information about that 
plaintiff's background which, if known, would have led to a job offer. 
20. See, e.g., Bailey v. Binyon, 583 F. Supp. 923 (N.D. Ill. 1984) (owner tells black 
employee, "You're not a human being; you're a nigger," and "[A]II you niggers are 
alike."); Ledsinger v. Burmeister, 114 Mich. App. 12, 318 N.W.2d 558 (1982) (in public 
accommodations case, store owner tells black couple, "[I don't] want or need nigger 
business."). 
21. See, e.g., Miles v. M.N.C. Corp., 750 F.2d 867, 873 (11th Cir. 1985) (racial slur); 
Torres v. County of Oakland, 758 F.2d 147, 152 (6th Cir. 1985) (derogatory language); 
Krodel v. Young, 748 F.2d 701, 710 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (age-based comment), cert. denied, 
106 S. Ct. 62 (1985). The general point was put nicely by Judge Coffin: "[W]here there is 
smoke, there is fire." Manego v. Cape Cod Five Cents Savings Bank, 692 F.2d 174, 177 
(1st Cir. 1982). In Mpnego, however, the court affirmed the granting of summary judgment 
for the defendant, saying that "the district judge invited the plaintiff to lead him to at least 
some glowing embers and plaintiff failed to do so." Id. at 177. 
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two or more reasons for its decision, at least one of which is lawful 
and one of which is racially discriminatory. Company D2, in re­
jecting the application of P6, writes to her:22 "You don't have the 
necessary two years experience; you are twenty-fifth on the list; 
and, besides, we already have too many black salespeople and so 
we wouldn't have hired you anyway."23 There are both outcome­
determinative and non-outcome determinative mixed motive 
claims. The racial reason in the outcome-determinative claim is a 
determinative factor in the decision/'" In the non-determinative 
mixed motive claim, race plays some role but is not a determina­
tive factor. 02 adversely considers P6's race in evaluating the ap­
plication, but makes the decision on the basis of independent, law­
ful reasons. 
D. Current Doctrine and the Underenforcement Problem 
Current doctrine addresses the conduct identified in the pre­
ceding examples of non-determinative discrimination only in out­
come-determinative discrimination terms. Following the sugges­
tions in several Supreme Court opinions presenting outcome­
determinative claims,211 most courts have adopted a "same deci­
sion" standard of liability that could be construed as rejecting the 
theory of non-determinative discrimination: "If . . . an employer 
discriminates . . . but the complainant would not have been hired 
even if he or she had been a member of the opposite [race] a COII.l­
plainant has not proved a case of discrimination. " 28 
Using traditional but-for causation, this standard finds Iiabil­
22. In Mt. Healthy Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 283 n.1 (1977) the unlawful 
reason was stated in writing. As discussed infra text accompanying notes Section III D, 
there are covert mixed motive cases, as well as the explicit type used in the introductory 
example. 
23. See Rogers v. EEOC, 551 F.2d 456 (D.C. Cir. 1977). 
24. The meaning and application of the term "determinative factor" are discussed 
supra Section II B. 
25. Givhan v. Western Line Consol. School Dist., 439 U.S. 410, 416-17 (1979); Mt. 
Healthy Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 285 (1977); Village of Arlington Heights v. 
Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265-66, 270-71 n.21 (1977). These cases 
have often been misread and applied with insufficient sensitivity to their language and rea­
soning. A careful reading shows that the Court's "same decision" test distinguishes be­
tween determinative and non-determinative discrimination claims, precluding only the 
former. 
26. Smith College v. Massachusetts Comm'n Against Discrimination, 376 Mass. 221, 
227 n.S, 380 N.E.2d 121, 125 n.S (1978). 
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ity only if the racial discrimination was the determinative or but­
for cause of the final decision. If the outcome of the decision 
would have been the same even if the defendant had complied 
with the law and not discriminated against the plaintiff, courts 
find no discrimination. Under a strict version of this standard,27 
only outcome-determinative discrimination is unlawful; non-deter­
minative discrimination is not prohibited by the laws against 
discrimination. 
Some courts and commentators have criticized the same deci­
sion standard and the use of but-for causation, noting that: 
"[R]ace is an impermissible factor ... it cannot be brushed aside 
because it was neither the sole reason for discrimination nor the 
total factor of discrimination. We find no acceptable place in the 
law for partial racial discrimination."28 This observation that par­
tial discrimination is still discrimination contains an important 
truth but ignores an equally observant counterpoint that partial 
discrimination is not the same as total discrimination. The theory 
of non-determinative discrimination presented in this Article is an 
attempt to incorporate the truths of the contending positions, ad­
dressing the shortcomings of the same decision and but-for stan­
dards while also retaining their strengths. Derived from the lan­
guage of the statutes themselves,29 insights from fair housing and 
public accommodation litigation, 30 and from decisions in discrimi­
27. Applying the "same decision" test, in its strongest form, is not the only method 
courts have used to deny liability to plaintiffs who fail to prove that the decision would 
have been different had the defendant complied with the law. Instead, courts have some· 
times found liability and then used the test at the remedy stage to assure that plaintiffs do 
not receive relief that would place them in a better position than they would have occupied 
had there been no discrimination. See, e.g., Day v. Matthews, 530 F.2d 1083 (D.C. Cir. 
1976) (per curiam) (retroactive promotion and back pay may be awarded to an employee 
only where an employee would have received promotion had he not been victim of 
discrimination). 
28. Smith v. Sol D. Adler Realty Co., 436 F.2d 344, 349-50 (7th Cir. 1970) (emphasis 
in original). See also United States v. Hayes Int'l Corp., 6 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 
1328, 1330 (N.D. Ala. 1973) ("If any element of racial discrimination or retaliation or 
reprisal played any part in a challenged action, no matter how remote or slight or tangen­
tial, the Court would hold that the challenged action was in violation of . . . the law 
..••"), aff'd, 507 F.2d 1279 (5th Cir. 1975) (mem.). For a recent example, see, e.g., Bibbs 
v. Block, 749 F.2d 508 (8th Cir. 1984). The criticism of current doctrine is presented more 
fully supra Section II B. 
29. See infra note 35. 
30. See infra Section III B & C. 
95 1986] NON-DETERMINATIVE DISCRIMINATION 
natory work environment31 and procedural due process cases, 32 
this theory recognizes and protects the right to be free from race­
based discrimination. It matches that right with a remedy appro­
priately attuned to the precise violation and the particular injury. 
The fundamental flaw of the same decision standard, if 
strictly applied to exclude non-determinative discrimination 
claims, is its limited range and narrowing effect. By unnecessarily 
and impermissibly limiting the scope of inquiry to discriminatory 
outcome claims, it ignores the processes which underlie the result 
and tolerates many practices which clearly are, and properly 
should be, forbidden by law. Additionally, the same decision stan­
dard defines too narrowly the private and societal interests in 
prohibiting discrimination, and the types of injuries inflicted by 
such wrongs. While job applicants surely are most interested in 
obtaining the jobs for which they apply, they also want to be con­
sidered "worthy of respect" 33 and recognition as persons. When 
denied that treatment, the injury is not only the loss of an equal 
opportunity. It is also the loss of an individual's dignity, self-re­
spect and confidence, and an affront to the collective commitment 
to a nondiscriminatory society. Denial of the non-determinative 
discrimination theory, and recognition of only discriminatory out­
come claims, "underenforces"34 the laws against discrimination 
and the goals they are intended to serve. By providing a vocabu­
lary to discuss this type of discrimination, and by specifying its va­
rieties and characteristics, this Article seeks the recognition and 
appropriate enforcement of non-determinative discrimination 
claims. 
E. Non-Determinative Discrimination and the Overenforcement 
Problem 
While the theory of non-determinative discrimination can re­
solve the underenforcement problem inherent in current doc­
trine, its recognition will create a problem of its own, a problem 
of overenforcement. Discriminatory outcome claims are restricted 
31. See infra Section III B. 
32. See Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247 (1978), discussed infra Sections III A & D. 
33. Karst, Foreword: Equal Citizenship Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 91 HARV. L. REv. 
1, 6 (1977). 
34. Cf. Sagar, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced Constitutional Norms, 91 
HARV. L. REV. 1212 (1978). 
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to complaints about the outcome of decisions, but non-determina­
tive discrimination claims have no such limitation. Lacking the 
constraint of the outcome-determinative standard, the theory of 
non-determinative discrimination potentially reaches and invali­
dates all race-based different treatment. However, the coverage of 
the laws against discrimination is limited, and an unlimited appli­
cation of the theory would "overenforce" the laws by regulating 
conduct that the statutes did not intend to reach. 
The resolution of the overenforcement problem requires an 
assessment of those non-determinative discrimination claims that 
are encompassed by the statutes and therefore should be en­
forced, and those that are not. This assessment in turn requires a 
more general determination of the scope of coverage of the laws 
against discrimination. 
F. The Metaphor of the Inner Boundary of the Laws Against 
Discrimination 
The determination of the scope of coverage of the statutes 
defines a boundary, a place where the prohibition against discrimi­
nation ends and permission to discriminate begins. Within the 
boundary established by the laws, race-based different treatment is 
unlawful. Outside that boundary, legal challenges fail, not because 
the discrimination was not proven at trial but because the proven 
discrimination was not proscribed by the law. The demarcation of 
the boundary thus requires an understanding not only of the laws 
against discrimination and their underlying purposes but of the 
competing social policies which limit the scope of those laws and 
their prohibition against race-based different treatment. 
The coverage of the laws against discrimination, as estab­
lished by text, case law and consideration of their underlying pur­
poses, is broad. In addition to prohibiting outcome-determinative 
discrimination, such as refusing to hire or to rent to a black per­
son, the laws typically make it unlawful "otherwise to discriminate 
. . with respect to . . . terms, conditions, or privileges . " 811 
35. Title VII makes it unlawful for an employer: 
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to dis­
criminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, condi­
tions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, reli­
gion, sex, or national origin; or 
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in 
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The statutory purposes are also broad-eradication of discrimina­
tion, deterrence of future discrimination, and compensation for 
the victims of discrimination.36 The antidiscrimination principle 
which underlies these laws has a similarly broad 
reach-"guard[ing] against certain defects in the process by which 
race-dependent decisions are made and also against certain harm­
ful results of race-dependent decisions. " 37 
These broad statutory prohibitions are supported by two 
types of justifications: intrinsic and instrumental.38 The intrinsic 
justification is a moral one-we support laws against discrimina­
tion because we believe that they are right and that discrimination 
any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment 
opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of 
such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. 
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1982). 
Title VIII makes it unlawful: 
(a) To refuse to sell or rent after the making of a bona fide offer, or to refuse to 
negotiate for the sale or rental of, or otherwise make unavailable or deny, a 
dwelling to any person because of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. 
(b) To discriminate against any person in the terms, conditions, or privileges of 
sale or rental of a dwelling, or in the provisions of services or facilities in con­
nection therewith, because of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. 
(c) To make, print, or publish, or cause to be made, printed, or published any 
notice, statement, or advertisement, with respect to the sale or rental of a dwell­
ing that indicates any preference, limitation, or discrimination based on race, 
color, religion, sex, or national origin, or an intention to make any such prefer­
ence, limitation, or discrimination. 
(d) To represent to any person because of race, color, religion, sex, or national 
origin that any dwelling is not available for inspection, sale, or rental when such 
dwelling is in fact so available. 
42 u.s.c. § 3604 (1977). 

State statutes are similarly broad. See, e.g., MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 37.2202, 37.2502 

(West 1985); N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 296 (McKinney 1982 & Supp. 1986). 

36. See Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405,417-18 (1975) (Title VII); Sulli­
van v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229, 238-40 (1969) (public accommodation law); 
Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 414 n.l4 (1968) (§ 1982). In one sense, these 
statements of purpose are little more than restatements of the fact that the laws against 
discrimination prohibit discrimination. They describe the purposes that the enacted laws 
serve, i.e., eradication, deterrence and compensation; they do not tell us the reasons why 
the laws were passed. These underlying reasons are discussed infra notes 39-61 and accom­
panying text. 
37. Brest, Foreword, supra note 6, at 6 (emphasis in original). The term "race-depen­
dent" refers to "decisions and conduct ... that would have been different but for the race 
of those benefited or disadvantaged by them." !d. 
38. CJ. Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 104 S. Ct. 3244, 3249 (1985) ("intrinsic and 
instrumental features of constitutionally protected association .•.."). 
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is wrong.39 The instrumental justifications, on the other hand, are 
essentially utilitarian:40 we support laws against discrimination be­
cause it is in our interest to do so. By prohibiting discrimination, 
these laws are said to enhance economic efficiency,41 to foster de­
sired social and economic change42 and to legitimize the social and 
39. Supported by any number of moral theories, this intrinsic justification is based on 
a belief that adverse treatment of a person on the basis of certain characteristics offends 
our sense of human dignity and is wrong, whether or not it leads to the undesirable results 
addressed by the instrumental theories. See, e.g., R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 
273 (1977) ("equal concern and respect"); j. RAWLS, A THEORY OF jUSTICE 60·67, 83·90 
(1971) (fair equality of opportunity is second principle of justice); M. WALZER, SPHERES OF 
JusncE: A DEFENSE OF PLURALISM AND EQUALITY 149, 151 (1983). See also Clarke v. Board 
of Educ., 215 Neb. 250, 260, 338 N.W.2d 272, 277 (1983) ("Laws against discrimination 
have as their very foundation the notion that it is immoral to racially discriminate against 
another human, either by deed or by word."). 
40. The reference is to a weak form of utilitarianism, and particularly to that branch 
which is closer perhaps to welfare economics than philosophy. See Posner, Utilitarianism, 
Economics and Legal Theory, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 103 (1979). In its stronger form, the difficulty 
of making interpersonal comparisons of utility disables utilitarianism from resolving many 
discrimination problems, because the bigot's pleasure in discriminating and the victim's 
displeasure in being discriminated against both register equally on the strong-form utilita· 
rian's scale. Williams, A Critique of Utilitarianism, in j. SMART & B. WILLIAMS, UTILITARIAN· 
ISM: FOR AND AGAINST 105-06 (1973). But seeR. BRANDT, A THEORY OF THE Goon AND THE 
RIGHT 257-65 (1979) (interpersonal utility comparisons are possible). See generally D. LYONS, 
FORMS AND LIMITS OF UTILITARIANISM (1967). 
41. This justification is based on the belief that discrimination is economically ineffi­
cient and that prohibiting discrimination will enhance economic efficiency. "[Discrimina· 
tion] ... denies society the benefits of wide participation in political, economic and cul­
tural life." Roberts v. United States Jaycees, I 04 S. Ct. 3244, 3253 (1984). Discrimination 
excludes dollars from the housing, consumer, and credit markets, and skills from the labor 
market. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 443 (1968) (Congress intended to 
"assure that a dollar in the hands of a Negro will purchase the same thing as a dollar in the 
hands of a white man.''); Fiss, Theory, supra note 6, at 241. Professor Milton Friedman has 
argued against this economic purpose as a justification for the laws, claiming that, to the 
extent discrimination is inefficient, the discipline of the market will itself eliminate such 
discrimination. M. FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 109-10 (1962). However, the 
deeply-imbedded nature of discrimination, Bergmann & Darity, Social Relations, Productivity 
and Employer Discrimination, 104 MoNTHLY LAB. REv. 47 (1981), and the lack of competition 
in many labor markets, R. DOERINGER & M. PIERRE, INTERNAL LABOR MARKETS AND MAN• 
POWER ANALYSIS (1971) (dual labor markets with white males in one, minorities and women 
in the other); R. POSNER, EcoNOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 525-28 (2d ed. 1977); Deckard & 
Sherman, Monopoly PGWer and Sex Discrimination, 4 PoL. & Soc'y 475 (1978) have prevented 
the competitive processes from cleansing the market of this imperfection and therefore 
legal intervention is required. See generally G. BECKER, THE EcoNOMICS OF DISCRIMINATION 
(2d ed. 1971). 
42. The legislative history and major judicial decisions regularly reaffirm the reformist 
goal. Under this justification, the employment Jaws would improve the economic status of 
blacks. See, e.g., United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 202 (1979), reh'g denied, 444 
U.S. 889 (1979) ("Congress' primary concern ... was with 'the plight of the Negro in our 
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economic system. "3 
Although broad, these instrumental and intrinsic justifications 
do not necessarily imply, and the statutes do not require, the pro-
economy.'" 110 CONG. REc. 6548 (1964) (statement of Sen. Humphrey)). The housing laws 
would replace the residential segregation that has created "two societies, one white and 
one black- separate and unequal ...."U.S. RIOT COMM., REPORT OF THE NATIONAL AD­
VISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS 1 (1968), with "truly integrated and balanced living 
patterns.'' 114 CoNG. REc. 3422 (1968) (statement of Sen. Mondale), cited with apprwal in 
Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 211 (1972). See generally G. MYR­
DAL, AN AMERICAN DILEMMA: THE NEGRO PROBLEM AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 24 (1944) (if 
civil and political rights of formal democracy are respected, "there would no longer be a 
Negro problem.'' (emphasis in original)); M. SovERN, supra note 1, at 15, 141-42; Blum­
rosen, The Duty of Fair Recruitment Under the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 22 RUTGERS L. REv. 
465, 466 (1968); Fiss, Theory, supra note 6, at 244. 
This reformist goal, and its accompanying conception of an equality of results, rests in 
uneasy alliance with the first instrumental goal of economic efficiency and the equality of 
opportunity it represents. Early critics expressed the view that laws against discrimination 
themselves would not necessarily reduce social and economic inequalities. See, e.g., Winter, 
Imprwing the Economic Status ofNegroes Through Laws Against Discrimination: A Reply to Pro­
fessor Swern, 34 U. CHI. L. REv. 817 (1967). See also R DORN, RuLES AND RACIAL EQuALITY 
9-10 (1979) ("The only thing that follows from the fact that blacks and whites have equal 
rights is that blacks and whites have equal rights. Nothing follows about ... the distribu­
tion of other goods .... (T]hese rules (of suffrage and equal opportunity) actually serve 
to perpetuate substantive inequality between the races."). CJ. Goering, Race, Housing, and 
Public Policies: A Strategy for Social Science Research, 17 URB. AFF. Q. 463, 466 (1982) ("Con­
gress anticipated that the abolition of racially discriminatory housing practice would ulti­
mately result in residential integration and did not consider which of the two goals should 
be given priority in the event a conflict emerged between them.''). The continuing massive 
social and economic inequality suggests that these skeptical views have been vindicated. See, 
e.g., j. KAIN & j. QUIGLEY, HOUSING MARKETS AND RACIAL DISCRIMINATION: A 
MICROECONOMIC ANALYSIS (1975); M. REICH, RACIAL INEQUALITY: A POLITICAL-EcoNOMIC 
ANALYSIS 109-11 (1981); Oliver & Glick, An Analysis of the New Orthodoxy on Black Mobility, 
29 Soc. PROBS. 511 (1982). But see Freeman, Public Policy and Employment Discrimination in 
the U.S. (NBER Working Paper #928 1982). Other commentators have doubted the very 
compatibility of the reformist vision with the antidiscrimination principle. Brest, Foreword, 
supra note 6, at 2, 5; Chamallas, Equality, supra note 7, at 317-18; Fiss, Groups, supra note 
4, at 135-36. These doubts and subsequent tensions persist, and are reflected in the ongo­
ing debates over the necessity and desirability of the disparate-impact theory and affirma­
tive action programs. 
43. This third instrumental justification is more cynical, but no less real. Laws against 
discrimination provide formal, symbolic assurance that American society is free and open 
and thus serve a legitimizing or "safety valve" purpose. See Freeman, Legitimizing Racial 
Discrimination Through Antidiscrimination Law: A Critical Review ofSupreme Court Doctrine, 62 
MINN. L. REV. 1049 (1978); Lawrence, "justice" or "just Us": Racism and the Role of Ideology 
(Book Review), 35 STAN. L. REv. 831, 841 (1983) (reviewing D. KIRP, juST SCHooLS: THE 
IDEA OF RACIAL EQUALITY IN AMERICAN EDUCATION (1982)). See also Auerbach, The 1967 
Amendments to the 1967 Minnesota State Act Against Discrimination and the Uniform Law Com­
missioners' Model Anti-Discrimination Act: A Comparative Analysis and Evaluation, 52 MINN. L. 
REV. 231, 231 (1967) (goal of anti-discrimination laws is "to lessen danger that tragic racial 
violence ... will recur.''). 
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hibition of all discrimination. Other conflicting social values, such 
as support for the expression of personal autonomy"" and concern 
over the various types of costs associated with these laws, 411 have 
influenced their enactment and interpretation. Thus, the statu­
tory prohibition against discrimination is not universal; the laws 
exempt certain areas from coverage.46 Within those areas, the 
laws regulate only discriminatory conduct and not discriminatory 
thoughts,47 and recognize certain affirmative defenses to discrimi­
natory conduct. 
The statutes accommodate the tension between the antidis­
crimination principle and other values by limiting the respective 
domain of each principle and keeping the conflicting values apart, 
44. Personal autonomy is regarded as a social value, both because the cultivation of 
individual freedom tends to maximize social welfare, see, e.g., A SEN, CoLLECTIVE CHOICE 
AND SOCIAL WELFARE 128-30 (1970), and because it is a moral value in and of itself. R. 
NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE AND UTOPIA 50-51 (1974). 
45. Aside from the possible efficiency losses caused by implementation of prohibition 
itself, there are two other types of costs: insurance and enforcement. Insurance costs are 
the price of those extra efforts that a defendant will take to protect itself from potential 
liability. Fiss, Theory, supra note 6, at 235. See also Easterbrook, The Supreme Court, 1983 
Term - Foreword: The Court and the Economic System, 98 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1984) (emphasizing 
ex ante effect of liability rules). As an example of reasonable insurance cost, defendant 
might engage in increased training and supervision of its employees to assure that they do 
not discriminate. On the other hand, in what would be viewed as an excessive cost, a de· 
fendant might hire every black applicant, whether qualified or not, in order to avoid litiga­
tion and possible liability. Enforcement costs are the transaction costs of administering the 
Jaws. They consist of privately paid litigation costs and the budgets of state and federal 
enforcement agencies and courts. Fiss, Theory, supra note 6, at 255-56. 
46. For example, the Jaws generally do not regulate what are considered private deci­
sions, such as the choice of a marriage partner or a dinner guest. See Moose Lodge No. I 07 
v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 180 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting) ("Government may not tell a 
man or woman who his or her associates must be."). The laws regulate the area of conduct 
and decision-making that Professor Walzer has called the "sphere of office," M. WALZER, 
supra note 39, at 129-64, where the public interest is heightened and the privacy interest is 
correspondingly reduced. 
47. "[T]he attitude of prejudice, or at least the practice of discrimination can be sub­
stantially reduced by authoritative order.'' M. BERGER, EQUALITY BY STATUTE: LEGAL CON• 
TROLS OVER GROUP DISCRIMINATION 175-76 (1952) (quoting S. SCHWARTZ, THE jEWS IN THE 
SOVIET UNION (1951)). The term discrimination refers to action and conduct, and is thus 
distinguished from the term prejudice, which refers to belief and feeling. G. ALLPORT, THE 
NATURE OF PREJUDICE (1954); j. GREENBERG, RACE RELATIONS AND AMERICAN LAW 2-4, 26-28 
(1959); WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 648, 1788 (1976). See 110 CONG. 
REC. 7253-57 (1964) (statements of Senators Ervin and Case on whether the 1964 Civil 
Rights Act will penalize thoughts or deeds). Cj. A. HIGGINBOTHAM, IN THE MATTER OF 
COLOR: RACE AND THE AMERICAN LEGAL PROCESS-THE COLONIAL PERIOD 32 (1978) (Early 
segregation laws were a codification of prejudice granting "legal force to social bias."), 
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each dominant within its own domain, dormant without.48 The 
primary statutory technique used to achieve these accommoda­
tions is the adjustment of the scope of coverage through excep­
tions, exemptions or other specific limitations. For example, Title 
VIII, the federal Fair Housing Act,49 prohibits discrimination in 
the rental of housing, but exempts certain small landlords from 
110coverage. Within the area specified by the exemption, "Mrs. 
Murphy" can express herself by indulging her racist tastes,111 if 
any, and societal support for her freedom to discriminate trumps 
the conflicting personal and societal interests in prohibiting dis­
crimination.112 However, the statute also limits her autonomy. She 
must refrain from discriminating if she purchases a larger build­
ing or otherwise loses the exemption.113 
48. For a discussion of the method of accommodation in constitutional law, see D. 
BELL, RACE, supra note 6, § 7.11; Bell, Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest-Conver­
gence Dilemma, 93 HARV. L. REv. 518 (1980). Professor Bell has developed an insight, 
"rely[ing] as much on political history as legal precedent and emphasiz[ing] the world as it 
is rather than as we might like it to be," D. BELL, RAcE, supra note 6, at 443, which is 
applicable as well to the accommodation reflected in the statutes: the law will express a 
"preference for white interests over black rights when the two converge ...." I d. 
49. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619 (1977 & Supp. 1985). 
50. The statute exempts from coverage an owner-occupied building intended to be 
occupied by no more than four families. Id. § 3603(b)(2). 
51. One aspect of personal autonomy is the development and expression of personal 
preferences, which can include the preference for associating with persons of one's own 
race. See, e.g., Wechsler, Towards Neutral Principles ofConstitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REv. l, 
34 (1959). This preference has been described by Professor Becker as a taste, like any 
other consumer or personal taste, and the person with such discriminatory tastes will "pay 
something . • . to be associated with some persons instead of others." G. BECKER, supra 
note 41, at 14. See also A DowNs, OPENING UP THE SuBURBS (1973); Arrow, The Theory of 
Discrimination, in DISCRIMINATION IN LABOR MARKETS (0. Ashenfelter & A. Rees eds. 1973). 
52. This indulgence is extended only by the particular statute under discussion. See 42 
U.S.C. §§ 3601, 3603(b) (1982). Mrs. Murphy's discrimination would violate another an­
tidiscrimination law, the Civil Rights Act of 1866,42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1982), which does not 
explicitly exempt any private property transaction from coverage. Section 1982 is a statute 
that resolves the conflict by strongly valuing the prohibition against discrimination. The 
limits of this law, if any, must be found in a constitutionally based argument. See Roberts v. 
United States Jaycees, 104 S. Ct. 3244, 3249-51 (1984); Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 
172 n.IO (1976). 
53. The Fair Housing Act has other exemptions. Section 3603(b)(l) exempts from 
coverage any single-family house sold or rented by an owner, 42 U.S.C. § 3603(b)(l) 
(1982), and then limits the exemption with three conditions: (I) that non-owner occupied 
sales are limited to one every two years; (2) that the owner not own more than three single­
family homes at one time; and (3) that the sales be conducted without using brokers or 
advertising. Id. This exemption nicely depicts the accommodation of competing values. 
The autonomy interest in one's home is strong, and, hence, protected with an exemption. 
However, if one does not live in the home (nonowner-occupied), the autonomy interest is 
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All modern laws against discrimination have such exemptions. 
Only employers of a certain size are bound by the prohibition; 
smaller firms or individuals can discriminate with impunity .114 Reli­
gious preferences are recognized and, within a specific domain, 
honored.1511 The public accomodation laws forbid discrimination 
only in public, not private, places.118 
The statutes also reflect a sensitivity to the costs of both the 
prohibition against discrimination and the enforcement of these 
laws. Some costs are accepted as the price of the prohibition. For 
example, companies seeking to hire computer programmers and 
also to minimize personnel screening costs might argue that the 
small number of blacks in the high-technology field makes it more 
efficient to consider only white applicants.117 The transaction costs 
of processing the applications of black applicants, their argument 
goes, exceed the possible productivity gains derived f:t;"om selecting 
its employees from a larger pool.118 Although discrimination in this 
thereby reduced, and the exemption is accordingly qualified. For the person who owns 
several homes at the same time, the interest in their sale or rental begins to look more like 
a business decision than an expression of personal autonomy. The exemption is thus 
capped at three homes. 
54. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1982) (fifteen employees makes person an em· 
ployer under Title VII) with 29 U.S.C. § 630(b) (1982) (twenty-five employees for coverage 
under ADEA), and, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 151B, § 1(5) (West 1982) (six employees 
for coverage under Mass. anti-discrimination laws). 
55. Title :VIII permits religious organizations to exercise their religious-discriminatory 
preference for renting non-commercial dwellings to persons of the same religion. 42 
U.S.C. § 3607 (1982). Title VII has two religious exemptions. The first states broadly that 
the law "shall not apply .•. to a religious [organization] with respect to the employment 
of individuals of a particular religion to perform work connected with the carrying on by 
such [organization) of its activities." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1 (1982). The second provision 
permits a religious school "to hire and employ employees of a particular religion." /d. § 
2000e-2(e)(2). 
56. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (1982); MINN. STAT.§ 363.03, subd. 3(1) (1982). The 
public accommodation laws in Minnesota and other states have been construed to prohibit 
the membership practices of an organization that accepts all men as members but excludes 
women. See Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 104 S. Ct. 3244, 3248 (1984). See also 42 
U.S.C. § 3607 (1982) (Title VIII permits private clubs to rent only to members (who may 
be discriminatorily chosen)). See generally D. BELL, RACE, supra note 6, at 104-24. 
57. See generally WOMEN AND MINORmES IN HIGH TECHNOLOGY: HEARINGS BEFORE THE 
UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS (1982); S. SCHNEIDER, THE AVAILABILITY OF 
MINORmES AND WOMEN FOR PROFESSIONAL AND MANAGERIAL POSITIONS 1970-1985 15-75, 
163-200 (1977). 
58. This example is a variation on "information cost" or "statistical" discrimination. 
L. THUROW, GENERATING INEQUALITY: MECHANISMS OF DISTRIBUTION IN THE U.S. ECONOMY 
170-207 (1975); Phelps, The Statistical Theory of Racism and Sexism, 62 AM. EcoN. REV. 659 
(1972). 
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circumstance may arguably be efficient, it is nevertheless prohib­
ited. The legislatures have not provided an exception, and the 
courts have not created one.119 However, when the prohibition of 
discrimination exacts large economic costs, nearly to the point of 
making an enterprise impossible, the prohibition against discrimi­
nation often yields. Most laws provide that if the discriminatory 
criterion is shown to be a bona fide occupational qualification rea­
sonably necessary to the operation of the business, such discrimi­
nation will be permitted.60 This exception reflects the judgment 
that in certain "narrow" circumstances,61 the interest in efficiency 
prevails over the commitment to prohibiting discrimination. 
The exceptions and limitations discussed thus far accommo­
date policy concerns that are extrinsic to and in conflict with the 
purposes that underlie the prohibition against discrimination. 
There is also, however, another type of limitation, created for a 
different set of reasons. Affirmative action programs generally in­
volve some level of race-based different treatment. As an example, 
employers may be permitted or required62 to grant hiring or pro­
motion preferences to black persons because of their race.68 Af­
firmative action programs may be viewed as another type of ex­
59. See 29 C.F.R. § 860.103(h) (1985) ("[A] general assertion that the average cost of 
employing older workers is higher •.. will not be recognized as a [defense]."). Indeed, this 
example presents precisely the type of situation where it would be said that we need the 
laws against discrimination. See Brest, Foreword, supra note 6, at 10-11; Fiss, Theory, supra 
note 6, at 257-63. 
60. Title VII 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (1982) (no violation "where religion, sex, or na­
tional origin is a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal 
operation of that particular business or enterprise ..•."); 29 U.S.C. § 623(£)(1) (1982) 
(ADEA) (not unlawful "where age is a bona fide occupational qualification."). Although it 
exists under some state statutes, see, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 151B, § 4(1) (West 
1982); N.Y. EXEC. LAw§ 296 (McKinney 1982), there is no bona fide occupational qualifica­
tion defense for racial discrimination under Title VII. Knight v. Nassau County Civil Serv. 
Comm'n, 649 F.2d 157 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 818 (1981). But see Miller v. Texas 
State Bd. of Barbers, 615 F.2d 650, 653-54 (5th Cir.) ("business necessity doctrine" justifies 
assigning black undercover agent to investigate "all black barber shop"), cert. denied, 449 
u.s. 891 (1980). 
61. Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 334 (1977). 
62. See, e.g., Firefighters Institute for Racial Equality v. St. Louis, 616 F.2d 350, 364 
(8th Cir. 1980) (affirmative action plan required: eight blacks to be immediately promoted, 
one black for each two whites thereafter). 
63. See, e.g., United States Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO-CLC v. Weber, 443 
U.S. 193 (1979) (employer permitted to implement affirmative action plan mandating that 
50% of the openings in an in-plant craft training program be awarded to black employees 
until racial parity with the local labor force acheived). 
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ception to the general prohibition against race-based different 
treatment. 
To capture the differences between these two types of limita­
tions, I suggest the term inner boundary as ~ metaphor to de­
scribe the traditional exceptions and limitations, where the com­
mitment to prohibiting discrimination yields to other social values, 
such as respect for the autonomy of the discriminator or concern 
about the costs or enforceability of the laws. The term outer 
boundary is used to describe the affirmative action cases, where 
some race-based different treatment is permitted for policies and 
concerns similar to those that in part led to the initial passage of 
the laws against discrimination, namely, a desire to improve the 
social and economic conditions of black Americans. 64 
In drawing the line between the non-determinative discrimi­
nation claims that are recognized and those that are rejected, the 
challenge is to establish an inner boundary that neither under­
enforces nor overenforces the prohibition of the laws against dis­
crimination. The language of the statutes broadly proscribes dis­
crimination, and no limitations, exemptions or policies justify a 
general refusal to recognize non-determinative discrimination. 
While there will be certain language discrimination and mixed 
motive cases where the particular discriminatory act is outside the 
boundary line of the statute in question, such cases are the excep­
tions to the general rule. The theory of non-determinative dis­
crimination attempts to locate the inner boundary and classify 
prohibited and permissible discriminatory conduct in a way that 
more accurately represents the language and purposes of the laws 
against discrimination. 
Before more fully describing and evaluating the various non­
determinative discrimination claims, this Article first presents, in 
Section II, the factfinding procedures and legal standards that 
govern the liability and remedy stages of discriminatory outcome 
claims. Those procedures and standards are then applied, in Sec­
tion III, to the four varieties of non-determinative discrimination 
claims. The comparison of the two types of claims reveals that 
many of the factfinding and remedial issues present in non-deter­
minative discrimination claims also attend discriminatory outcome 
claims, and· that the techniques developed to resolve these 
64. These reformist goals are discussed supra note 42. 
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problems can be applied to both types of cases. 
II. THE DISCRIMINATORY OUTCOME CLAIM 
Complaints of unlawful discrimination can raise discrimina­
tory outcome or non-determinative discrimination claims sepa­
rately, or can present both types of claims in the same case.65 In 
many situations, it will be impossible to determine which theory is 
more applicable until the facts are fully developed. The presenta­
tion and analysis of most cases will be enhanced by the comple­
mentary use of both theories, for this will permit an evaluation of 
the case that is comprehensive and sensitive to the allegations and 
proof of discrimination in a particular record. 
In order to appreciate the similarities, differences and com­
plementary nature of discriminatory outcome and non-determina­
tive discrimination claims, it is necessary to understand certain as­
pects of the liability and remedy phases of a single-plaintiff, 
disparate treatment case that play an important role in both types 
of claims. The vehicle for the initial discussion of these issues will 
be a discriminatory outcome claim. The specific hypothetical for 
discussion is a variation on the examples used in Section I. P, a 
black woman, applies for a job as a computer salesperson at D 
company. She is a college graduate, with two years of experience 
in the sale of office systems to small businesses in the area, but no 
computer sales experience. She does not get the job, and is told by 
the sales manager that she did not have sufficient experience. She 
65. The term "claim" is used throughout this Article in a shorthand, informal manner 
to mean a legal theory that can support relief on a given set of facts. The reference in this 
Article is not to the formal usage of "claim" as a legal term of art. See FED. R Civ. P. 8(a), 
10(b), Appendix of Forms, Form 10; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 24 (1982). 
Indeed, discriminatory outcome and non-determinative discrimination "claims" will usually 
constitute one legal claim for pleading, preclusion, and other purposes. They will generally 
involve "rights of the plaintiff to remedies against the defendant with respect to all or any 
part of the transaction, or series of connected transactions, out of which the action arose.'' 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 25 (1982). The two approaches provide supple­
mental or alternative theories of recovery for the same claim. As such, they may be 
pleaded separately, FED. R. Civ. P. 8(e)(2), Appendix of Forms, Form 10, with relief sought 
in the alternative, depending on which theory prevails. FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(3). Because they 
are legal theories and not facts, it may not be necessary to plead or to mention the separate 
approaches of dicriminatory outcome and non-determinative discrimination, see 5 C. 
WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1219 (1969), although it will 
usually be wise to do so. See infra Section II A. The relationship of the two theories to the 
various aspects of a lawsuit is developed infra Sections II A and III. 
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is disappointed but willing to accept the rejection, until she learns 
that the successful applicant is even less experienced than she is. 
She decides to file a case of race discrimination against D. She 
presents a discriminatory outcome claim, alleging that D did not 
hire her because of her race. In this case, the right involved is the 
right to be free of unlawful discrimination in the final decision 
made by the defendant. The correlative duty is the obligation not 
to discriminate in making that final decision. The injury alleged is 
the loss of the desired outcome-the denial of the job. The focus 
of her discriminatory outcome claim is, by definition, on the final 
decision. 
A. Methodology ofProof 
In order to establish liability in an individual disparate treat­
ment case,68 the plaintiff must prove that she was treated differ­
ently from other persons,87 and that the reason for the different 
treatment was her race.88 The plaintiff can carry her heavy bur­
den of persuading the factfinder89 that "she has been the victim of 
66. Disparate treatment claims can also be brought as class actions or pattern-or-prac­
tice claims. International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977). See 
generally C. SULUVAN, M. ZIMMER & R RICHARDS, THE CLASSICAL MODEL OF DISPARATE 
TREATMENT DISCRIMINATION§ 1.4 (1980). This Article discusses only individual claims. 
67. Most often there will be other persons whose treatment can be compared to the 
treatment of the plaintiff. On the relatively few occasions when actual comparative evi­
dence is not available, courts have engaged in hypothetical comparisons: how would D have 
treated P if she were a white person or a male? Such counterfactual assessments arc a 
routine part of discrimination litigation, used in determining causation, see infra Section II 
B, and damages, see infra Sections III A-C. The difficulty of the use of comparisons in 
certain sex discrimination cases is well described in Kay, supra note 7, at 40, and Wildman, 
The Legitimation of Sex Discrimination: A Critical Response to Supreme Court jurisprudence, 63 
OR. L. REv. 265 (1984). 
68. The iss~e has been described as whether "the employer is treating 'some people 
less favorably than others because of their race, color, religion, sex or national origin.'" 
Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978) (quoting International Bhd. of 
Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977)). For a recent warning that 
proof only of different treatment, without also establishing that the different treatment was 
motivated by race, is insufficient to prove unlawful discrimination, see Carter v. Duncan· 
Huggins, Ltd., 727 F.2d 1225, 1245 (D.C. Cit. 1984) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
69. The fact-finder may be a judge, a jury or both. Title VII cases are tried by a 
judge. Lehman v. Nakshian, 453 U.S. 156, 164 (1981); Great Am. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n 
v. Novotny, 442 U.S. 366, 375 & n.19 (1979). If requested by either party, FED. R C1v. P. 
38(b), a jury trial is required for the legal issues in racial discrimination claims under 42 
U.S.C. § 1981, Setser v. Novak Inv. Co., 638 F.2d 1137 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 
1064 (1981); age discrimination claims under 29 U.S.C. § 621, Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 
575 (1978); or any discrimination claims against a state or local government under 42 
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intentional discrimination"70 directly or indirectly.71 The classic 
example of direct proof-the "smoking gun"-is a letter or state­
ment that the plaintiff should not be hired because she is black.72 
Such evidence, if believed, establishes the unlawful intentional dis­
crimination.78 However, such direct evidence is rarely available,7" 
U.S.C. § 1983. Jury trials are also required for legal claims in housing discrimination cases 
brought under either 42 U.S.C. §§ 3610-3612, Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189 (1974), or 
42 u.s.c. § 1982. 
70. Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 256 (1981). Intent 
has now been defined as "mean[ing] actual motive." Pullman-Standard v. Swint; 456 U.S. 
273, 290 (1982). A suggested alternative definition of intent, that an actor intends the 
foreseeable consequences of his or her acts, see, e.g., J. KusHNER, FAIR HousiNG 64 (1983); 
Perry, The Disproportionate Impact Theory of Racial Discrimination, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 540 
579-80 (1977), has been rejected for both statutory, Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 335 n.15 
("Proof of discriminatory motive is critical"), and constitutional cases, Personnel Adm'r of 
Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979) (equal protection violation requires "more than 
intent as volition or intent as awareness of consequences."). The foreseeable consequences 
of an act can be used as evidence to demonstrate the defendant's actual motive, but only as 
"a working tool, not a synonym for proof." Id. at 279 n.25. 
71. Both direct and indirect proof are typically used in cases of "covert" discrimina­
tion, where the defendant denies discrimination and tries to hide its existence. There are 
also cases of "explicit" discrimination, where the defendant acknowledges its disciminatory 
practice and seeks to justify it on some basis. Except in the affirmative action area, where 
race is explicitly used as a decisional criteria, cases involving overt racial discrimination are 
rare. Modern overt discrimination cases typically involve a mandatory age retirement pol­
icy, e.g., johnson v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 105 S. Ct. 2717 (1985), or a sex­
related benefit plan, e.g., Arizona Governing Comm. v. Norris, 463 U.S. 1073 (1983). Most 
outcome cases involve covert discrimination. Belton, Burdens ofPleading and Proof in Dis­
crimination Cases: Toward a Theory ofProcedurqljustice, 34 VAND. L. REv. 1205, 1224 (1981); 
Chamallas, Spectrum, supra note 7, at 17. 
72. Bell v. Birmingham Linen Serv., 715 F.2d 1552, 1557 (lith. Cir. 1983) (sex), cert. 
denied, 104 S. Ct. 2385 (1984); Lee v. Russell County Bd. ofEduc., 684 F.2d 769 (lith Cir. 
1982) (race), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 91 (1985); Hodgson v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 
455 F.2d 818, 821 (5th Cir. 1972) (age) (Interview notes read "too old for teller"). A 
"direct evidence" case differs from an "explicit" discrimination case, see supra note 71, in 
that the direct evidence or smoking gun is hidden by the defendant, not openly acknowl­
edged. When such evidence surfaces in the covert discrimination case, it is denied and 
sharply contested. 
73. However, it might not entitle P to prevail. Under the "same decision" theory, D is 
still entitled to prove that, even if it had not discriminated, P would not have been hired. 
See infra Section II B. Certain statutory defenses might also be available. See B. SCHLEI & P. 
GROSSMAN, supra note 4, at 340-60, 507-19 (discussing statutory defenses in Title VII and 
ADEA cas~s). 
74. Gates v. Georgia Pac. Corp., 326 F. Supp. 397, 399 (D. Or. 1973) ("direct evi­
dence of discrimination is ... virtually impossible to produce."), affd., 492 F.2d 292 (9th 
Cir. 1974). "Unless the employer is a latter-day George Washington, employment discrimi­
nation is as difficult to prove as who chopped down the cherry tree." Thornbrough v. 
Columbus & Greenville R.R., 760 F.2d 633, 638 (5th Cir. 1985). There will "seldom be 
'eyewitness' testimony as to the [defendant's] mental processes," United States Postal Serv. 
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and if plaintiffs were required to present such evidence in order to 
prevail in discriminatory outcome cases, their victories would be 
few indeed. 
Largely in response to the difficulty of proving unlawful mo­
tive, courts have fashioned a general methodology for "the order 
and allocation of proof in a private, non-class action. " 711 Initially 
outlined in the school desegregation case of Keyes v. School District 
No. 1,76 and more fully developed in a series of employment dis­
crimination cases, 77 the process of circumstantial proof known col­
loquially as the McDonnell-Douglas method is now in widespread 
use.78 This approach generally involves three steps: (1) the plain-
Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 7II, 7I5 (I983), and the defendant will have supe­
rior knowledge of, and better access to, the relevant evidence. United States Postal Serv. 
Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 453 U.S. 902, 905 n.2 (Aikens I) (Marshall, J., dissenting); 
Bartholet, Proof of Discriminatory Intent Under Title VII: United States Postal Service Board of 
Governors v. Aikens, 70 CALIF. L. REv. I200, I2I4-I5 (I983) ("it is intentional discrimination 
in its covert, hidden form that now poses the real problem."). The process of proving 
intentional discrimination is, in short, "often a problematic undertaking." Hunter v. Un­
derwood, I05 S. Ct. I9I6, I920 (I985). 
Difficult and problematic does not mean impossible. In Hunter, the Court affirmed the 
invalidation, as purposeful racial discrimination in violation of the fourteenth amendment, 
of an action by a I90 I Alabama constitutional convention that added an amendment to the 
state constitution. This amendment provided for the disenfranchisement of persons con­
victed of crimes of moral turpitude. Id. This Article will not discuss the additional issues 
that arise when the discriminatory decision-maker is a legislative body. See generally Brest, 
Palmer v. Thompson: An Approach to the Problem of Unconstitutional Legislative Motive, I97I 
SuP. CT. REV. 95; Ely, Legislative and Administrative Motivation in Constitutional Law, 79 YALE 
L.J. I205 (I970). 
75. McDonnell-Douglas Corp. v. Green, 4II U.S. 792, at 800 (I973). 
76. 4I3 U.S. I89, 208 (I973) (finding of discriminatory intent in one portion of school 
district creates a presumption of discrimination in entire system). The adoption of a Keyes­
type presumption has long been advocated by commentators. See, e.g., Note, An American 
Legal Dilemma - Proof of Discrimination, I7 U. CHI. L. REV. I 07 (I949). 
77. The initial case was McDonnell-Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (I973); the 
progeny are United States Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 7I1 (I983); 
Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273 (I982); Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. 
Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (I98I); Board of Trustees of Keene State College v. Sweeney, 439 
U.S. 24 (I978); Furnco Constr. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567 (I978). See also International Bhd. 
of Teamsters v. United States, 43I U.S. 324, 335 n.I5 (I977). 
78. Besides the Title VII cases from which it derived, the McDonnell-Douglas method 
of circumstantial proof is now used in age discrimination cases, see Player, ProofofDisparate 
Treatment Under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act: Variations on a Title Vll Theme, I7 
GA. L. REV. 62I (I983); housing discrimination cases, seeR. SCHWEMM, FAIR HoUSING LAW 
405 n.I37 (I983); cases brought under 42 U.S.C. §§ I98I, I982, see, e.g., Crawford v. 
Western Electric Co., 745 F.2d I373, I377 (lith Cir. I981) (§ 198I); Phiffer v. Proud 
Parrot Motor Hotel, 648 F.2d 548, 551 (9th Cir. I980) (§ I982); and state law discrimina­
tion cases, see, e.g., Woodbury County v. Iowa Civil Rights Comm'n, 335 N.W.2d I6I (Iowa 
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tiff's establishment of a prima facie case; (2) the defendant's pro­
duction of legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for its action; 
and (3) the plaintiff's attempt to demonstrate that the defendant's 
reasons are pretextual or otherwise to prove that the defendant 
unlawfully discriminated against him or her. This methodology 
authorizes the plaintiff to bring, and the factfinder to find liability 
in, a discrimination case where there is no direct evidence of 
discrimination. 
The establishment of the prima facie case does not prove dis­
crimination; rather, it creates a presumption that the defendant 
unlawfully discriminated against the plaintiff.79 The burden of es­
tablishing a prima facie case of disparate treatment is "not oner­
ous;"80 its elements must address and eliminate "the most com­
mon nondiscriminatory reasons"81 for the negative action. Thus, 
in our example, P can establish a prima facie case by showing that 
she is a member of a statutorily protected class, that she applied 
for the job, that she was generally qualified, that she was rejected 
and that someone else was hired.82 
1983); Martinez v. Yellowstone County Welfare Dep't, 626 P.2d 242 (Mont. 1981). 
79. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253-54. Until the Burdine decision, lower courts interpreting 
the effect of the prima facie case expressed confusion and disagreement. See generally Bel­
ton, supra note 83, at 1261-73; Mendez, Presumption of Discriminatory Motive In Title VII 
Disparate Treatment Cases, 32 STAN. L. REv. 1129 (1980). In earlier cases, and even in Bur­
dine, 450 U.S. at 253, the Court stated that a prima facie case created an "inference" of 
discrimination. See, e.g., Furnco, 438 U.S. at 577; Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 358. An inference, 
of course, is simply permissive: the fact finder may accept or reject it. A presumption on 
the other hand, is mandatory: until rebutted, it compels a finding for the beneficiary of the 
presumption. E. CLEARY, McCORMICK ON EVIDENCE 965-84 (3d ed. 1984); 9 j. WIGMORE, 
EviDENCE 2483-540 (Chadbourne Rev. 1981). As Professor Bartholet has demonstrated, 
supra note 74, at 1210-19, the presumption is supported by reasons of policy and 
probability - the recognition of the difficulty of proving discrimination with direct evi­
dence and the defendant's greater access to such evidence, and the belief that the defend­
ant's actions, "if otherwise unexplained, are more likely than not based on the considera­
tion of impermissible factors." Furnco, 438 U.S. at 577. See also Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 358 
n.44; Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254. 
80. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253. 
81. Id. at 253-54. 
82. In the initial case of McDonnell-Douglas Corp. v. Green, a case of alleged racial dis­
crimination in refusing to hire a black former employee, the court stated that the applicant 
must show: 
(i) that he belongs to a racial minority; (ii) that he applied and was qualified for 
a job for which the employer was seeking applicants; (iii) that, despite his quali­
fications, he was rejected; and (iv) that, after his rejection, the position re­
mained open and the employer continued to seek applicants from persons of 
complainant's qualifications. 
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The prima facie case shifts to the defendant the burden to 
"articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason" for its ac­
tion.83 This burden is a burden of production, and not persua­
sion.84 It is satisfied by the defendant's producing "admissible evi­
dence"85 explaining the reasons for its actions. If the plaintiff 
establishes a prima facie case and the defendant fails to satisfy its 
burden of production, then "the court must enter judgment for 
the plaintiff because no issue of fact remains in the case. " 86 If the 
plaintiff is able to establish a prima facie case and the defendant 
articulates a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason,87 the case then 
411 U.S. at 802. The Court added that "[t]he facts necessarily will vary ... and the speci­
fication . . . of the prima facie proof • . . is not necessarily applicable in every respect to 
differing factual situations." Id. at 802 n.l3. This recognition of the need for flexibility in 
the structuring of the prima facie case has been reaffirmed in later cases. Burdine, 450 U.S. 
at 253 n.6. See, e.g., F. jAMES & G. HAZARD, CIVIL PRocEDURE§§ 7.5-7.8 (2d ed. 1977). 
83. McDonnell-Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. at 802. From the perspective of the 
laws against discrimination, a decision-maker may act "for good reason, bad reason or no 
reason absent discrimination." Tims v. Board ofEduc., 452 F.2d 551,552 (8th Cir. 1971) 
(§ 1981 employment discrimination claim). The McDonnell-Douglas case requires only that 
the decision-maker produce evidence of that reason, whatever it is. See, e.g., Elliott v. 
Group Medical & Surgical Serv., 714 F.2d 556, 567 (5th Cir. 1984) ("Even had the reasons 
••• been frivolous or capricious, had they been the genuine cause .•. they would have 
defeated liability under the ADEA. We reiterate that the statute proscribes only one reason 
for discharge - age."); Garcia v. Gloor, 618 F.2d 264, 269 (5th Cir. 1980) (Title VII 
"does not forbid employers to hire only persons born under a certain sign of the zodiac 
..• .''). The case law has thus rejected the earlier view that the employment discrimina· 
tion laws created a general '1ust cause" requirement for all personnel decisions. Blum­
rosen, Strangers No More: All Workers Are Entitled to ''just Cause" Protection Under Title VII, 2 
INDUS. REI. L.J. 519 (1970). As a practical matter, the zanier the reason, the greater the 
risk that it will be disbelieved. See Elliott, 714 F.2d at 567; St. Peter v. Secretary of Army, 
659 F.2d 1133, 1139 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (Mikva,J., concurring); Loeb v. Textron, Inc., 600 
F.2d. 1003, 1007-08, 1019-20 (1st. Cir. 1979). 
84. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253. For a discussion of the distinction between the two bur­
dens, see Belton, supra note 71; Mendez, supra note 79. 
85. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 255. "The defendant cannot meet its burden merely through 
an answer to the complaint or by argument of counsel." Id. at 255 n.9. 
86. Id. at 254. In a case tried by a jury (such as a housing, ADEA, or§ 1981 case, see 
supra note 69), there is some uncertainty as to whether the court should enter a directed 
verdict for the plaintiff, or give a peremptory instruction dependent on credibility findings. 
See, e.g., Lovelace v. Sherwin Williams Co., 681 F.2d 230, 239 n.9 (4th Cir. 1982). See 
generally 9 C. WRIGHT & A. R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2535 (1971); 
Cooper, Directions For Directed Verdicts: A Compass For the Federal Courts, 55 MINN. L. REV. 
903, 947-48 (1971). The resolution of this issue in favor of simply an instruction may be 
suggested by Justice Powell's statement in Burdine that the plaintiff is entitled to judgment 
"[i]f the trier of fact believes the plaintiff's evidence." Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254. 
87. If the defendant provides sufficient evidence to meets its burden of production, 
then the presumption established by the prima facie showing "drops from the case." Bur­
dine, 450 U.S. at 255 n.IO. The plaintiff's evidence which created the prima facie case is 
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proceeds to the final element in the McDonnell-Douglas triptych­
the pretext stage.88 
The pretext issue is where the action is, where most disparate 
treatment cases are won or lost.89 At this stage, "the factual in­
quiry proceeds [both] to a new level of specificity"90 and to "the 
ultimate question of discrimination vel non. " 91 On the issues thus 
joined, the plaintiff can carry his or her burden of persuasion "di­
rectly by persuading the court that a discriminatory reason more 
likely motivated the employer or indirectly by showing that the 
employer's proferred explanation is unworthy of credence,"92 a 
pretext or subterfuge to hide the unlawful discrimination.93 
Using what in many cases will be only conflicting circumstan­
tial evidence and self-serving statements by D, the factfinder must 
determine what was in D's mind when the decisionmaker decided 
not to hire P and whether unlawful or lawful reasons motivated 
the decision. While this determination is "both sensitive and diffi­
still available for consideration, but the presumption is "destroy[ed]." /d. This destruction 
of the presumption is a defining characteristic of the Thayer-type or "bursting bubble" 
presumption which was adopted by FED. R EVID. 301. J. THAYER, A PRELIMINARY TREATISE 
ON EVIDENCE AT CoMMON LAw 314, 336 (1898); E. CLEARY, McCoRMICK ON EVIDENCE 974­
80 (3d ed. 1984). 
88. McDonnell-Douglas, 411 U.S. at 804. The three stages are analytic, not mechanical. 
See Furnco, 438 U.S. at 577 ("never intended to be rigid, mechanized, or ritualistic."). Liti­
gants need not perform a three-step '1udicial minuet," Sime v. Trustees of Calif. State 
Univ. & Colleges, 526 F.2d 1112, 1114 (9th Cir. 1975), or conduct "a trifurcated trial." B. 
SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 156 (2d ed. Supp. 1984). 
89. "Most disparate treatment cases turn on the plaintiff's ability to demonstrate that 
the nondiscriminatory reason offered by the employer was a pretext for discrimination." 
Miles v. M.N.C. Corp., 750 F.2d 867, 870 (lith Cir. 1985) (footnote omitted) (quoting B. 
ScHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, supra note 4, at 1317); Friedman, The Burger Court and the Prima 
Facie Case In Employment Discrimination Litigation: A Critique, 65 CoRNELL L. REV. 1, 14 
(1979); Furnish, Formalistic Solutions to Complex Problems: The Supreme Court's Analysis of In­
dividual Disparate Treatment Cases Under Title VII, 6 INDUS. REL L.J. 353, 357 (1984). 
90. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 255. 
91. Aikens, 460 U.S. at 714. 
92. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256. 
93. In proving discrimination indirectly, the plaintiff only disproves the defendant's 
reason, establishing it as a pretext. This proof of pretext then converts to proof of discrim­
ination by means of the McDonnell-Douglas methodology. See Aikens, 460 U.S. at 718 ("the 
McDonnell-Douglas framework requires that a plaintiff prevail when ..• he demonstrates 
that the legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason ... is in fact not the true reason for the ... 
decision.") (Blackmun, J., concurring) (emphasis added). Although recognizing the appro­
priateness of indirect proof, id. at 1481 n.3, 1482, 1483, the majority opinion's focus on 
the requirement of a factual finding of intent has engendered some apprehension, perhaps 
reflected in the concurrence, that a plaintiff needs to do something more than simply pro­
vide pretext. See Furnish, supra note 89, at 353. 
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cult[,]"9' it is treated as a finding of fact,9G reviewable under the 
"clearly erroneous" standard.96 This approach-denominating 
the determination of discrimination as a finding of 
fact-necessarily vests considerable discretion in the factfinder.97 
It places a premium on careful factual determinations, assisted by 
the use of procedural and evidentiary devices to focus the inquiry, 
in order to achieve an accurate determination of a difficult issue. 
This need for accurate factfinding and the significant role of cir­
cumstantial proof are also important in applying the causation 
standard, and play a maJor part in the resolution of non-determi­
native discrimination claims. 
B. Causation 
The laws against discrimination, which prohibit D from treat­
ing P differently "because of' race,96 require a causal relationship 
94. Aikens, 460 U.S. at 714. 
95. In Aikens, Justice Rehnquist illustrated the "fact-ness" of the intent determination 
with a colorful quote from a nineteenth century English case: 
[T]he state of a man's mind is as much a fact as the state of his digestion. It is 
true that it is very difficult to prove what the state of a man's mind at a particu­
lar time is, but if it can be ascertained it is as much a fact as anything else." 
Edgington v. Fitzmaurice, 29 Ch. D. 459, 483 (1885), quoted in Aikens, 460 U.S. at 716-17. 
See also 2 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE§ 661 (Chadbourn rev. 1979) ("the argument ••• [that) 
we cannot directly see, hear, or feel the state of another person's state of mind" and there­
fore intent cannot be shown "is finical ... and it proves too much."). 
96. Swint, 456 U.S. at 290. See also Anderson v. Bessemer City, 105 S. Ct. 1504 (1985). 
In a jury trial, the comparable standard for review ofjury verdicts is whether the evidence, 
viewed most favorably to the party against whom the motion is made, is legally sufficient to 
support the verdict. See, e.g., Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 
U.S. 690, 696; 5A J. MOORE & J. LUCAS, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE ~50.02[1) (2d ed, 
1985). 
97. "[T]he problems of proof raised by [an intent] test are treacherous at best, and the 
discretion it leaves to courts in actual cases is enormous." L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CoNSTITU• 
TIONAL LAW 1032 (1978). The fact standard also means that summary judgment will usually 
be inappropriate and that most cases, unless settled, will be resolved only after a trial. As 
Judge Aldrich put it, "[e]ven an andabata holds the field until someone comes forward to 
defeat him." Mack v. Cape Elizabeth School Bd., 553 F.2d 720, 722 (1st Cir. 1977). 
98. See supra note 2 for the many variations on the "because or• requirement. Legal 
doctrine recognizes two types of causation: cause-in-fact and proximate cause. Cause-in-fact 
concerns whether the defendant's conduct caused the plaintiff's injury in the sense of 
whether the harm would have occurred without that conduct. Proximate cause addresses 
the issue of whether the defendant should be held liable, or absolved from liability, for 
policy reasons. See generally W. PROSSER & P. KEETON, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF 
ToRTS §§ 41-42 (5th ed. 1984). The causation requirement discussed in this Article is 
cause-in-fact. 
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between D's conduct and 
( 
P's race. This Section explores the cau­
sation requirement in the discriminatory outcome case. 99 
A simple causation standard was implicit in the preceding dis­
cussion of the methodology of proof. That discussion assumed a 
dichotomous result at the end of the McDonnell-Douglas fact find­
ing road. The fact-finder found that an unlawful reason either 
caused or did not cause D's conduct: either/or, discrimination/no 
discrimination. In many cases, however, the causation issue is not 
so straightforward. In these more difficult cases, the results of the 
factfinding process are not dichotomous; the finding is not eitherI 
or, but both. The factfinder concludes after careful scrutiny of 
the evidence that D's conduct was motivated by both lawful and 
unlawful considerations. There were, in short, mixed motives. 
The mixed motive case has bedeviled regulatory law, and par­
ticularly labor law, for years.100 The problem is inherent; it re­
flects the contrast between the discrete nature of the regulatory 
prohibition and the richness of human interactions. The law does 
not prohibit all adverse employment or rental decisions; it pros­
cribes only those motivated by racial considerations. However, 
people's motives are complex and multi-faceted. It can rarely be 
sai~ that any single stimulus is totally responsible for a particular 
act; many factors normally contribute. There will often be several 
reasons for D's action, only one of which is unlawfuP01 
99. This Article discusses only the causation standard for disparate treatment cases. 
The disparate impact theory of discrimination has its own standard of causation and bur­
den of proof requirements. See C. SULUVAN, M. ZIMMER & R RICHARDS, supra note 66, § 
1.4. 
100. The problem in labor law has been resolved, at least temporarily, by the NLRB's 
articulation of a specific methodology in Wright Line, Inc., 251 N.L.R.B. 1083, 1089 
(1980) (the Mt. Healthy test •.• provide[s] the necessary clarification of[the Board's) deci­
sionmaking process"), enforced, 622 F.2d 899 (1st Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 989 
(1982), and by the Supreme Court's affirmance of that approach. NLRB v. Transportation 
Management Corp., 462 U.S. 393 (1983). For a sampling of the literature on the topic, see, 
e.g., Christensen & Svanoe, Motive and Intent in the Commission ofUnfair Labor Practices: The 
Supreme Court and the Fictive Formality, 77 YALE L.J. 1269 (1968); DuRoss, Toward Rational­
ity in Discriminatory Discharge Cases: The Impact ofMt. Healthy Board of Education v. Doyle 
upon the NLRA, 66 GEo. L.J. 1109 (1978); Jackson & Heller, The Irrelevance of the Wright 
Line Debate: Returning to the Realism of Erie Resistor in Unfair Labor Practice Cases, 77 Nw. 
U.L. REV. 737 (1983); Remar, Climbing Mt. Healthy: In Search ofthe "Wright Line" on Mixed­
Motive Discharges Under Section 8(aX3), 4 INDUS. REI.. L.J. 636 (1981). In tax law, the determi­
nation of tax treatment often turns on the purpose for which a taxpayer undertook a par­
ticular activity. See generally Blum, Motive, Intent and Purpose in Federal Income Taxation, 34 
u. CHI. L. REV. 485 (1967). 
101. The Supreme Court has frequently noted this reality in the context of determin­
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The possible mixture of motives in a particular mixed motive 
case is represented by a continuum between the polar possibilities 
of total discrimination and total nondiscrimination: 
Table I 
The Mixed-Motive Continuum 
Race Is Race Is One Of Race Is The 
Not A Factor 
I 




At one end of the continuum, represented in the chart as point N 
(and all points to the left of N), race is not a factor. It plays no 
part in the decision and does not cause a violation of the law. At 
the other end, represented in the chart as point 0 (and all points 
to the right of 0), race is the only reason for D's action. In such 
cases, D takes the action "because of' P's race and violates the 
statute. In these polar cases, there is only one motive, lawful or 
unlawful. Between these end points, the line N-0 represents a 
continuum of intermediate positions, all involving mixed 
motivation. 
Courts have articulated causation standards that span the 
mixed motive continuum. While a small number of courts have 
stated102 that a violation is proved if P shows that race was "a fac­
tor,"108 most courts have required more.104 The precise formula­
ing the intent of legislative bodies. See, e.g., Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan 
Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265 (1977) ("Rarely can it be said that a legislature or 
administrative body operating under a broad mandate made a secision motivated solely by 
a single concern, or even that a particular purpose was the 'dominant' or 'primary' one."); 
Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 225 (1971) ("It is difficult or impossible for any court 
to determine the 'sole' or 'dominant' motivation behind the choices of a group of 
legislators."). 
I 02. Caution is advised in evaluating judicial language that sets forth a causation stan­
dard. Courts are often writing in response to a particular argument or a lower court find· 
ing. A careful reading of the cases suggests that in most if not all the cases, the courts 
believed that race was the sole reason for the decision. One of the most frequently quoted 
opinions was issued in what today would be called a pretext, not a mixed motive, case. 
Smith v. Sol D. Adler Realty Co., 436 F.2d 344 (7th Cir. 1970). 
103. See, e.g., Robinson v. 12 Lofts Realty, 610 F.2d 1032, 1043 (2d Cir. 1982) (court 
must find that race "did not play any role."); Jordan v. Dellway Villa of Tenn., Ltd., 661 
F.2d 588, 594 (6th Cir. 1981) ("a part"), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1008 (1982); United States 
v. Mitchell, 580 F.2d 789, 791 (5th Cir. 1978) ("a consideration", "some role"); Oliver v. 
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tions have varied. Plaintiffs have had to show that the use of race 
was "significant,"10G "substantial,"106 "effective,"107 or "influ­
enced greatly"108 the defendant's decision. These several phrases 
represent an attempt to evaluate the strength of the unlawful ra­
cial reason and to assign liability on the basis of that evaluation. 
The most widely used formulation focuses, not on the weight 
or strength of the unlawful reason, but on its likely operative ef­
fect. This approach borrows the familiar but-for test from tort 
law109 and applies it to discrimination cases by requiring the plain­
tiff to prove that a racial reason was a "determinative factor"110 in 
Shelly, 538 F. Supp. 600, 602 (S.D. Tex. 1982) ("at least one of the factors"); Bishop v. 
Pecsok, 431 F. Supp. 34, 37 (N.D. Ohio 1976) ("any part") (emphasis in opinion); cf. Payne 
v. Bracher, 582 F.2d 17, 18 (5th Cir. 1978) (race "not to be considered in any way."); 
Smith v. Sol D. Adler Realty Co., 436 F.2d 344, 349-50 (7th Cir. 1970) ("no acceptable 
place in the law for partial racial discrimination."). For employment cases, see Bibbs v. 
Block, 749 F.2d 508, 512 (8th Cir. 1984) ("discernible factor"); Langford v. City of Texar­
kana, 478 F.2d 262, 268 (8th Cir. 1973) ("a factor"); United States v. Hays Int'l Corp., 6 
Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1328, 1330 (N.D. Ala. 1973) ("any part"), a.ffd, 507 F.2d 
1279 (5th Cir. 1975). 
104. See, e.g., Lee v. Russell County Bd. ofEduc., 684 F.2d 769,775 (lith Cir. 1983) 
("[A]n insignificant unconstitutional factor does not warrant relief ...."); Whiting v. 
Jackson State Univ., 616 F.2d 116, 121 (5th Cir. 1980) ("Title VII is not violated simply 
because an impermissible factor plays some part in the employer's decision. The forbidden 
taint need not be the sole basis for the action to warrant relief, but it must be a significant 
factor.") (emphasis in original). 
105. See, e.g., Fadhl v. City and County of San Francisco, 741 F.2d 1163, 1166 (9th 
Cir. 1984); Woods-Drake v. Lundy, 667 F.2d 1198, 1202 (5th Cir. 1982) ("one significant 
factor"). 
106. See, e.g., Lee v. Russell County Bd. of Educ., 684 F.2d 769, 774 (lith Cir. 1982) 
("significant or substantial"). 
107. See, e.g., Green v. Century 21, 740 F.2d 460, 464 (6th Cir. 1984). 
108. Weatherspoon v. Andrews & Co., 32 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1226, 1228 (D. 
Colo. 1983). 
109. See W. PROSSER & P. KEETON, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS,§ 41, at 
266 (5th ed. 1984) ("[T]he 'but-for' or 'sine qua non' rule may be stated as follows: The 
defendant's conduct is a cause of the event if the event would not have occurred without 
it."); see also 2 F. HARPER & F. jAMES, THE LAw OF ToRTS§ 20.2, at IIIO (1956) ("[T]he 
'but for' or sine qua non test .•. [is whether] defendant's negligence is a cause in fact of an 
injury where the injury would not have occurred but for defendant's negligent conduct.") 
(emphasis in original). 
110. See, e.g., Lewis v. University of Pittsburgh, 725 F.2d 910,917 (3d Cir. 1983), cert. 
denied, 105 S. Ct. 266 (1985). While most cases use the adjective "determinative," cases 
involving age discrimination often employ the term "determining factor," that which is 
used in United States Department of Labor Guidelines interpreting the ADEA, 29 C.F.R. 
§ 860.103(c) (1985) ("The clear purpose is to insure that age ... is not a determining 
factor in making any decision ...."). To resolve uncertainty about the appropriate 
formula, one judge used an inclusive approach. Dougherty v. Barry, 607 F. Supp. 1271, 
1285 (D.D.C. 1985) ("race was a 'substantial', 'significant', and 'determinative' factor."). 
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the defendant's decision. A reason is a determinative factor when, 
"but for" the unlawful racial motive, the adverse decision would 
not have been made.111 
This "determinative factor" or but-for standard is the major­
ity standard in discrimination cases.112 Following recent Supreme 
Court cases dealing with outcome-determinative constitutional 
claims,113 the standard has been adopted by at least ten circuits in 
age cases, 114 and by many courts in Title VII, Section 1981, m and 
Ill. Loeb v. Textron, Inc., 600 F.2d 1003, 1019 (1st Cir. 1979) ("'but for' ..• em­
ployer's motive to discriminate ••. [plaintiff] would not have been discharged."). The de­
terminative factor and but-for tests are identical to the "same decision" test discussed supra 
notes 26-27 and accompanying text. Although using different formulations, each test ap­
plies the same standard to the same issue: would the decision have been different if race 
had not been a factor. 
112. See infra notes 114-16 and accompanying text. Present arguments more often 
involve semantic quibbling and refinement of the but-for test than a fundamental reassess­
ment of the standard itself. One recent issue, for example, has been whether a jury instruc­
tion which refers to "the determinative factor" as opposed to "a determinative standard" 
constitutes reasonable error. See, e.g., Cuddy v. Carmen, 694 F.2d 853, 857 (D.C. Cir. 
1982), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 597 (1985); Golomb v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 688 F.2d 
547 (7th Cir. 1982); Spagnuolo v. Whirlpool Corp., 641 F.2d 1109, 1112 (4th Cir. 1981), 
cert. denied, 454 U.S. 860 (1981); Smithers v. Bailar, 629 F.2d 892, 896-98 (3d Cir. 1980). 
The proper instruction employs the phrase "a determinative factor", since "[u]se of the 
definite article 'the' instead of the indefinite article 'a' incorrectly suggests that the plaintiff 
.•• must prove that age was the sole determinative factor ••••" Golomb, 688 F.2d at 552 
n.2. 
A second contemporary issue is whether the burden of proving that the racial factor 
was determinative can ever be shifted to the defendant. In the Eleventh Circuit, if the 
plaintiff establishes discrimination by direct evidence, the burden shifts to the defendant to 
prove that the same decision would have occurred even without the unlawful discrimina­
tion. Lee v. Russell County Bd. of Educ., 684 F.2d 769 (lith Cir. 1982); Perryman v. 
Johnson Prods. Co., 698 F.2d 1138 {lith Cir. 1983). 
113. See supra note 25. The Supreme Court has favorably referred to the but-for stan­
dard in several Title VII cases, but has never expressly adopted it as a causation standard 
under that statute. In McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273 (1976), the 
Supreme Court rejected the argument that Title VII plaintiffs must show that race was the 
sole basis for the adverse decisions and stated that "no more is required to be shown than 
that race was a 'but for' cause." Id. at 282 n.IO. In several recent sex discrimination cases, 
the Court has reiterated that "the simple test of Title VII discrimination" is whether the 
plaintiff is treated " ' "in a manner which but for that person's sex would be different." ' " 
Newport News Shipbuilding & Drydock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U.S. 669, 683 (1983) (quoting 
Los Angeles Dept. of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 711 (1978) (quoting Devel­
opment In The Law, Employment Discrimination and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 84 
HARV. L. REv. 1109, 1170 (1971)). This Manhart quotation has been reprinted in Newporf 
News, 462 U.S. at 683 n.23, and in Arizona Governing Comm. v. Norris, 463 U.S. 1073, 
1081 (1983). 
114. Jorgensen v. Modern Woodmen of Am., 761 F.2d 502 (8th Cir. 1985); Goldstein 
v. Manhattan Indus., Inc., 758 F.2d 1435 (lith Cir.), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 525 (1985); 
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state-law discrimination cases.116 This broad acceptance warrants 
careful scrutiny of the standard's effectiveness in achieving its par­
ticular purposes and the broader purposes of the laws against 
discrimination. 
The primary reason for adopting the "determinative factor" 
test instead of a less stringent standard has been the concern that 
"[a] rule of causation which focuses solely on whether protected 
conduct played a part, 'substantial' or otherwise, in a decision ... 
could place an employee in a better position . . . than he would 
[otherwise] have occupied ...." 117 The courts have feared that a 
lesser standard would result in a remedy disproportionate to the 
wrong, with both a windfall to the plaintiff and excessive punish­
ment of the defendant. As one trial judge stated in an age discrim­
ination case: 
If relief were to be afforded every time age was considered [even 
though it did not make a difference in the final decision], the effects would 
go well beyond the remedial designs of the drafters of the [ADEA]. Back pay 
would be awarded to those who never had a chance for the job .... While 
doing so would provide a strong deterrent against . . . discrimination, it 
would be a deterrent far in excess of the limited deterrent Congress in­
tended to provide when it enacted the ADEA.118 • 
Perrell v. Financeamerica Corp., 726 F.2d 654 {lOth Cir. 1984); Hagelthorn v. Kennecott 
Corp., 710 F.2d 76 (2d Cir. 1983); Blackwell v. Sun Elec. Corp., 696 F.2d 1176 (6th Cir. 
1983); Cuddy v. Carmen, 694 F.2d 853 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Golomb v. Prudential Ins. Co. of 
Am., 688 F.2d 547 (7th Cir. 1982); Lovelace v. Sherwin-Williams Co., 681 F.2d 230 (4th 
Cir. 1982); Kelly v. American Standard, Inc., 640 F.2d 974 (9th Cir. 1981); Smithers v. 
Bailar, 629 F.2d 892 (3d Cir. 1980); Loeb v. Textron, Inc., 600 F.2d 1003 (1st Cir. 1979). 
115. See, e.g., Grubb v. W.A. Foote Memorial Hosp., Inc., 741 F.2d 1486 (6th Cir. 
1984) (Title VII and § 1981), vacated on reh'g, 759 F.2d 456, cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 342 
(1985); Lewis v. Univ. of Pittsburgh, 725 F.2d 910 (3d Cir. 1983) (Title VII and§ 1981), 
cert denied, 105 S. Ct. 266 (1984); Fisher v. Flynn, 598 F.2d 663 (1st Cir. 1979) (Title VII). 
Compare American Fed'n of Gov't Employees v. Fed. Labor Relations Auth., 716 F.2d 47, 
51 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1983) ("[I]t is uncertain, however, what standard of causation applies in 
Title VII discrimination cases.") with Williams v. Boorstin, 663 F.2d 109, 117 (D.C. Cir. 
1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 985 {1981) {"The law in this circuit, however, is clear. The but 
for test applies."). 
116. See, e.g., Burroughs v. Great At!. & Pac. Tea Co., 462 So. 2d 353 (Ala. 1984); 
Smith College v. Mass. Comm'n Against Discrimination, 376 Mass. 221, 380 N.E.2d 121 
(1978); Wadeson v. American Family Mut. Ins. Co., 343 N.W.2d 367 (N.D. 1984); Odgen 
v. Bureau of Labor, 68 Or. App. 235, 682 P.2d 802 (1984), alf'd in part and rev'd in part, 
299 Or. 98, 699 P.2d 189 (1985); Bruce v. Western Auto Supply Co., 669 S.W.2d 95 
(Tenn. Ct. App. 1984). 
117. Mt. Healthy City School Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 285 (1977). 
118. Geller v. Markham, 481 F. Supp. 835, 841 (D. Conn. 1979), alf'd in part and rev'd 
in part, 635 F.2d 1027 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 945 (1981). See also Belton, 
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To avoid this dissonance between remedy and wrong, courts 
have been attracted to a "test of causation which distinguishes be­
tween a result caused by a . . . violation and one not so 
caused. " 119 The but-for standard, by explicitly requiring a connec­
tion between the unlawful act and the injury, distinguishes be­
tween such results and addresses this major judicial concern. 
The implementation of the but-for test introduces a new level 
of difficulty into the factfinding process of a discrimination case. 
Since liability attaches only if the racial factor was determinative, 
it is no longer sufficient simply to decide if race was or was not a 
factor in the decision. The determinative factor test requires that 
the factfinder further refine its assessment, quantify the impor­
tance of race as a factor in the particular case and locate it along 
the continuum. This assignment is not a simple one. The 
factfinder must now engage in a counterfactual determination of 
what might have happened if one variable (D's use of race as a 
factor) had been different.120 As one judge has noted, it is difficult 
to determine "once the omelet [is] cooked ... what each egg had 
contributed to it."121 However, the performance of this factfind­
ing function is essential to the successful resolution of the mixed 
motive case. While "cause itself is not a fact,"122 the application of 
supra note 71, at 1255-56 (illustrating similar point with hypothetical). 
119. Mt. Healthy, 429 U.S. at 286. 
120. For a critique of such counterfactual determinations in negligence cases, see 
Thode, The Indefensible Use of The Hypothetical Case To Determine Cause In Fact, 46 TEX. L. 
REV. 423, 434 (1968) ("The only function of the factual inquiry is to find out what hap­
pened, and that inquiry is not illuminated by an inquiry into what did not happen."). 
121. Garcia v. Gloor, 618 F.2d 264, 268 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1113 
(1981). lt is sometimes suggested, even by the Supreme Court, that this further factfinding 
cannot be done. Personnel Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 277 (1979) ("Discrimi­
natory intent is simply not amenable to calibration. It either is a factor that has influenced 
the legislative choice or it is not."). See Malone, Ruminations on Cause-In-Fact, 9 STAN. L. 
REv. 60, 67 (1956) (such fact finding "demands the impossible. It challenges the imagina­
tion of the trier to probe into a purely fanciful and unknowable state of affairs."). While 
there is no question that this task is "sensitive and difficult," United States Postal Serv. Bd. 
of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 716 (1983), it is not appreciably more so than is the 
initial factfinding to determine that race was "a" factor, or the further factfinding neces­
sary to determine the appropriate remedy. Additionally, the problem is inherent in the 
mixed motive case. The only way to escape this additional factfinding is either to require 
the plaintiff to prove that race was "the" factor, or to adopt a causal standard that estab­
lishes liability and provides a full remedy upon proof that race was "a" factor. In either of 
these cases, no calibration is necessary. No court or commentator, however, has explicitly 
endorsed either of these positions. 
122. Malone, supra note 121, at 69. But see W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF 
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the causal standard in a mixed motive case necessarily requires a 
firm factual foundation.123 
The but-for test addresses the problem of a mismatch be­
tween the remedy and the wrong. However, its underinclusiveness 
creates a mismatch of its own, between the violation of the plain­
tiff's right to be free from discrimination and the lack of a finding 
of liability and a remedy for that violation. If conduct is discrimi­
natory but not determinative of the decision, the but-for test finds 
no wrongdoing. As displayed in the revised chart, where D repre­
sents the place at which the racial factor becomes determinative 
and the line D-0 represents the conduct encompassed by the pre-
TORTS§ 41, at 237 (4th ed. 1971) ("Causation is a fact. It is a matter of what has in fact 
occurred."). Professor Malone and Dean Prosser are each describing a different aspect of 
the cause-in-fact determination. Dean Prosser is pointing out that the resolution of the 
problem begins by finding out "what happened out there," and that this initial determina­
tion is factual. Professor Malone is emphasizing that a legal standard is needed to give 
meaning to those facts. Both authors are correct. 
123. The but-for standard and factual findings are connected, in jury cases, by means 
of jury instructions and special interrogatories on the critical causation issue. "[F]inding 
appropriate language for the charge" is a general problem with causation. 2 J. FLEMING & 
F. jAMES, THE LAW OF ToRTS§ 1111 (1956). These instructions attempt to convey, some­
times with a difficulty that can be appreciated only by first year law students and their 
teachers, see Morris, On the Teaching ofLegal Cause, 39 CoLUM. L. REV. 1087-88 (1939), the 
meaning of the but-for standard. For examples of the attempts of several courts to instruct 
on this issue, see Perrell v. Financeamerica Corp., 726 F.2d 654, 655-56 (lOth Cir. 1984); 
Blackwell v. Sun Elec. Corp., 696 F.2d 1176, 1181-83 (6th Cir. 1983); Golomb v. Pruden­
tial Ins. Co., 688 F.2d 547, 549-50 (7th Cir. 1982); Spagnuolo v. Whirlpool Corp., 641 
F.2d 1109, 1112 n.l (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 860 (1981). 
Because of the importance of this causation issue, the difficulty of explaining it in the 
instructions, and the uncertainty as to whether the charge was understood or followed, 
some courts use special interrogatories to guide and to monitor the jury's deliberations in 
this area. Two questions are generally asked: 
1) Was race a factor in the defendant's decision? (YES/NO) 
2) If yes, was race a determinative factor, in the sense that the plaintiff 
would have been hired if she had been white? (YES/NO) 
The answers to these special interrogatories focus the jury deliberation and provide find­
ings with the requisite specificity for applying the determinative factor standard to the dis­
criminatory outcome claim in the mixed motive case. See Lewis v. University of Pittsburgh, 
725 F.2d 910, 917-18 (3d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 892 (1984); Geller v. Markham, 
635 F.2d 1027, 1031 (2d Cir. 1980); Gibbs v. Exxon Corp., 37 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 
1005, 1006 (D.NJ. 1985). While the use of special verdicts and interrogatories is a matter 
of discretion, FED. R. C1v. P. 49, at least one court of appeals has suggested that their use is 
a preferred approach in certain types of discrimination cases. Cancellier v. Federated Dep't 
Stores, 672 F.2d 1312, 1317 (9th Cir. 1982) (As amended on Denial of Rehearing and 
Rehearing En Bane). There may also be a separate instruction as to which party bears the 
burden of proof on the determinative factor or same decision issue, particularly in a "di­
rect evidence" case in the Eleventh Circuit. See supra note 112. 
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vailing causation standard, the but-for test immunizes a considera­
ble range of conduct in which the defendant has considered the 
plaintiff's race as a factor in its decision: 
TABLE II 





By recognizing only determinative factors as unlawful, the 
but-for test prohibits racially-motivated conduct between points D 
and 0, but does not attach liability to such conduct between 
points Nand D. Between Nand D, in all cases of non-determina­
tive discrimination, "[t]he fact that ... violations have occurred 
[is] lost in the shuffle. "12' The discrimination, having been found 
to be non-determinative, is deemed "harmless,"1211 without any 
further reflection on its discriminatory nature. 
Critics of the but-for requirement would replace it with an­
other causation standard drawn from tort law, the "substantial 
factor~·· test.128 Explicitly designed for situations where there is 
more than one cause of a particular event, 127 this alternative stan­
124. Wolly, What Hath Mt. Healthy Wrought7, 41 OHIO ST. L.J. 385, 399 (1981). 
125. Brodin, supra note 11, at 317. Professor Brodin suggests that "the refusal of the 
courts to take some action against such 'harmless' discrimination might actually encourage 
the continuation of such conduct." ld. at 318 (emphasis in original). He further states that 
the but:for standard "appears to be a restriking of the balance that Congress intended to 
establish between minority persons and their employers." ld. at 322. 
126. Eaton, Causation in Constitutional Torts, 67 IoWA L. REV. 443, 452 (1982). Profes­
sor Brodin offers "motivating factor" as an alternative test, but does not define the term 
and cites only Mt. Healthy and a district court case as authority. Brodin, sttpra note 11, at 
323 & n.63. Professor Schwemm has suggested a "two-tiered causation standard." R. 
SCHWEMM, supra note 11, at 57-58. See also Brown, Givelber, & Surbin, sttpra note 1, at 27 
("contributing factor" test); Note, Section 1981 and the Thirteenth Amendment After Runyon 
v. McCrary- On the Doorsteps ofDiscriminatory Private Clubs, 29 STAN. L. REV. 747, 772-74 
(1977); Kushner, supra note 11, at 81-82. Professor Eaton's suggestion is most explicitly 
grounded in tort doctrine. 
127. See REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 432 (1965); W. PROSSER & P. KEETON, 
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dard regards "any culpable conduct that is a substantial factor in 
producing an injury as a factual cause of that injury."128 A "sub­
stantial factor" is defined as one that "of itself is sufficient to 
bring about harm to another,"129 if the other factors had not been 
present. This test permits a finding of liability in cases of "concur­
rent causation, " 180 where each of two factors would independently 
have caused the injury, and, therefore, neither of them can be a 
but-for cause.181 This area of additional liability is represented on 
the chart as the line S-D, where S represents the point at which 
the racial motive becomes substantial, and the line S-D represents 
all claims that are substantial but non-determinative. In holding 
the wrongdoer liable for its substantial wrongful acts, even if the 
same consequences would have resulted from an independent and 
lawful cause, the test acknowledges the plaintiff's windfall award 
as a necessary consequence of its policy objective of deterring de­
fendants from engaging in the prohibited activity and securing a 
higher level of care.182 
Courts construing the laws against discrimination have re­
jected the "substantial factor" standard of causation. They have 
insisted on a closer connection-a but-for relationship-between 
the use of race as a factor and the alleged wrong.188 Despite its 
problems, the but-for standard is suitable for the discriminatory 
PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS§ 41, at 266-68 (5th ed. 1984). 
128. Eaton, supra note 126, at 454. 
129. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§ 432(2) (1965). The determination of when a 
cause becomes substantial presents another difficult question of fact. As with the determi­
native factor assessment, see supra notes 112-17 and accompanying text, the finding of sub­
stantiality also requires a counterfactual inquiry, this time with the hypothetical factors 
reversed. The factfinder must decide what would have happened if the lawful reasons (in 
the example, P's lack of experience and late application) had not existed and D had based 
its decision solely on the unlawful racial reason. Whereas the determinative factor test 
seeks to measure the motivating force of the lawful reason, the substantial factor test un­
dertakes the same assessment of the unlawful reason. For suggested special interrogatories 
to assist the jury in deciding if a reason is substantial, see supra note 123. 
130. See Carpenter, Concurrent Causation, 83 U. PA. L. REv. 941 (1935). 
131. In our example, D has three reasons for denying P a job: her lack of experience, 
the date of her application, and her race. If each factor were independently sufficient to 
determine the result, then none of them would be a but-for cause but each would be a 
substantial, "concurrent cause." 
132. Eaton, supra note 126, at 454; Carpenter, supra note 130, at 951-52. 
133. See supra notes 112-16. Professor Eaton attributes the rejection of the "substan­
tial factor" test in the constitutional tort context to federalism concerns and·the belief that 
"a substantial factor approach to causation would too greatly interfere with the functioning 
of government." Eaton, supra note 126, at 457, 458-61. 
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outcome case. The alleged wrong is the denial of the job for racial 
reasons; the injury is the loss of the job and its benefits. Since 
both the wrong and the injury caused by that wrong are totally 
related to the hiring decision, it is sensible to require that the un­
lawful factor be the determinative cause of that decision. If the 
adverse decision and the outcome-related injury would have oc­
curred in any event, then there simply has been no wrong or in­
jury in the discriminatory outcome sense. There has been discrim­
ination, however. In all cases on the line N-S-D, the factfinder has 
found that the defendant used race as a factor. To say that race 
did not make a difference in the outcome of the decision is not to 
say that the use of race as a factor does not matter at all. Such 
non-determinative discrimination can have a severe effect on the 
victim and can frustrate the achievement of the purposes of the 
laws against discrimination. By definition, the but-for test in the 
discriminatory outcome case simply ignores all instances of non­
determinative discrimination. 
The appropriate solution is not the replacement of the but­
for test with the substantial factor test.134 Rather, the better ap­
proach involves the application of the but-for standard to a more 
carefully specified wrong and injury. The problem of under­
enforcement inherent in the but-for test in the discriminatory out­
come case is not a causation problem, but a problem in defining 
the substantive rights and duties established by the laws against 
discrimination. By focusing attention on these rights and duties, 
and by providing a vocabulary with which to discuss the claims of 
non-determinative discrimination, the theory of non-determina­
tive discrimination promises a more successful resolution of the 
problem of discrimination left untouched by the but-for standard 
in the outcome case. Analysis of the substantive conduct, as op­
posed to the causation standard, returns the focus to the proper 
issues: whether conduct that admittedly constitutes race-based dif­
ferent treatment is prohibited or permitted by the laws against 
134. As indicated infra Section III D2, the substantial factor test is both underinclu­
sive in certain cases and imprecise and unhelpful in other, more difficult ones. The substan· 
tial factor test still leaves a certain amount of discrimination, that located between points N 
and D on the continuum, undiscussed and unprotected. Additionally, in the non-determi­
native discriminiation, mixed motive case, it does not identify the unlawful behavior with 
sufficient clarity to permit the fashioning of an appropriate remedy, and it presents the 
danger of imposing liability for thoughts, as opposed to deeds. 
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discrimination and, if prohibited, the appropriate remedial re­
sponse to that conduct. 
C. Remedy 
It is hornbook law that the determination of the appropriate 
remedy is made only after a prior determination of liability,1311 and 
that the "nature of the violation determines the scope of the rem­
edy."136 However, these determinations of right and of remedy 
occur not separately, but dialectically:137 "[a] judgment about vio­
lation should reflect, and in fact does reflect, a judgment about 
remedy,"138 and the absence of appropriate remedies, or concern 
about the imposition of inappropriate remedies, often influences 
the definition of a right.139 An understanding of remedies is thus 
essential to the evaluation of the theory of non-determinative dis­
crimination. If the remedies provided by the laws against discrimi­
nation fit only the discriminatory outcome claim and are inappro­
priate to the non-determinative discrimination claim, there will be 
little incentive to bring such claims. Similarly, there will be a re­
luctance to recognize the right to be free of non-determinative 
discrimination on absence-of-remedy grounds. As this Section 
demonstrates, however, a full range of remedies is available in 
many, but not all, discrimination cases. Additionally, the tech­
niques for augmenting damages and tailoring the remedy to the. 
injury developed in discriminatory outcome cases also apply to 
non-determinative discrimination claims. 
At the remedy stage of a discrimination case, the similarity 
that characterizes the determination of liability in the many laws 
against discrimination disappears. The differences are not total. 
Nearly all the laws against discrimination provide for equitable re­
lief, the recovery of certain monetary losses, and the award of 
135. D. DoBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES 1 (1973) ("The law of judicial 
remedies concerns itself with the nature and scope of the relief to be given a plaintiff once 
he . . . has established a substantive right."). 
136. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenberg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 16 (1971). 
137. Gewirtz, Remedies and Resistance, 92 YALE L.J. 585, 590, 678-80 (1983). 
138. 0. FISS, THE CIVIL RIGHTS INJUNCI'ION 55-56 (1978) [hereinafter FISS, CIVIL 
RIGHTS INJUNCI'ION]. But see Fiss, The Supreme Court 1978 Term - Foreward: The Forms of 
justice, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1, 52, 53 (1979). 
139. Note, Making the Violation Fit the Remedy: The Intent Standard and Equal Protection 
Law, 92 YALE L.J. 328 (1982); Freeman, supra note 43. 
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nominal damages.140 All federal and many state statutes authorize 
the awarding of attorneys' fees. 141 However, in the important area 
of compensatory damages, the statutes are sharply divided.142 
Compensatory damages in discrimination cases are important 
to provide relief for the emotional and psychological injuries 
caused by unlawful discrimination. The humiliation, embarrass­
ment and psychological harm that can be caused by discrimination 
is particularly severe and well-established.143 As even the formal 
transcripts of courtroom testimony reveal, 144 victims of discrimi­
nation lose not only the opportunity to live in a particular home 
or to have a particular job; they have also suffered a "dignitary 
tort,"1415 a harm involving: 
140. See infra notes I48-72. Not all statutes authorize such relief. A measure of sur­
prise is often provided by the disclosure that some laws against discrimination provide no 
monetary remedy but only injunctive relief. A striking example is provided by the federal 
public accommodation law, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (I982). The Senate report on the bill loftily 
proclaimed: 
The primary purpose of [Title II] is to solve this problem, the deprivation of 
personal dignity that surely accompanies denials of equal access to public estab­
lishments. Discrimination is not simply dollars and cents, hamburger and mov­
ies, it is the humiliation, frustration and embarrassment that a person must 
surely feel when he is told that he is unacceptable as a member of the public 
because of his race or color. 
S. REP. No. 872, 88th Gong., 2d Sess. I6, reprinted in I964 U.S. CoDE CoNG. & ADMIN. NEWS 
2355, 2370. However, the law as enacted had no provision for damages. A plaintiff can 
seek "preventive relief', 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-3(a) (I982), and can receive attorney's fees if 
successful, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-3(b) (I982), but can not recover monetary relief.Id. § 2000a­
6(b). ("The remedies provided in this subchapter shall be the exclusive means of enforcing 
the rights based on this subchapter ..•."). See generally Note, Discrimination in Access to 
Public Places: A Survey of State and Federal Public Accommodations Laws, 7 N.Y.U. REV. L. & 
Soc. CHANGE 2I5, 225 (I978). 
I41. See generally I M. DERFNER & A. WOLF, COURT AWARDED ATTORNEY FEES 5-30, 5· 
3I (I984). 
I42. See infra notes I48-72 and accompanying text. Another area of division involves 
the award of punitive damages. 
I43. See G. ALLPORT, THE NATURE OF PREJUDICE (I954); K. CLARK, DARK GHETTO 63·64 
(I 965); 0. Cox, CASTE, CLASS AND RACE 383 (I 948); E. GOFFMAN, STIGMA (I 963); W. GREIER 
& P. CoBBS, BLACK RAGE (I 968). 
I44. The testimony in two cases is illustrative. A black man who could not buy a house 
because of racial discrimination testified: "I was humiliated. I was intimidated, not only as a 
person but as a man. He stripped me of my right as a father to my kids." Seaton v. Sky 
Realty Co., 49I F.2d 634, 636 (7th Cir. I974). A black plaintiff in another case testified: 
"Well, it makes you feel ••• that you were still back in slavery or something. It really 
embarrasses you. It makes you feel bad to know that you want something and can't have it 
on account of being black." Burris v. Wilkins, 2 Equal Oppt'y. Hous. Cas. (CCH) lll5,2I9 
(N.D. Tenn. I977). 
I45. Housing discrimination was recognized as a dignitary tort by the Supreme Court 
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injuries to the personality. This means that, though economic or physical 
loss may be associated with the injury, the primary or usual concern is not 
economic at all, but vindication on an intangible right . . ·. .[l]n a great 
many of these cases, the only harm is the affront to the plaintiff's dignity, 
the damage to his self-image, the resulting mental distress.146 
Such emotional harm will be the most significant injury in 
certain types of discriminatory outcome cases, and in most non­
determinative discrimination cases. The reality of these injuries 
requires recognition and, where possible, recompense. The many 
laws agajnst discrimination that provide broad relief demonstrate 
the willingness to use the legal system to provide monetary com­
pensation for such harm.147 Other laws, however, have been con­
strued not to authorize the. award of damages, other than nominal 
damages, for such injuries. 
Title VII typifies the class of laws against discrimination that 
have been interpreted to provide only narrow relief to prevailing 
plaintiffs in individual disparate treatment actions.148 Under Title 
VII, if a plaintiff proves that he or she was denied employment 
because of race, a court may declare the conduct unlawful, enjoin 
the defendant from continuing to discriminate,149 and order the 
defendant to hire the plaintiff.1110 A court may also vest a plaintiff 
in Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189 (1974). 
146. D. DoBBS, supra note 135, at 509-10. 
147. Professor Bittker recognized and placed in perspective the problem of attempt­
ing to monetize the emotional injury inflicted by discrimination. "It is difficult to convert 
humiliation and emotional distress into cost, but American courts regularly rise to the chal­
lenge by compensating victims of slanderous utterances, abusive tactics by bill collectors, 
misdelivery of telegraphic notices of illness and death, . . . and innumerable other acts 
causing mental distress but not visible injury." B. BITTKER, THE CASE FOR BLACK REPARA­
TIONS 61 (1971). As a historical note, Professor Bittker also reminds that in the era of de 
jure segregation, state law provided compensation for the emotional distress suffered by 
whites who were mistakenly classified as black and ordered to sit in the black-only cars. 
Louisville & N.R.R. v. Ritchel, 148 Ky. 701, 147 S.W. 411 (1912); Chicago, Rock Island & 
Pacific Ry. Co. v. Allison, 120 Ark. 54, 178 S.W. 401 (1915). 
148. Other statutes that have been construed to follow Title VII in this respect are 
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1982) and several state 
statutes. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN.§ 44-1005 (1981) (Woods v. Midwest Conveyor Co., 231 
Kan. 763, 648 P.2d 234 (1982)); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, §§ 4572, 4582 (West Supp. 
1985); Maine Human Rights Comm'n v. City of Auburn, 425 A.2d 990 (Me. 1981). 
149. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1982) ("the court may enjoin the respondent from en­
gaging in such unlawful employment practice."). Factors that influence the issuance of in­
junctive relief in individual cases are discussed in C. SULLIVAN, M. ZIMMER & R. RICHARDS, 
supra note 66, at 683-86. 
150. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1982) ("[The Court may] order ... reinstatement or 
hiring ...."); 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1982) (court may grant 'judgments compelling em­
126 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 35 
with "constructive" seniority, enabling the new employee to begin 
the job with the rights and benefits he or she would have had if 
the unlawful discrimination had not occurred.m In addition to in­
junctive relief, a court may also order monetary payments for 
three purposes: compensation for employment-related monetary 
losses,1112 payment of attorney's fees, 1113 and award of nominal 
damages.1114 The compensation for monetary loss can take the 
form of back pay11111 or front pay1116 and is designed to serve "the 
central statutory purpose of eradicating discrimination through­
out the economy and making persons whole for injuries suffered 
through past discrimination."1117 The award of attorney's fees to 
ployment, reinstatement or promotion ...."). Title' VII prohibits the court from order­
ing the hiring of a person or the reinstatement or award of back pay if the denial was "for 
any reasons other than discrimination on account of race, color, religon, sex or national 
origin ...." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1982). 
151. Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747 (1976). This seniority includes 
both benefit-type (vacation, pension, step-raises) and competitive-type (bidding and layoff 
preferences) seniority. 
152. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1982); Albemarle, 422 U.S. at 413-25. These payments 
include employment-related benefits, such as pensions, medical insurance and the like. 
They do not include moving expenses. See generally B. ScHLEI & P. GRoSSMAN, supra note 4, 
at 1418-51. 
153. Hensley v. Eckerhardt, 461 U.S. 424 (1983); New York Gaslight Club, Inc. v. 
Carey, 447 U.S. 54 (1980); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (1982). 
154. Nominal damages are not specifically authorized by Title VII, but are a tradi­
tional equitable remedy, D. DoBBS, supra note 135, § 3.8, at 193 (1973), and have been 
awarded in Title VII cases. See, e.g., Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 905 (11th 
Cir. 1982); Dean v. Civiletti, 670 F.2d 99, 101 (8th Cir. 1982);Joshi v. Florida State Univ., 
646 F.2d 981, 991 n.33 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 972 (1982). 
155. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1982). Back pay is the payment of earnings that a person 
would have received but for the unlawful discrimination. The award of back pay is subject 
to a host of technical requirements, including mitigation, set offs, fringe benefit calcula· 
tions and tax issues. See generally, B. ScHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, supra note 4, at 1418-52; C. 
SULUVAN, M. ZIMMER & R. RICHARDS, supra note 66, § 9.1. 
156. Front pay is the payment of future earnings to a person who has been adjudi· 
cated a victim of discrimination, but has not been offered a job (or reinstatement) by the 
defendant. It is awarded if no comparable position is presently available, or as an alterna· 
tive to reinstatement if the court determines that an amicable employment relationship 
between the parties is not possible. See Fitzgerald v. Sirloin Stockade, 624 F.2d 945 (lOth 
Cir. 1980). Front pay is generally calculated as "the estimated present value of lost earn· 
ings that are reasonably likely to occur between the date of judgment and the time when 
the employee can assume his new position." Patterson v. American Tobacco Co., 535 F.2d 
257, 269 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 920 (1976). 
157. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 421 (1975). The connection be· 
tween back pay and the "make whole" purpose is obvious. The monetary compensation 
serves the eradication purpose by providing "the spur or catalyst which causes employers 
and unions to self-examine and self-evaluate their employment practices and to endeavor to 
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the successful plaintiff serves a related purpose, "to encourage in­
dividuals injured by racial discrimination to seek judicial relief 
••••" 1118 Nominal damages vindicate the societal interest in pro­
tecting important rights, when the monetary damage caused by 
that injury is nonexistent or not ascertainable.1119 
These types of injunctive and monetary relief exhaust the cat­
egories of relief available under this class of statutes. As construed 
by virtually all courts, Title VII does not authorize compensatory 
damages for emotional distress or punitive damages.160 This limi­
eliminate, so far as possible, the last vestiges of an unfortunate and ignominious page in 
this country's history." Id. at 417-18 (quoting United States v. N.L. Indus., Inc., 479 F.2d 
354, 379 (8th Cir. 1973)). Back pay as a "spur or catalyst" is thus a form of deterrence. 
158. Newman v. Piggie Park Enter., 390 U.S. 400, 402 (1968) (construing attorney's 
fee provision in 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-3(a) (1982), the federal public accommodation law). 
The Court also discerned a second purpose, to penalize litigants who deliberately advance 
arguments that they know to be untenable. Piggie Park, 390 U.S. at 402. 
159. D. DoBBS, supra note 135, at 191. 
160. While the Supreme Court has not directly ruled on the availability of either type 
of remedy, dictum supports the statement in the text. Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, 
Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 458-60 (1975). The reasons advanced for the limitation of relief are 
varied: (a) reliance on the NLRA model, see, e.g., Walker v. Ford Motor Co., 684 F.2d 
1355, 1364 (lith Cir. 1982); (b) limitations implicit in the statute's use of the term "equita­
ble"; (c) comparisons with other statutes, such as the Fair Housing Act, that expressly au­
thorize such relief; and (d) the possibility that the availability of such damages would inter­
fere with the informal conciliation of complaints, see Greenbaum, Toward a Common Law of 
Employment Discrimination, 58 TEMP. L.Q. 65, 88-94 (1985). None of the arguments is con­
clusive. While it is true that "(t]he back pay provision was expressly modeled on the back 
pay provision of the National Labor Relations Act," Albemarle, 422 U.S. at 419, and that 
the NLRA has been interpreted as not authorizing compensatory and punitive damages, 
Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 235-36 (1938), the 1972 Amendments 
broadened the remedy section of Title VII beyond the limits of the NLRA. Sape & Hart, 
Title VII Reconsidered: The Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, 40 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 
824 (1972). In Title VII cases, the plaintiff is an individual not an agency, and the remedy­
formulator is a federal district court judge, not the NLRB. Thus, while it is entirely appro­
priate for back pay doctrine to inform Title VII back pay law, it is not similarly sensible for 
that same doctrine to control the scope of the broader Title VII remedy section. Addition­
ally, Title VIII was enacted in 1968, four years after the passage of Title VII and four 
years before the 1972 amendments that broadened § 2000e-5(g), the remedy section of 
Title VII. While the specific language on damages in Title VIII does indicate that Con­
gress knows how to authorize such damages if it focuses on the issue, the absence of such 
specific language provides only a weak inference of a Congressional intent to preclude such 
damages. 
The Age Discrimination In Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 
(1982), provides another example of narrowing judicial construction of remedy provisions. 
The statute authorizes "such legal or equitable relief as may be appropriate to effectuate 
the purposes of [the Act] ...•", id. § 626(b), and provides for a jury trial. Lorillard v. 
Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 585 (1978); 29 U.S.C. § 626(c)(2). But see Lehman v. Nakshian, 453 
U.S. 156, 168 (1980) (no jury trial for federal employees under the ADEA). While this 
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tation makes the relief provided by Title VII narrow, in the sense 
that it neither compensates a plaintiff for all injuries nor provides, 
as with punitive damages, a moral condemnation of the unlawful 
act and an extra measure of deterrence.161 There are strong argu­
ments for a broader interpretation of the relief authorized by the 
statute.162 Nevertheless, the case law is clear-compensatory and 
punitive damages are unavailable under Title VII and similarly 
construed statutes-and does not appear likely to change.163 
Many of the other laws against discrimination provide more 
combination of language and procedure led observers to predict the award of broad dam· 
ages, Smith & Leggette, Recent Issues in Litigation Under the Age Discrimination in Employment 
Act, 41 OHIO ST. L.J. 349, 366-68 (1976); B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, supra note 4, at 525-27, 
nn. 236-46 (1981) (collecting early cases); Note, Damage Remedies Under The Age Discrimina­
tion In Employment Act, 43 BROOKLYN L. REv. 47 (1976), the courts of appeals that have 
addressed this issue have concluded that compensatory damages for pain and suffering are 
not available under the ADEA. Perrell v. Financeamerica Corp., 726 F.2d 654, 657 (lOth 
Cir. 1984); Hill v. Spiegel, Inc., 708 F.2d 233, 235 (6th Cir. 1983); Fiedler v. Indianhead 
Truck Line, 670 F.2d 806, 809-10 (8th Cir. 1982); Pfeiffer v. Essex Wire Corp., 682 F.2d 
684 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1039 (1982); Naton v. Bank of Cal., 649 F.2d 
691, 698-99 (9th Cir. 1981); Slatin v. Stanford Research Inst., 590 F.2d 1292, 1293-96 
(4th Cir. 1979); Vazquez v. Eastern Air Lines, 579 F.2!i 107, 110 (1st Cir. 1978); Dean v. 
American Sec. Ins. Co., 559 F.2d 1036 (5th Cir. 1977); Rogers v. Exxon Research & Eng'g 
Co., 550 F.2d 834, 840-41 (3d Cir. 1977). On the punitive damages issue, the determina­
tion that such damages are not authorized by the ADEA is certainly correct. See H. R. CoNF. 
REP. No. 950, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 14, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CoNG. & ADMIN. NEWS 
528, 535 ("The ADEA as amended by this act does not provide remedies of a punitive 
nature."). The ADEA has a specific statutory provision for liquidated damages, in an 
amount equal to the back pay. 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1982) (incorporating to 29 U.S.C. §§ 
211(b), 216, 217-the remedy provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act). Such liquidated 
damages are awardable only if the solution is "willful." 29 U.S.C. § 216 (1982). See Trans 
World Airlines v. Thurston, 469 U.S. Ill, 126-27 (1985). 
161. For a survey of the common law requisites prompting punitive damage awards 
and the debate over their deterrent effect, see D. DOBBS, supra note 135, at 204-21. See also 
Developments in the Law • Employment Discrimination and Title VII of The Civil Rights Act of 
1964, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1109, 1261 (1971) ("[T]he award of punitive damages is a form of 
compensation for playing a public enforcement role."). 
162. The eradication, deterrence and compensation purposes are better served by 
broader relief. The limited remedies are inadequate to compensate the injuries caused by 
discrimination. Where the back pay damages are small or nonexistent, (because a plaintiff 
mitigates damages immediately or, as in some sexual harassment claims, remains on the 
job) and the emotional distress to the plaintiff is severe, the lack of compensatory damages 
as an available remedy reduces the size of the recovery and, to the extent that large recov­
eries provide the "spur and catalyst" to eradicate discrimination, lessens the deterrent 
value of the law. 
163. Note, Sexual Harassment Claims of Abusive Work Environment Under Title VII, 97 
HARV. L. REv. 1449, 1466 n.96 (1984) (predicting that such remedies will remain unavaila­
ble unless Congress amends Title VII). 
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complete relief. The Civil Rights Act of 1866 and 187P64 have 
been interpreted to authorize compensatory and punitive dam­
ages.165 Title VIII, the federal Fair Housing Act of 1968/66 spe­
cifically authorizes the award of all "actual damages,"167 which has 
been construed to include emotional distress damages168 as well as 
monetary losses such as moving expenses and increased housing 
expenses.169 Many state statutes authorize the award of compensa­
tory damages in discrimination cases, and some permit punitive 
damages.170 Damage recoveries under these statutes have ranged 
164. 42 u.s.c. §§ 1981-1983 (1982). 
16~. Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30 (1985) (§ 1983);Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, 
421 U.S. 454, 460 (1975) (§ 1981); Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229, 
238-40 ( 1969) (§ 1982). 
166. 42 u.s.c. §§ 3601-3631 (1982). 
167. Id. at § 3612(c). In keeping with the characterization of such relief as legal as 
opposed to equitable, there is no discretion in the award of these actual damages, even 
though the statute uses the term "may award." "[I)f a plaintiff proves unlawful discrimina­
tion and actual damages, he is entitled to judgment for that amount." Curtis v. Loether, 
415 U.S. 189, 197 (1974). There is also a right to a jury trial. ld. at 198. 
168. See, e.g., Phillips v. Hunter Trails Community Ass'n, 685 F.2d 184, 190-91 (7th 
Cir. 1982) (each plaintiff awarded $10,000 for humiliation and embarrassment). All the 
circuits that have addressed this issue have upheld the award of emotional distress dam­
ages. R. SCHWEMM, supra note 11, at 257 n.172. For a thorough discussion and collection of 
cases, see Schwemm, Compensatory Damages in Fair Housing Cases, 16 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 
83 (1981) [hereinafter Schwemm, Damages]. Title VIII also authorizes punitive damages 
but limits the amount of the award to $1,000. 42 U.S.C. § 3612(c) ("not more than $1,000 
punitive damage"). This limitation restricts recovery only for each claim in a case so that a 
lawsuit involving multiple parties (e.g., husband-and-wife plaintiffs, and husband-and-wife 
or partnership owners) and several claims could result in punitive damages in excess of 
$1,000. R. ScnwEMM, supra note 11, at 262. Cj Phillips, 685 F.2d at 191 (suggesting that 
$1,000 limitation in § 3612 does not apply to interference, intimidation and coercion 
claims under§ 3617). 
169. These actual economic losses are usually modest. See, e.g., Steele v. Title Realty 
Co., 478 F.2d 380 (lOth Cir. 1973) (plaintiff awarded $13.25 for telephone expenses and 
$125 for moving and storage expenses); R. ScHWEMM, supra note 11, at 256. 
170. The authorization for these more complete remedies is varied. The laws against 
discrimination in Kentucky and Tennessee have specific language allowing compensation 
for "humiliation and embarrassment;" KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 344.230 (Michie/Bobbs-Mer­
rill 1983); TENN. CoDE ANN. § 4-21-307 (1985). See also MINN. STAT. ANN. § 363.071(2) 
(West Supp. 1985) ("damages for mental anguish or suffering •.•.");N.Y. ExEc. LAw § 
297(3)(c) (McKinney 1982) ("awarding of compensatory damages"); WASH. REv. CoDE ANN. 
§ 49.60.250(5) (1981) ("[E)xcept that damages for humiliation and mental suffering shall 
not exceed $1,000."). The Montana statute permits damages for "any harm, pecuniary or 
otherwise;" MoNT. CoDE ANN.§ 49-2-506 (1985). Louisiana allows recovery of "general or 
special compensatory damages," LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 23:1006(D) (West 1985) ("general 
or special compensatory damages"). Other states authorize the award of "actual damages", 
and interpret that phrase to permit the recovery of emotional distress damages. See, e.g., 
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 68, § 8-108 (E) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1985) ("actual damages ... for 
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from a few dollars to $580,000.171 Even where modest, however, 
they serve as both a reminder and a vindication of the reality that 
"[a]s anyone who has been a victim of discrimination can attest, 
the wounds run deeper than the pocketbook. " 172 
One practical consequence of this divergence of standards at 
the remedy stage is that well-counseled plaintiffs structure dis­
crimination cases to permit the fullest recovery. They accomplish 
their purpose by combining claims under different statutes, so 
that the modern discrimination lawsuit often presents multiple 
counts arising under several statutes, both federal and state. In 
some circumstances, primarily in cases involving racial discrimina­
tion, plaintiffs can maximize their possible recovery by pleading 
only federal statutes. For example, in an employment case alleging 
injury or loss"); IowA ConE ANN. § 601A.15(8)(a)(8) (West Supp. 1986) ("actual damage") 
(Iron Workers Local 67 v. Hart, 191 N.W.2d 758, 767-68 (Iowa 1971)); MASS. GEN. LAWS 
ANN. ch. 151B, § 5 (West 1985) (housing- "damages, not to exceed two thousand dollars 
.••."); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 37.2605(2)(i) (West 1985) ("payment , . , of damages 
for an injury or loss"); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 213.120(6) (Vernon 1983) ("actual damages" in 
housing cases) Qoplin v. Missouri Comm'n on Human Rights, 642 S.W.2d 370, 375 (Mo. 
App. 1982)); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 495(b) (1982) (':damages"). In several other states, 
courts have found authorization for emotional distress damages by combining general lan­
guage with the compensatory and deterrent purposes of the statutes. See, e.g., MAss GEN. 
LAWS ANN. ch. 151B, § 5 (West Supp. 1985) ("such affirmative action ... as, in the judg­
ment of the commission, will effectuate the purposes of [the statute].") (Bournewood Hasp. 
v. Massachusetts Comm'n Against Discrimination, 371 Mass. 303, 358, N.E.2d 235 (1976)); 
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-17 (West Supp. 1985) (authorizing Division on Civil Rights director 
to take "affirmative action" to "effectuate the purpose of this act.") (Director, Div. on Civil 
Rights v. Slumber, Inc., 82 N.J. 412, 413 A.2d 603 (1980)). Compare ALASKA STAT. § 
22.10.020(c) (1985) ("any other relief, including payment of money, that is appropriate.") 
with Loomis Elec. Protection, Inc. v. Schaefer, 549 P.2d 1341, 1344 (Alaska 1976). 
171. See, e.g., Muldrew v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 728 F.2d 989 (8th Cir. 1984) (§ 1981 
award included: $52,644 for emotional distress and $72,355 in back pay): Block v. Macy & 
Co., 712 F.2d 1241 (8th Cir. 1983) (plantiffawarded under§ 1981:$12,402 for emotional 
distress, $60,000 in punitive damages, and $7,598 in back pay); Rodgers v. Fisher Body 
Div., 575 F. Supp. 12 (W.D. Mich. 1982) (under § 1981, plantiff awarded $80,000 for 
emotional distress, $500,000 in punitive damages, and $220,000 in back pay). See also J. 
KusHNER, supra note 11, at Appendix 9-1 (list of 122 cases): J. KusHNER, FAIR HoUSING 243 
(Supp. 1985) (additional listing of 21 cases); Schwemm, Damages, supra note 168, at 123-27 
(list of 46 cases with compensatory damages ranging from $1 to $15,000). See generally 
KENTUCKY COMM. ON HUMAN RIGHTS, DAMAGES FOR EMBARRASSMENT AND HUMILIATION IN 
DISCRIMINATION CASES (1982). 
172. Freeman v. Kelvinator, Inc., 469 F. Supp. 999, 1004 (E.D. Mich. 1979). See also 
Stallworth v. Shuler, 35 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 770, 775-76 (N.D. Fla. 1984) ("The 
Court is of the opinion that there is probably no monetary figure which would be entirely 
adequate to compensate this Plaintiff and provide him with redress for the wrongs and 
hurts suffered by him because of his race . . . . "). 
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racial discrimination, a plaintiff will ordinarily plead a Section 
1981 as well as a Title VII claim, in order to assure the availability 
of compensatory and punitive damages.173 However, since Section 
1981 does not apply to an employment case alleging sex or other 
forms of discrimination,174 a plaintiff raising those issues has no 
recourse to a federal statute that provides full recovery.175 In such 
situations, a plaintiff may look to state law for more complete re­
lief.176 The remedies available under state laws may be invoked 
173. Similarly, in a housing case alleging racial discrimination, even though Title VIII 
permits recovery of compensatory damages, a plaintiff will ordinarily plead a § 1982 as well 
as a Title VIII claim, in order to avoid Title VIII's $1,000 limitation on punitive damages. 
Sections 1981-1983 may also provide longer statutes of limitations, Burnett v. Grattan, 468 
U.S. 42 (1984), and direct access to court without the need to comply with administrative 
filing requirements. Patsy v. Board of Regents, 457 U.S. 496 (1982). See generally Green­
baum, supra note 160. 
174. See, e.g., Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 167 (1976) (dictum); Movement for 
Opportunity v. General Motors, 622 F.2d 1235, 1278 (7th Cir. 1980). See also B. SCHLEI & 
P. GROSSMAN, supra note 4, at 674 n.23 (listing of 28 cases holding that § 1981 is not 
applicable to discrimination based on sex). 
175. This proposition must be qualified in the case of a lawsuit against a public em­
ployer. Intentional sex discrimination by a public employer would constitute a constitu­
tional violation, Feeney v. Personal Adm'r of Mass., 442 U.S. 256, 276-80 (1979), actiona­
ble under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. While this statute has been construed to authorize both 
compensatory and punitive damages, Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 35 (1983), an award of 
damages against a government unit considered part of the state is barred by the Eleventh 
Amendment, Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89 (1984); Quern v. 
Jordan, 440 U.S. 332 (1979). Also, a suit against local governments must meet the policy 
requirement of Monell v. Department of Social Servs. of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978), 
and punitive damages cannot be awarded against a municipality. City of Newport v. Fact 
Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247 (1981). While most courts have permitted § 1983 employ­
ment discrimination claims against state and local governments, see, e.g., Day v. Wayne 
County Bd. of Auditors, 749 F.2d 1199 (6th Cir. 1984); Bradshaw v. Zoological Soc'y of 
San Diego, 569 F.2d 1066 (9th Cir. 1978), at least one judge, citing Great Am. Fed. Sav. & 
Loan Ass'n v. Novotny, 422 U.S. 366 (1979) has disallowed such claims, holding that Title 
VII provides the only federal remedy for these wrongs, Torres v. Wisconsin Dep't of 
Health & Soc. Servs., 592 F. Supp. 922 (E.D. Wis. 1984). 
176. Such reliance presupposes a state law with remedial provisions more complete 
than federal law, a situation that exists in at least sixteen jurisdictions. In addition to the 
statutes for Alaska, Illinois, Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minne­
sota, Montana, New Jersey, New York, Tennessee, Vermont and Washington, see supra 
note 170, see W.VA. CoDE§ 5-11-9 (Supp. 1986) (State Human Rights Comm'n v. Pauley 
158 W.Va. 495, 212 S.E.2d 77 (1975), overruled, 161 W. Va. I, 239 S.E.2d 147 (1977)). 
There are other jurisdictions that authorize compensatory damages, but only in housing 
cases. See CoNN. GEN. STAT. § 46a-64(c) (1982); HAWAII REv. STAT. § 515-7 (1976) ("dam­
ages for any injury"); Mo. ANN. STAT.§ 213.120 (Vernon 1983) Qoplin v. Missouri Comm'n 
on Human Rights, 642 S.W.2d 370 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982)); RI. GEN. LAws § 34-37-5(L)(I) 
(A) (1984) ("damages sustained thereby"). Other jurisdictions also authorize compensatory 
damages in age discrimination cases. OHIO REV. CoDE ANN. § 410 I.7 (Anderson 1982) (Bai­
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either by suing in state court, or by pleading a state law violation 
as a pendent state claim in a federal lawsuit. For several reasons, 
not the least of which is that plaintiffs often want to assert Title 
VII claims177 over which federal courts have exclusive jurisdic­
tion,178 the state law claims will most often appear as pendent 
ley v. Container Corp. of Am., 594 F. Supp. 629 (S.D. Ohio 1984)). In at least eight juris­
dictions, compensatory damages are clearly not permitted. ARK. STAT. ANN.§ 81-624 (1976) 
("amount of unpaid wages"); CoLO. REv. STAT. § 24-34-402, -502 (1982) (Silverstein v. Sis­
ters of Charity of Leavenworth, 38 Colo. App. 286, 559 P .2d 716 (1976); but see Rawson v. 
Sears, Roebuck & Co., 585 F. Supp. 1393, 1396 (D. Colo. 1984)); IND. CoDE ANN§ 22-9-1­
6-(k)(l) (Burns Supp. 1985) (Indiana Civil Rights Comm'n v. Holman, 177 Ind. App. 648, 
380 N.E.2d 1281 (1978)); Mo. ANN. CoDE art. 49B, § ll(e) (1979) (Gutwein v. Easton Pub­
lishing Co., 272 Md. 563, 325 A.2d 740, cert. denied, 420 U.S. 991 (1974)); N.H. REV. STAT. 
ANN.§ 354-A:9(d) (1984) (Swett, Inc. v. New Hampshire Comm'n For Human Rights, 124 
N.H. 404, 470 A.2d 921 (1983)); OR. REv. STAT. § 659.070 (1985) (Holien v. Sears, Roe· 
buck & Co., 298 Or. 76, 97-100, 689 P.2d 1292, 1303-05 (1984)); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 
959 (Purdon 1985) (Midland Heights Homes, Inc. v. Commmonwealth, 478 Pa. 625, 387 
A.2d 664 (1978)); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 111.36(3) (West 1974) (Bachand v. Connecticut Gen. 
Life Ins. Co., 101 Wis. 2d 617, 305 N.W.2d 149 (Ct. App. 1981)). Alabama and Mississippi 
have no statutory laws against discrimination, and in twenty-four states, the statutes are 
unclear and no reported decisions have been found. 
In Connecticut and Illinois, statutory discrimination cases must be adjudicated before a 
state human rights agency. There is no private cause of action in court, only judicial review 
of administrative decisions. In Kentucky, there is a private cause of action, but the com pen· 
satory damages can be awarded only by the state agency, not the court. These statutory 
restrictions would prohibit the adjudication of such claims as pendent claims in a federal 
lawsuit. 
177. There are two objective reasons for wanting to maintain a Title VII claim. Title 
VII clearly recognizes a disparate impact theory of discrimination. Other statutes such as 
section 1981 do not and state laws may be unclear. Thus, in a case that presents the possi· 
bility of both a disparate impact and a disparate treatment challenge, Title VII would be 
the preferred statute. Additionally, because Title VII is such a heavily litigated statute, 
there is abundant authority on most of the issues and federal judges are conversant with 
such claims. Even though many states have shown a willingness to use the Title Vll law and 
concepts, discrimination laws in most states are less developed than the federal law, and 
state judges may, therefore, have less experience in hearing these cases. The second reason 
for maintaining a Title VII claim is a practical one. Plaintiffs will frequently file pro se an 
administrative charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) and 
will arrive at their attorney's office only after receipt of a "right to sue" letter from the 
EEOC. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f}(l) (1982); 29 C.F.R. § 1601.28 (1985). As a jurisdictional 
matter, a plaintiff must file a Title VII complaint within ninety days of receipt of the letter. 
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(l) (1982). Consequently, there are often severe time pressures on 
the filing of the complaint and little opportunity to reflect on all the available avenues of 
relief. 
178. While the Supreme Court has not expressly decided the issue, Kremer v. Chemi­
cal Constr. Co., 456 U.S. 461, 479-80 & n.20, reh'g denied, 458 U.S. 1133 (1982), and the 
statute does not explicitly vest exclusive jurisdiction in the federal courts, the Court has 
stated that "the 'ultimate authority' to secure compliance with Title VII resides in the 
federal courts[,)" New York Gaslight Club, Inc. v. Carey, 447 U.S. 54, 64 (1980), and that 
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claims in· federal court.179 
Modern discrimination cases present a mosaic of different 
combinations of multiple federal and state claims, with the range 
of available remedies varying from case to case. In employment 
cases, a plaintiff alleging racial discrimination can combine Section 
1981 and Title VII claims and obtain full monetary relief.18°For a 
plaintiff alleging sex discrimination, however, the scope of availa­
ble relief depends on the party she is suing, and where the claim 
arises. If she is suing a state or local government defendant, 181 or 
if her claim arises in one of the jurisdictions that provide full re­
lief,1811 she can recover all the damages that she can prove. How­
ever, if her claim is against a private entity in a state that restricts 
the available relief, 188 her recovery will be limited. She may obtain 
only declaratory and possibly injunctive relief, nominal damages 
and attorney's fees. A person alleging age discrimination con­
fronts a similar situation. 184 
The variety presented by this mosaic may lack tidiness; it 
surely lacks symmetry. It does not lack form, however, and its 
form is the functional one of implementing the remedial choices 
Congress intended the "final responsibility for enforcement of Title VII'' to be assigned to 
the federal judiciary. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 44 (1974). The stat­
ute itself has a special venue provision for Title VII actions, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3) 
(1982), as well as a section providing for referral to a special master if the Title VII claim 
cannot be tried within 120 days. Id. § 2000e-5(f)(5); Valenzuela v. Kraft, Inc., 739 F.2d 434 
(9th Cir. 1984); C. SULLIVAN, M. ZIMMER & R. RICHARDS, supra note 66, § 3.14; Catania, 
State Employment Discrimination Remedies and Pendent jurisdiction Under Title VII: Access to 
Federal Courts, 32 AM. U.L. REV. 777, 804-05, {1983). 
179. The appropriateness of federal courts asserting pendent jurisdiction over state 
law claims in discrimination cases has been thoroughly discussed, and numerous case have 
been collected, in a recent article by Professor Catania, supra note 178. In only one area, 
dealing with "pendent parties", will a discrimination lawsuit encounter an implied "con­
gressional negative" of the type presented in Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1, 18 (1976). 
Title VII governs the conduct only of employers and their agents, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) 
(1982); it does cover discrimination by individuals whose conduct cannot be attributed to 
the employer. In a federal court lawsuit, such an unrelated individual would be a "pendent 
party", over whom the court would not have an independent base of jurisdiction. Any 
claims against a pendent party would face the substantial obstacle posed by Aldinger. See 
Muskiwamba v. ESSI, Inc., 760 F.2d 740, 754-55 (7th Cir. 1985); Catania, supra note 178, 
at 796 n.94. 
180. See supra note 165. 
181. Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1981). See supra note 175 for the Eleventh 
Amendment, Monell, and other limitations on suing a state or local government. 
182. See supra notes 170 & 176, for a listing of such jurisdictions. 
183. See supra note 176. 
184. See supra note 160. 
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made by the federal and state legislatures that have addressed the 
problem of unlawful discrimination. It works tolerably well with 
the basic discrimination case1811 and is also servicable in redressing 
the injuries involved in the non-determinative discrimination 
claims. 
Ill. THE NoN-DETERMINATIVE DISCRIMINATION CLAIM 
Although sharing the definition of discrimination as race­
based different treatment, the non-determinative discrimination 
claim specifies the substantive right and the injury in a different 
manner than the discriminatory outcome claim. With the discrimi­
natory outcome claim, a plaintiff asserts the right to be free from 
different treatment because of race in the outcome or final deci­
sion under review. The right under a non-determinative discrimi­
nation claim, on the other hand, is the broader right to be free of 
all forms of different treatment because of race in matters gov­
erned by the statute, even if that racial treatment does not change 
the final decision. The injury in a case of non-determinative dis­
crimination is the harm caused by the proven race-based different 
treatment, and the remedy is tailored to redress that injury. The 
relief is not the back pay and job offer that characterizes the dis­
criminatory outcome claim. Instead, the remedy for non-determi­
native discrimination involves an admixture of declaratory relief, 
emotional dis.tress or nominal damages, a preventive injunction to 
stop the discriminatory conduct and attorney's fees. 
A. Initially Determinative Discrimination 
Initially determinative discrimination occurs when D refuses 
even to consider P, because of P's race, and therefore makes an 
initial adverse decision for an unlawful reason. In the introductory 
example of initially determinative discrimination, two plaintiffs 
were denied jobs as computer salespersons because of race, but 
would not have been hired, even in the absence of discrimination, 
because of lack of experience (P2) and date of application (P3).186 
185. But see Modjecka, The Supreme Court and the Ideal Of Equal Employment Opportu­
nity, 36 MERCER L. REV. 795, 809-11 (1985) (Congress should transfer enforcement of Title 
VII from federal courts to an adjudicatory administrative agency with a "vibrant adminis­
trative process."). 
186. Although the example in the text concerns race discrimination, most recent cases 
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The discrimination was initially determinative but ultimately non­
determinative. 
The example is sharpened at this point to specify a case of 
explicit discrimination, where the plaintiffs were told by the de­
fendant that the reason for the denial was their race, and that this 
racial reason was the company policy.187 When these plaintiffs 
challenge the company's action, they present both discriminatory 
outcome and non-determinative discrimination claims. In their 
cases, the discriminatory outcome claim will be readily dismissed 
for failing to meet the but-for causation standard.188 The non-de­
terminative discrimination claim remains, however, to be ad­
dressed on its own merits. 
Several courts have concluded that initially determinative dis­
crimination is unlawful. They have perceived that the wrong is 
the race-based failure even to consider the plaintiffs for the posi­
tion, and that this wrong is independent of any subsequent deci­
sion. As one state court recognized, there are two separate types 
of discrimination, "discriminatory refusal to hire, and wrongful 
failure to fairly consider an applicant. " 189 In the case of the 
"wrongful failure to consider," "the gravamen of the ... com­
plaint is that [they] were not considered for the openings ... 
merely because they were women. [The defendant] can hardly de-
of initially determinative discrimination involve age and sex discrimination. For age cases, 
see, e.g., Smallwood v. United Airlines, 728 F.2d 614 (4th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 
832 (1984); Murane v. American Airlines, Inc., 482 F. Supp. 135, 148 (D.D.C. 1979), afl'd, 
667 F.2d 98 (D.C. Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 915 (1982). For cases involving explicit 
sex discrimination, see, e.g., Easerly v. Empire, 757 F.2d 923 (8th Cir. 1985); Lewis v. 
Smith, 731 F.2d 1535 (11th Cir. 1984); Dillon v. Coles, 746 F.2d 998 (3d Cir. 1984); Gillen 
v. Federal Paper Bd. Co., 479 F.2d 97 (2d Cir. 1973); Saracini v. Missouri Pac. R.R. Co., 
431 F. Supp. 389 (E.D. Ark. 1973). For cases involving covert sex discrimination, see, e.g., 
Ostroff v. Employment Exch., 683 F.2d 302 (9th Cir. 1982) (per curiam); EEOC. v. Ford 
Motor Co., 645 F.2d 183 (4th Cir. 1981), reu'd on other grounds, 458 U.S. 219 (1983). 
Courts and commentators draw examples from the race area. In International Bhd. of 
Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977), Justice Stewart referred to a putative 
employer who "announce[ d) his policy of discrimination by a sign reading 'Whites Only' on 
the hiring office door ...." /d. at 365. See also A. LARSON & L. LARSON, supra note I 1, at 
13-26 n.12; Brown, Givelber, & Subrin, supra note 1, at 28. 
187. See, e.g., Easerly v. Empire, 757 F.2d at 931 (company personnel manual stated: 
"[A] male Office Manager is better qualified to perform these duties; and, therefore, it is 
recommended that a male applicant be hired if possible."); Smallwood v. United Airlines, 
728 F.2d at 614 (explicit airline policy of not hiring pilots over thirty-five years old). 
188. See supra Section II B. 
189. Scarborough v. Arnold, 117 N.H. 803, 805, 379 A.2d 790, 793 (1977) (per 
curiam). 
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fend itself on the basis of relative qualifications when it never eval­
uated the qualifications of the women."190 When the plaintiffs are 
"not given equal treatment,"191 the defendant infringes their 
right not to be treated differently because of their race192 and vio­
lates its correlative duty not to engage in race-based different 
treatment.198 
While intuitively understandable, initially determinative dis­
crimination claims present a number of problems at both the lia­
bility and remedy stages. This discussion will first address proof 
and causation issues, and then turn to the calculation of damages, 
the determination of injunctive relief, and the award of attorney's 
fees. 
The first liability issue concerns the prima facie case. The 
original McDonnell-Douglas definition of the prima facie case re­
quired, as its second element, that plaintiffs prove that they were 
qualified for the job.194 Most plaintiffs raising non-determinative 
discrimination claims are, by definition, not qualified,19G and thus 
encounter a problem with this original definition of the prima fa­
cie case. 
Two arguments support the conclusion that lack of qualifica­
tions does not defeat the non-determinative discrimination claim. 
Both start with the recognition that the Supreme Court did not 
establish the McDonnell-Douglas methodology as an inflexible stan­
190. EEOC v. Ford Motor Co., 645 F.2d 183, 188 n.3 (4th Cir. 1981}. See also Gillen 
v. Federal Paper Bd. Co., 479 F.2d 97 (2d Cir. 1973), where the court stated: 
While the ultimate prize was won by the male who had superior qualifica· 
tions, this in our view does not purge Federal of its prior discriminatory act of 
refusing to consider her at all, not solely because of lack of qualification but 
because she was a woman. [T]he refusal . . . to consider her because she was a 
woman, is clearly a mischief which the statute was designed to prevent. 
/d. at 102. 
191. Gillen v. Federal Paper Bd. Co., 479 F.2d at 101. 
192. "[A] plaintiff may suffer harms that fall short of demonstrable loss of a job or 
promotion .... An illegal act of discrimination ... is a wrong in itself under Title VII 
•••. The goal of the statute is to bar all employer actions based on impermissible fac­
tors." Smith v. Secretary of the Navy, 659 F.2d 1113, 1120 (D.C. Cir. 1981). 
193. "[W]e hold that (the defendant] did transgress by failing to consider [the plain­
tiff] not simply because she was not qualified but because she was a woman." Gillen v. 
Federal Paper Bd. Co., 479 F.2d at 102. 
194. McDonnell-Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). See also supra Sec­
tion II A. 
195. Not every non-determinative discrimination plantiff lacks the stated qualifica­
tions. Some may be rejected, not for lack of qualifications, but because they applied too 
late or because there were too many earlier applicants for the position. 
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dard but as a "sensible and orderly way" to proceed in certain 
cases.196 The first argument reminds us that, in cases of overt dis­
crimination such as the one posited in the example, the·discrimi­
nation is either admitted or is readily proved by direct evidence. 
The plaintiff does not rely on presumptions and circumstantial 
proof, but instead directly shows that the defendant treated her 
differently because of her race.197 In a direct evidence case, there 
is no need to use the McDonnell-Douglas methodology or to estab­
lish a prima facie case. 
In some initially determinative discrimination cases, however, 
the discrimination will be covert, and the plaintiff may need to 
utilize circumstantial proof and the McDonell-Douglas presump­
tion. Although the prima facie case performs the identical func­
tion-shifting the burden of production-for both discriminatory 
outcome and non-determinative discrimination claims, the ele­
ments of the prima facie case are different for each claim. The 
qualification element for outcome claims serves the distinct pur­
pose of filtering out claims with little or no merit.198 If the dis­
criminatory outcome plaintiff is not at least minimally qualified, 199 
then there is no basis for presuming that the decision to reject was 
based on race. For the non-determinative discrimination claim, 
the qualification element has a comparable but much reduced 
196. The Court recognized that "[t]he facts necessarily will vary ... and the specifi­
cation above of the prima facie proof . . . is not necessarily applicable in every respect to 
differing factual situations." McDonnell-Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802 n.13. See also Texas Dep't 
of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253-54 n.6; Frunco Constr. Corp. v. Wa­
ters, 438 U.S. at 575-76 (1978). 
197. The direct evidence, if believed, establishes the discrimination and the defendant 
can escape liability only by showing, in the Eleventh Circuit, that the result would have 
been the same, see supra note 112, or by establishing an affirmative defense. The most 
common defense in cases of overt discrimination is that the discrimination is justified as a 
bona fide occupational qualification. See supra notes 60-61. The burden of proof is on the 
defendant to establish this affirmative defense. Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977). 
198. See generally Bartholet, supra note 74, at 1210-14. 
199. In Aikens, the Court avoided ruling on the position taken by some courts, see, e.g., 
Adams v. Reed, 567 F.2d 1283, 1286-87 (5th Cir. 1978); But cf. Aikens v. United States 
Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors, 665 F.2d 1057, 1059 (D.C. Cir. 1981), vacated, 460 U.S. 
711 (1983), that the plaintiff must show that he or she was "as qualified or more qualified" 
than other persons. United States Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. at 
713. However, because of the Court's previous characterization of the plaintiff's burden as 
"not onerous," Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253, the better view is that the plaintiff can establish a 
prima facie case by showing that he or she possesses average qualifications. Any lack of 
relative qualifications is better addressed as part of the defendant's response. B. SCHLEI & P. 
GROSSMAN, supra note 4 at 1298-99, 1312. 
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role. Plaintiffs need only provide evidence which shows that it is 
more probable than not that the defendant's failure to consider 
them was based on their race. In the non-determinative discrimi­
nation case, this showing generally will not involve qualifica­
tions.200 Instead, the prima facie case should include proof of: (1) 
membership in a protected class; (2) application (or attempted ap­
plication); (3) rejection (or refusal to consider); and (4) some evi­
dence to suggest that white applicants for the same or similar posi­
tions were not summarily rejected but were evaluated on the 
merits. The fourth element is the critical one. In a case of covert, 
initially determinative discrimination, this element is often pro­
vided by the testimony of a "tester," a white person who applies 
and is afforded better treatment than the black applicant. 201 While 
most often used in housing cases, 202 evidence supplied by testers is 
also used in employment cases to provide facts necessary to estab­
lish the prima facie case.203 More traditional comparative evidence 
can also establish the different treatment and the presumption of 
unlawful action. 
The establishment of a prima facie case shifts the burden of 
production to the defendant to articulate a legitimate, nondiscrim­
inatory reason for its failure to consider the plaintiff's applica­
tion.204 There may be such a reason. A defendant might state 
that, while it normally accepted applications from all people, it re­
fused to consider the plaintiff's application because he or she was 
unkempt or obnoxious.2011 This stated reason would be a non-ra­
cial reason, and the inquiry would then focus on whether it was 
200. Ostroff v. Employment Servs., 683 F.2d 302, 304 (9th Cir. 1982) (per curiam), 
201. The Supreme Court has defined testers as "individuals who, without an intent to 
rent or purchase a horne or apartment, pose as renters or purchasers for the purpose of 
collecting evidence of unlawful steering practices." Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 
U.S. 363, 373 (1982). See generally LEADERSHIP COUNCIL FoR METROPOLITAN OPEN COMMU· 
NlTIES, INVESTIGATION AND AUDlTING IN FAIR HoUSING CASES (1975). Testers have standing 
to sue on their own, Havens Realty Corp., 455 U.S. at 373-75, but more often provide criti­
cal testimony as witnesses in discrimination cases. As the Tenth Circuit has stated: "It 
would be difficult indeed to prove discrimination in housing without this means of gather­
ing evidence.'' Hamilton v. Miller, 477 F.2d 908, 910 n.1 (lOth Cir. 1973). 
202. See generally R. ScHWEMM, FAIR HousiNG LAW 416-17,429-31 (1983); J. KusHNER, 
supra note 11, at 70-81. 
203. See Ostroff, 683 F.2d at 304 (test by plaintiff's husband); Lea v. Cone Mils Corp., 
438 F.2d 86 (4th Cir. 1971) (per curiam) (test by black woman). 
204. See supra Section II A. 
205. See, e.g., Nanty v. Barrows Co., 660 F.2d 1327 (9th Cir. 1981). 
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the real reason or a pretext for unlawful discrimination. While the 
defendant's reason in the initially determinative discrimination 
claim may often have a post hoc character that strains credibility, 
the plaintiff has the burden of proof on this issue and must con­
vince the factfinder that the reason· was a pretext.206 
The second liability issue in the non-determinative discrimi­
nation case, the causation requirement, is straightforward. As part 
of their case, the plaintiffs will show that race was the determina­
tive, but-for factor in the defendant's failure to consider their ap­
plications and that their applications would have been considered 
if race had not been used. The causation requirement is easily met 
because the non-determinative discrimination claim carefully spec­
ifies the wrong to which the racial motive can be readily traced. 
Whereas race was not a but-for cause of the failure to hire, it was 
the but-for cause of the failure to consider.207 The more precise 
specification of the wrong resolves the causation problem that· 
plagued the discriminatory outcome case. 
Once the plaintiffs establish liability, several remedial issues 
require resolution. Since the remedy is designed to right the 
wrong inflicted upon the plaintiffs, and the wrong is the failure to 
consider their applications, the appropriate remedy is not the 
combination of back pay and reinstatement so familiar to the out­
come case. Such relief would be inappropriate in the non-determi­
native discrimination case for precisely the reasons identified by 
the Supreme Court in Mt. Healthy. It would give the plaintiffs a 
windfall by "placing the [plaintiffs] in a better position"208 than 
they would have occupied had there been no discrimination. How­
ever, the non-determinative discrimination plaintiffs may have suf­
fered emotional distress damages. Depending on the facts of a 
given case-the particular plaintiff and defendant, the position in­
volved, the specific interaction of the parties-the plaintiff may or 
may not have been deeply upset, humiliated or embarrassed. In an 
appropriate case, where the plaintiff can prove an injury and pre­
sent either federal or state claims that authorize damages for such 
206. See supra Section II A. 
207. Indeed, the causation issue collapses into a tautology: the denial of the right to be 
considered without regard to race is caused by the consideration (and rejection) because of 
race. The proof of the race-based failure to consider ipso facto establishes the required but­
for causation. 
208. Mt. Healthy City School Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 285 (1977). 
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injuries,209 he or she should be awarded appropriate 
compensation. 
The threshold decision to allow recovery of emotional distress 
damages leads to another problem, the calibration of those dam­
ages for the non-determinative discrimination violation. Since the 
violation was the failure to consider, and not the failure to hire, 
the damages can compensate only the emotional distress caused by 
the non-consideration, and must be purged of any award for dis­
tress caused by the non-hiring. Given that emotional distress is 
subjective and difficult to evaluate,210 the requirement that the 
fact-finder further parse the plaintiff's emotional distress to com­
pensate only that distress caused by the initially determinative dis­
crimination violation is a demanding one. While necessary to 
avoid a windfall to the plaintiff and a blurring of the distinction 
between outcome and non-determinative discrimination claims, it 
surely will impose a considerable burden on the fact-finding pro­
cess. Nevertheless, as Justice Harlan observed in an analogous 
context, "the experience of judges in dealing with private [tort] 
claims supports the conclusion that courts of law are capable of 
making the types of judgment concerning causation and magni­
tude of injury necessary to accord meaningful compensation for 
invasion of . . . rights. " 211 
The requirement that compensation be awarded only for in­
juries caused by the actual violation, and the resultant need for 
precision in remedy-phase fact-finding, are not issues. unique to 
discrimination law. Similar problems regularly arise in the field of 
constitutional torts,212 particularly in cases involving procedural 
due process violations. In Carey v. Piphus,218 the Supreme Court 
considered a case very similar to a non-determinative discrimina­
tion claim. Two students suspended from high school without 
209. See supra Section II C. 
210. See W. PRossER & P. KEETON, PRoSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF ToRTS 54-64 
(5th ed. 1984); C. McCORMICK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF DAMAGES 318-19 (1935). 
211. Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388,409 (1971) (Harlan, 
J., concurring in judgment). 
212. A constitutional tort is the breach of the duty not to violate the plaintiff's "rights, 
privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution ...." 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1981). The 
literature on the subject is enormous. See, e.g., Newman, Suing the Lawbreakers: Proposals to 
Strengthen the Section 1983 Damage Remedy for Law Enforcer's Misconduct, 87 YALE L.J. 447 
(1978); Whitman, Constitutional Torts, 79 MICH. L. REv. 5 (1980); Yudof, Liability For Consti­
tutional Torts and the Risk-Averse Public School Official, 49 S. CAt. L. REV. 1322 (1976). 
213. 435 u.s. 247 (1978). 
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prior hearings214 alleged that their suspensions constituted depri­
vations of liberty without due process in violation of the four­
teenth amendment.2115 They sought declaratory and injunctive re­
lief and damages.216 In deciding "the elements and prerequisites 
for the recovery of damages,"217 the Court considered whether 
damages should be awarded if the school could prove on remand 
that the students "would have been suspended even if a proper 
hearing had been held. " 218 In such a situation, the due process 
violation would not have been outcome-determinative. Therefore, 
the plaintiffs could not "recover damages to compensate them for 
injuries caused by the suspensions"219 which would have occurred 
anyway. Transposing this teaching to the non-determinative dis­
crimination case, Carey underscores the point that damages cannot 
be awarded for injuries caused by an outcome decision which 
would nevertheless have occurred. 
More importantly, however, the Court in Carey reaffirmed 
that the plaintiffs could recover damages for emotional distress 
caused by and traceable to unlawful conduct, 220 in that case the 
denial of a hearing. Because of the "ambiguity in causation,"221 
the Court emphasized the "need for requiring the plaintiff to con­
vince the trier of fact that he actually suffered distress because of 
214. Respondent jarius Piphus was suspended for twenty days for allegedly smoking 
marijuana in violation of a school rule prohibiting the use of drugs. /d. at 249. Respondent 
Silas Briscoe was suspended for twenty days for wearing one small earring in violation of a 
school rule which prohibited the wearing of earrings by male students. /d. at 250. 
215. /d. The due process clause of the fourteenth amendment provides: "[N]or shall 
any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." It 
has been construed to require at least an informal hearing prior to suspension from public 
school for more than a short period of time. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975). 
216. Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. at 250-51. Piphus sought actual and punitive damages 
totaling $3,000. Briscoe sought actual and punitive damages of $5,000. /d. 
217. !d. at 248. 
218. /d. at 260, quoting Piphus v. Carey, 545 F.2d 30, 32 (7th Cir. 1976). 
219. Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. at 260. 
220. /d. at 263. The Court "use[d) the term 'distress' to include mental suffering or 
emotional anguish. Although essentially subjective, genuine injury in this respect may be 
evidenced by one's conduct and observed by others. Juries must be guided by appropriate 
instructions, and an award of damages must be supported by competent evidence concern­
ing the injury.'' /d. at 264 n.20. 
221. Id. at 263. The ambiguity was that "whatever distress a person feels may be at­
tributable to the justified deprivation rather than to deficiencies in procedure." /d. This 
ambiguity is directly analogous to the similar problem with discriminatory outcome and 
non-determinative discrimination claims in discrimination law. 
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the denial of procedural due process itself."222 However, the 
Court did not "foresee [any] particular difficulty" in producing ev­
idence and making the factual determinations necessary to resolve 
such claims.223 The conclusion drawn from Carey, then, is that the 
legal system has the capacity to perform the careful fact-finding 
necessary in these cases. As with other determinations in discrimi­
nation cases, the task is "sensitive and difficult."224 However, it is 
necessary in order to award compensation for injuries truly caused 
by unlawful discrimination, and to avoid windfall awards for inju­
ries not so caused. 
The Carey decision also highlights the value of nominal dam­
ages in appropriate cases. Not every non-determinative discrimi­
nation plaintiff will suffer (or will be able to prove that he or she 
suffered) emotional distress damages attributable to the failure to 
consider. Such plaintiffs are entitled to nominal damages even 
though the actual injury caused by the deprivation is modest, non­
existent, or not ascertainable.2215 As the Court stated: 
By making the deprivation of such rights actionable for nominal damages 
without proof of actual injury, the law recognizes the importance to organ­
ized society that those rights be scrupulously observed; but at the same time, 
it remains true to the principle that substantial damages should be awarded 
only to compensate actual injury or, in the case of exemplary or punitive 
damages, to deter or punish malicious deprivations of rights.236 
Nominal damages have been approved in a number of dis­
crimination cases.227 A black plaintiff who was discriminated 
222. Id. 
223. Id. Subsequent to the Carey decision, courts have gained experience from hun­
dreds of cases in assessing this type of damages. See, e.g., County of Monroe, Fla. v. United 
States Dep't of Labor, 690 F.2d 1359 (11th Cir. 1982); Black v. Stephens, 662 F.2d 181 
(3d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1008, reh'g denied, 456 U.S. 950 (1982); Wilson v. 
Taylor, 658 F.2d 1021 (5th Cir. 1981);Jones v. Dep't of Human Resources, 300 N.C. 687, 
268 S.E.2d 500 (1980). 
224. United States Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 716 (1983). 
225. See C. McCORMICK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF DAMAGES §§ 20-22 (1935); D. 
DoBBS, supra note 135, § 3.8. 
226. Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. at 266. 
227. See, e.g., Erebia v. Chrysler Plastics Prods., 37 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1820 
(6th Cir. 1985) (§ 1981 race claim); Irby v. Sullivan, 737 F.2d 1418 (5th Cir. 1984) (§§ 
1981, 1983 race claim); Goodwin v. Circuit Court of St. Louis County, Mo., 729 F.2d 541 
(8th Cir. 1984) (Title VII·§ 1983 sex claim), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 1194 (1985); Katz v. 
Dole, 709 F.2d 251 (4th Cir. 1983) (Title VII sex claim); Dean v. Civiletti, 670 F.2d 99 
(8th Cir. 1982) (Title VII sex claim); Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897 (11th Cir. 
1982) (Title VII sex claim); T & S Serv. Assoc. v. Crenson, 666 F.2d 722 (1st Cir. 1981) (§ 
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against in housing, but who might not have received the rental 
unit in any event because of the large number of other applicants, 
was entitled to nominal damages. 228 An applicant for a teaching 
position who established that her sex and national origin were "a 
factor" in her denial, but who would not have been hired because 
other individuals were more qualified, received nominal damages 
for the violation.229 In lieu of the customary one dollar for such 
damages,230 at least one state statute specifically establishes a rate: 
"unless greater damages are proven, damages may be assessed at 
$500 for each violation."231 Whether statutory or common law, 
nominal damages are well-suited for certain non-determinative 
discrimination claims. 
Injunctive relief must be specially crafted for the non-deter­
minative discrimination case. The affirmative injunction that is 
commonplace in the discriminatory outcome case will usually be 
inappropriate for a non-determinative discrimination claim. 232 In­
stead, the injunctive relief, if any, will be a preventative injunc­
tion,283 the issuance of which will depend upon a traditional equi­
1981 race claim); Gore v. Turner, 563 F.2d 159 (5th Cir. 1977) (Title VII race claim); 
Compston v. Borden, 424 F. Supp. 157 (S.D. Ohio 1976) (Title VII religion claim); Miles v. 
F.E.R.M. Enters., 29 Wash. App. 61, 627 P.2d 564 (1981) (state racial housing claim). 
228. Jordan v. Dellway Villa of Tenn. Ltd., 661 F.2d 588, 594 (6th Cir. 1981), cert. 
denied, 455 U.S. 1008 (1982). 
229. Joshi v. Florida State Univ., 646 F.2d 981, 991 n.33 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 
456 u.s. 972 (1982). 
230. See, e.g., Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. at 267 ("nominal damages not to exceed one 
dollar ... .").But see Compston v. Borden, 424 F. Supp. 157, 163 (S.D. Ohio 1976) (nom­
inal damages of $50). 
231. HAw. REv. STAT. § 515-13(b)(7) (1976). The Hawaii provision applies only to 
housing discrimination cases. The $500 figure may have been derived from § 705 of the 
Model Anti-Discrimination Act of the National Conference of Commissions on Uniform 
State Laws, drafted in 1966 by Professor Norman Dorsen. Note, The Proposed Uniform State 
Civil Rights Act: An Analysis With Recommendations, 7 B.C. INDUS. & CoM. L. REV. 660, 666, 
668 (1966). The $500 provision was designed "to compensate complainants who suffer 
none or a speculative financial loss." Id. at 691 (quoting comment to a proposed model of§ 
705 of the Civil Rights Act). The National Conference adopted a "Model Act" on August 
3, 1986. Bonfield, The Substance ofAmerican Fair Employment Practices Legislation 1: Employ­
ers, 61 Nw. U.L. REv. 907, 911 n.13 (1967). 
232. In the affirmative injunction, D is ordered to offer P the job, apartment or loan 
that she would have obtained but-for the discrimination, see supra Section II C. This relief 
is inappropriate in the non-determinative discrimination case because it would give P some­
thing that she would not have obtained had there been no discrimination. 
233. See 0. Fiss, THE CIVIL RIGHTS INJUNCTION 8, 9, 32 (1978); 0. F1ss, INJUNCTIONS 1, 2 
(1972). 
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table review of the facts in each case.234 
Where an employer has a clearly identified company policy of 
refusing to consider blacks, the argument for enjoining the policy 
is straightforward, and a court can specify the unlawful activity 
that will be enjoined by its order. In this clear case, the fact that a 
plaintiff has prevailed on a non-determinative discrimination 
claim, as opposed to a discriminatory outcome claim, is not a sig­
nificant factor in the equitable calculus. Courts have issued injunc­
tions so that plaintiffs "can be considered for future appointments 
free of the taint of the invidious consideration."2311 However, 
where the violation looks more like a single, unrelated incident 
than an example of an established policy, and where the requested 
injunction becomes a paraphrase of the broad statutory prohibi­
tion against discrimination, then the appropriateness of a preven­
tive injunction and the likelihood of its issuance are diminished.236 
234. A constitutional standing argument against a preventive injunction may be sug­
gested by the Supreme Court's recent decision in Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95 
(1983). In that case, as one part of the relief in a complaint brought under 42 U.S.C. § 
1983, a black plaintiff sought an injunction ordering the city of Los Angeles to prohibit its 
police officers from using a chokehold except in certain specified circumstances. Writing 
for the Court, justice White stated that "to have a case or controversy ... that could 
sustain [the injunction], Lyons would have to credibly allege that he faced a realistic threat 
••." offuture injury from the challenged conduct. Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. at 107 
n.7. If the opinion is "read ... for all it might be worth," (as Professor Henry Hart com­
mented ironically about another questionable Supreme Court case addressing an article III 
issue, Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1868); Hart, The Power of Congress to Limit 
the jurisdiction of Federal Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1362, 1364 
(1953)), plaintiffs in all federal cases may be required to establish standing separately for 
each type of relief they seek. However, the statutory grants of standing to discrimination 
plaintiffs are broad, "as broa[d] as permitted by Article III of the Constitution." Traf· 
ficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 209 (1972) (construing 42 U.S.C. § 
2000e-5) (quoting Hacket v. McGuire Bros., 445 F.2d 442, 446 (1971)); Gladstone Realtors 
v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 109 (1979) (construing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5, quoting 
Tra.fficante). The statutes indicate a Congressional desire "to expand standing to the full 
extent permitted by Article III, thus permitting litigation by one 'who otherwise would be 
barred by prudential standing rules.'" Gladstone, 441 U.S. at 100, (quoting Warth v. Sel· 
din, 422 U.S. 490, 501 (1975)). Thus, even if the specialized injunction-standing doctrine 
in Lj·ons survives, it is unlikely to be applied as a barrier to injunctive relief against proven 
statutory discrimination. Indeed, the contemplation of its application to such cases exposes 
the lack of an analytical foundation of the Lyons decision. See Fallon, OJjusticiability, Reme­
dies and Public Law Litigation: Notes on the jurisprudence of Lyons, 59 N.Y.U. L. REV. I (1983). 
235. Evans v. Harnett County Bd. ofEduc., 684 F.2d 304, 306 (4th Cir. 1982). See also 
Smallwood v. United Airlines, Inc., 728 F.2d 614, 618 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 
120 (1984); King v. Trans World Airlines, 738 F.2d 255 (8th Cir. 1984); EEOC v. Mon­
arch Mach. Tool Co., 737 F.2d 1444 (6th Cir. 1980). 
236. The results of applying the general rules are varied, even within the same circuit. 
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The final remedy issue for the initially determinative discrimi­
nation plaintiff is the award of attorney's fees. The laws against 
discrimination typically authorize an award to a "prevailing 
party,"287 who "should ordinarily recover an attorney's fee unless 
special circumstances would render such an award unjust. " 288 
Since a plaintiff who wins a non-determinative discrimination 
claim will usually have also litigated and lost a discriminatory out­
come claim, the question is whether the non-determinative dis­
crimination plaintiff is a prevailing party under the attorney's fees 
statutes.289 
In the recent case of Hensley v. Eckerhart,240 the Supreme 
Court developed an approach to the award of attorney's fees to "a 
partially prevailing plaintiff. " 241 The Court approved the "typical 
formulation"242 that " 'plaintiffs may be considered 'prevailing 
parties' for attorney's fees purposes if they succeed on any signifi­
cant issue in litigation which achieves some of the benefit the par­
ties sought in bringing suit.' " 248 Under this standard, a plaintiff 
In Lewis v. Smith, 731 F.2d 1535 (lith Cir. 1984), one panel of the Eleventh Circuit ruled 
that "where there is abundant evidence of consistent past discrimination, injunctive relief is 
mandatory, absent clear and convincing proof that there is no reasonable probability of 
further noncompliance with the law." Id. at 1540. In Carmichael v. Birmingham Saw 
Works, 738 F.2d 1126 (11th Cir. 1984), a different panel held that injunctive relief was 
inappropriate where the plaintiff did not seek the job nor show how he would personally 
benefit from the injunction, stating that "the class benefited by the injunction must include 
the plaintiff." Id. at 1136. 
237. 42 u.s.c. § 1988 (1981). 
238. Newman v. Piggie Park Enters., 390 U.S. 400, 402 (1968), quoted inS. REP. No. 
1011, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 4, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CoDE CoNG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5908, 
5912. 
239. As previously discussed supra note 65, discriminatory outcome and non-determi­
native discrimination claims are separate legal theories of recovery, not separate claims in a 
formal sense. Since both claims arise out of the same facts, fees should be awarded for 
work on the non-determinative discrimination claim. As one leading treatise articulates this 
approach: "if the test is expressed in the affirmative, fees would be awarded for all claims, 
successful or unsuccessful, arising out of a common nucleus of operative fact, or, if ex­
pressed in the negative, fees would be denied if an unsuccessful claim arises out of a sepa­
rate transaction or occurrence." 1 M. DERFNER & A. WoLF, CouRT AWARDED ATrORNEY 
FEES§§ 12-18.1 (1983). 
240. 461 u.s. 424 (1983). 
241. Id. at 426. 
242. Id. at 433. 
243. Id. (quoting Nadeau v. Helgemoe, 581 F.2d 275, 278-79 (1st Cir. 1978)). In foot­
note 8, the Court cited, with the less approving signal "cf.", the case of Taylor v. Sterret, 
640 F.2d 663, 669 (5th Cir. 1981). 461 U.S. at 433 n.8. The Taylor formulation of the 
standard for a partially prevailing plaintiff is less generous: "the proper focus is whether 
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who prevails on an initially determinative discrimination claim 
should be entitled to reasonable attorney's fees, as well as the 
other relief previously discussed. The courts have regularly en­
tered such awards.2"" 
the plaintiff has been successful on the central issue as exhibited by the fact that he has 
acquired the primary relief sought." Taylor, 640 F.2d at 669 (emphasis added). 
244. See, e.g., King v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 738 F.2d 255 (8th Cir. 1984); Evans 
v. Harnett County Bd. of Educ., 684 F.2d 304 (11th Cir. 1982); Ostroff v. Employment 
Exch., Inc., 683 F.2d 302 (9th Cir. 1982) (per curiam); T & S Servs. Assoc. v. Crenson, 666 
F.2d 722 (1st Cir. 1981). The argument that attorney's fees should not be awarded has 
been poorly received by the courts. This argument begins by characterizing a plaintiff not 
as a non-determinative discrimination winner, but as a discriminatory outcome loser. In 
this view, the central claim is the outcome claim, the primary relief sought is the outcome­
relief of back pay and reinstatement, and the plaintiff loses on both major issues. Since the 
plaintiff is primarily a loser, it is argued that he or she should not be considered a prevail­
ing party. The argument is flawed in at least two ways. First, implying a Congressional 
intent to award attorney's fees to only certain "central" or "primary" theories of recovery, 
it misconstrues the statutory term "prevailing" and adds a limitation neither present in the 
statute nor recognized by the Court. Second, the argument depends on a devaluation of 
the non-determinative discrimination claim, an unspoken premise that such claims are not 
worthy of fee awards. However, the legislature has rejected this premise by creating the 
substantive right and authorizing fee awards for a party who proves a violation of that 
right. 
Assuming that the plaintiff is a prevailing party entitled to some award of attorney's 
fees, the next step is the calculation of the fee. The attorney will have spent time on both 
the successful and the unsuccessful claims. The problem is to decide how many of the total 
hours should be compensated. The preparation and litigation of a non-determinative dis­
crimination claim is complex and time-consuming, not appreciably different than trying a 
discriminatory outcome claim. The factual issues are similar and both are difficult; the dis­
covery is equally broad. Perhaps not until the close of the trial (or the issuance of the 
decision) will the attorney know whether the outcome or consideration claim will prevail. 
The professional time involved in pursuing both claims in the same case is not easily divisi­
ble, and most of the work will be fairly attributable to both claims. Therefore, if the plain­
tiff's counsel keeps "detailed records of the time and services for which fees are sought," 
Hensley, 461 U.S. at 440 (Burger, C.J., concurring), specifically noting the (usually concur· 
rent) time spent on the non-determinative discrimination claim, he or she will be able to 
show that the hours were spent on the successful claims and that they were reasonable. 
This showing, however, may not be sufficient. The Court may be planning to introduce the 
issue of partial success as a factor in the fee calculation. In Hensley, the Court also stated 
that "the most critical factor is the degree of success obtained." Hensley, 461 U.S. at 436. If 
the plaintiff "has obtained excellent results, his attorney should recover a fully compensa­
tory fee," id. at 435, but where the plaintiff "has achieved only partial or limited success," 
id. at 436, the fee may be reduced so as to be "reasonable in relation to the success 
achieved." Id. at 440. These latter remarks indicate that the Court may approve, in a given 
case where the "degree of success" was less than complete, the reduction of a fee award 
even if the hours are reasonable and carefully documented. For a thorough discussion of 
fee computations, see 2M. DERFNER & A. WOLF, COURT AWARDED ATTORNEY FEES§§ 15·1· 
501, 16-1-14 (1984). 
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B. Process Discrimination 
Process discrimination is different treatment because of race, 
not in the initially determinative or final decision, but in the 
processes that precede that decision. 
The most common type of process discrimination is different 
treatment at the application stage. A black applicant was given no 
interview at all;2411 a Chinese woman received an abbreviated in­
terview in which she was not asked the important hypothetical 
questions posed to other candidates.246 While other candidates 
were asked during a pre-hire interview about their work experi­
ence and training, a female applicant was quizzed on her marital 
status, pregnancy, number of children and child-care plans. 247 A 
black prospective purchaser of a cooperative housing unit was sub­
jected to "insistent and unprecedented" questioning.248 A black­
owned business bidding on a school contract was not inspected, as 
were all other bidders, prior to the bid award.249 Another appli­
cant encountered "the classic 'runaround' " 2110 and other "proce­
dural irregularities" which denied "an opportunity to compete on 
an equal footing."2111 
In each example, the plaintiff could challenge the alleged dis­
crimination in the process as well as in the adverse outcome.2112 As 
with other types of discrimination, the plaintiff could prove that 
245. Rasminas v. Michigan Dep't of Mental Health, 714 F.2d 614 (6th Cir. 1983), cert. 
denied, 466 U.S. 950 (1984). 
246. Woodbury County v. Iowa Civil Rights Comm'n, 335 N.W.2d 161, 169 (Iowa 
1983) (Schultz, J., dissenting). 
247. King v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 738 F.2d 255 (8th Cir. 1984). See also Ander­
son v. City of Bessemer, 470 U.S. 564 (1985). 
248. Robinson v. 12 Lofts Realty, Inc., 610 F.2d 1.032, 1041 (2d Cir. 1979). 
249. T & S Servs. Co. v. Crenson, 666 F.2d 722. 
250. Fiss, Theory, supra note 6, at 272 (citing Dobbins v. Local 212, IBEW, 272 F. 
Supp. 413, 425 (S.D. Ohio 1968)). Professor Fiss recognized that "[t]he runaround may 
itself be a form of discriminatory conduct (unequal treatment), subject to equitable relief; 
but it might also lend credibility to the inference [of outcome discrimination] and thereby 
warrant more general injunctive relief ...." Fiss, Theory, supra note 6, at 272. 
251. Day v. Mathews, 530 F.2d 1083, 1084 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (per curiam). 
252. Of course, "[O]rdinarily, the plaintiff does not challenge the hiring process itself 
but argues that the hiring decision was the product of unlawful discrimination." King v. 
Trans World Airlines, Inc., 738 F.2d at 257 n.1 (emphasis in original). The discriminatory 
outcome challenge will generally be more attractive to plaintiffs than the non-determina­
tive discrimination case because of the possibility of greater relief. See supra Sections II A, 
III A. It will be remembered that not all procedural irregularities violate the laws against 
discrimination, only those that are based on race. 
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the defendant treated her differently because of her race with ei­
ther direct or circumstantial evidence. Generally, the plaintiff 
would be able to prove the different treatment directly with com­
parative evidence: white persons were treated a certain way - she 
was not.2118 However, she would then need to rely on a McDonnell­
Douglas presumption to establish the racial motivation for the 
treatment. She would use the prima facie case to shift the burden 
of production to the defendant to articulate legitimate, nondis­
criminatory reasons for its conduct. 2114 
While in most reported cases the defendants have not con­
tested the process violation, it is possible to do so.21111 The laws 
against discrimination do not prescribe any particular type of pro­
cedure. They permit an employer, landlord, or bank to treat ap­
plicants in any manner it chooses, so long as the treatment is not 
based on an impermissible criterion. In one case, a black job can­
didate claimed process discrimination because she was required to 
take a test that no previous applicant for the position had ever 
taken. The court accepted as true the defendant's nondiscrimina­
tory reason: she was given the test not because she was black, but 
because she was the first new candidate for the position in several 
years and the company wanted to improve the qualifications for 
that particular job.2116 As with other disparate treatment cases, 
plaintiffs will lose process discrimination claims if they are unable 
to prove that a discriminatory reason caused the different 
treatment. 
A defendant might attempt to escape liability by admitting 
253. This comparative evidence may be available through discovery or the use of 
testers. 
254. The prima facie case of process discrimination should not be difficult to establish. 
The fact that she is a member of a protected class, and was treated differently from appli· 
cants not in that class, should be sufficient to establish that the defendant's actions, "if 
otherwise unexplained, are more likely than not based on the consideration of impermissi­
ble factors." Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978). 
255. In Anderson v. City of Bessemer, 470 U.S. 564 (1985), the defendant attempted 
to show that there was no different treatment in the process, in that male as well as female 
candidates were questioned about their spouses and family obligations. The trial court 
found against the defendant on this issue and the Supreme Court, vacating the Fourth 
Circuit's reversal of the trial court, emphasized that the determination of a different treat­
ment was a finding of fact, subject to the "clearly erroneous" standard of FED. R. C1v. P. 
52(e). Id. at 1512-15. 
256. McCloud v. Fairchild Indus., 582 F. Supp. 1478 (M.D. N.C. 1984). See also T & S 
Servs. Assoc. v. Crenson, 666 F.2d 722 (1st Cir. 1981) (remanding for determination of 
reason for different treatment). 
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the process discrimination claim but asserting the defense that the 
laws against discrimination d?_ not regulate the processes of deci­
sion but only the outcomes.257 This defense directly addresses the 
domain of these laws-the conduct they proscribe and the con­
duct they permit. The argument is that discriminatory outcomes 
are the most egregious wrongs, and that liability should be fo­
cused on these wrongs, and only on these wrongs. Enlargement of 
the prohibition to include processes is inappropriate, in this view, 
because it involves an attack on a less important target and impli­
cates countervailing interests, such as respect for management 
prerogatives and avoidance of excessive intrusion into the work­
ings of the market. 
This defense should be rejected, on both textual and policy 
grounds, at least for the process discrimination claims discussed 
thus far.258 The language of the laws against discrimination pro­
vides broad coverage.259 Outside the areas marked off by specific 
exceptions, the statutes strongly suggest that all forms of discrimi­
nation are prohibited. They give no support for the view that only 
outcomes are covered.260 Policy reasons also argue against permit­
257. See Page v. Bolger, 645 F.2d 227, 233 (4th Cir. 1981) (en bane) (Title VII covers 
only "ultimate employment decisions," not "interlocutory or mediate decisions"), cert. de­
nied, 454 U.S. 892 (1982). 
258. The arguments have greater force with respect to some of the discriminatory 
language claims discussed infra Section III C. 
259. The texts of the prohibitions of Title VII and Title VIII are set forth supra note 
35. Title VII makes it unlawful for an employer to 
refuse to hire or to discharge ... or otherwise to discriminate against any individ­
ual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges ofemployment . . . 
because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or ... 
to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in 
any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment oppor­
tunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee . . . . 
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1), (2) (emphasis added). While textually the "terms and condi­
tions" language of§ 2000e-2(a)(1) applies only to employees and not applicants, see Hishon 
v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69 (1984), this does not indicate a lesser degree of protection 
for applicants, but only a greater specification of the types of protection for employees. 
Section 2000e-2(a)(2) is equally broad but more general. Title VIII is similarly broad and 
inclusive, and most of the other statutes also make it unlawful to discriminate "in any re­
spect" in "terms, conditions or privileges" of the particular area. 
260. The court in Page v. Bolger, purported to find a limitation in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e­
16(a) (1982), a section added in 1972 to extend Title VII coverage to federal employees. 
However, the actual language of§ 2000e-16(a), not quoted in full in the opinion, provides: 
"All personnel actions affecting employees or applicants shall be made free from any dis­
crimination ...." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(a) (1982) (emphasis added). This characteristi­
cally broad language does not support the court's dictum that the phrase "personnel ac­
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ting process discrimination. The intrinsic purposes of the laws 
against discrimination are violated when defendants inflict the in­
dignity of race-based treatment on plaintiffs. Such conduct is mor­
ally wrong, whether it involves outcome or process discrimination. 
Instrumental purposes are also implicated, albeit less directly. De­
nying black applicants an equal process denies them an equal op­
portunity to be selected on their merits. Making the application 
process difficult or impossible for black applicants will also, over 
time, discourage minorities from participating as fully as they 
might in the employment, housing, and other markets. This di­
minished opportunity for selection and reduced participation will 
produce a pro tanto loss in instrumental performance. 
Balanced against these instrumental and intrinsic concerns, 
no competing interests justify a restriction in the coverage of the 
law. Neither efficiency nor autonomy concerns are strongly impli­
cated. The insurance and enforcement costs are reasonable and 
are related to the purposes of the law. To avoid liability, defend­
ants will have to monitor and control their personnel and proce­
dures to minimize discriminatory treatment. Such monitoring, 
however, is already necessary to avoid liability on outcome claims, 
and the cost of any increased prophylactic measures for process 
claims is likely to be modest. The resolution of process discrimina­
tion complaints will utilize administrative, judicial, and related re­
sources and thus will impose enforcement costs. However, since 
most process claims are not brought separately, but accompany 
outcome discrimination claims, the marginal increase in enforce­
ment costs will be small and will be outweighed by the benefits 
achieved. 
The remedies for process discrimination include declaratory 
relief, compensatory or nominal damages, injunctive relief, and at­
torney's fees. The conduct should be declared unlawful. The emo­
tional distress, if any, suffered by the plaintiff as a result of the 
process violation should be compensated to the extent permitted 
tions" means only "ultimate employment decisions." Page, 645 F.2d at 233. While the 
result in Page-the affirmance of the district court's rejection of the black plaintiff's fail­
ure-to-promote claim-may have been correct, the reasoning does not withstand analysis. 
The Supreme Court has used a strict rule of construction for limitations on coverage: 
"When Congress wanted to grant an employer complete immunity, it expressly did so." 
Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. at 77-78 (1984). See also Sumitomo Shoji America, 
Inc. v. Avagliano, 457 U.S. 176 (1982). 
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under the applicable law.261 As with the damages in the initially 
determinative discrimination claim, the fact-finder must carefully 
identify and compensate only the distress caused by the process 
violation.262 Where such damages cannot be proven (or, if proven, 
cannot be awarded because of limits imposed by law), the plaintiff 
should still be entitled to nominal damages. 263 The same equitable 
considerations that influence the issuance of injunctive relief in 
initially determinative discrimination cases apply to these claims as 
well. Courts have considered the clarity of the violation, the 
probability of its recurrence, and the nature of any future impact 
on the plaintiff and have issued injunctions, in appropriate cases, 
ordering the defendant to stop a specified form of process 
discrimination.264 
C. Language Discrimination 
The first two types of non-determinative discrimination in­
volve clear violations that present strong cases for regulation and 
relief. Claims of language discrimination are more difficult. The 
presentation thus far has argued that a curt or hostile interview, if 
racially motivated, constitutes a process violation. A racist remark 
made during an interview, from this perspective, would likewise 
be unlawful. The next step might then be to enlist the laws 
against discrimination to ban the utterance of all discriminatory 
words. This use would extend the non-determinative discrimina­
tion theory from assuring nondiscriminatory treatment in discrete 
interactions to guaranteeing nondiscriminatory language through­
out society. This potential reach strains the theory and invites a 
261. As is customary with this type of damages, the existence and severity of the emo­
tional distress will depend upon the facts of the particular case. Some violations, like the 
obnoxious questions in King v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 738 F.2d 255 or Robinson v. 12 
Lofts Realty, Inc., 610 F.2d 1032, seem likely to cause emotional distress. In certain cases, 
the knowledge of a process violation (like the failure to grant an interview) may make it 
more difficult for the plaintiff to accept as legitimate the outcome of the final decision. 
This incremental frustration is causally linked to the process violation and should be com­
pensated. Indeed, a primary purpose of process values is to legitimatize decisions which 
may otherwise be difficult to accept. 
262. See supra Section III A. 
263. See, e.g., T & S Servs. Assoc. v. Crenson, 666 F.2d at 728 n.8. See also supra 
Section II C. 
264. King v. Trans World Airlines, 738 F.2d at 259; Gresham v. Windrush, 730 F.2d 
1417, 1423 (1984). Attorney's fees are also calculated in a manner similar to the approach 
used in the initially determinative discrimination claim. See supra note 244. 
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reappraisal and a search for a workable limiting principle. 
Although arising in myriad factual settings, the language 
cases all have one thing in common: someone inflicts "words that 
wound"265 on the plaintiff. The owner of a company tells a black 
employee "'You're not a human being; you're a nigger,'" and 
" 'all you niggers are alike.' " 266 A merchant tells a black couple 
that he does not " 'want or need nigger business.' " 267 A black law 
graduate, vacationing with his family, is told, "'You can't talk to 
me like that, you black son-of-a-bitch. I will kill you.' " 268 
The conventional interpretation of the employment statutes 
views the use of discriminatory language not as a legal wrong in 
itself, but rather as evidence of one of two separate and indepen­
dent legal wrongs-either the commission of a discriminatory out­
come violation or the maintenance of a discriminatory work envi­
ronment. In the first instance, the racial slurs are used as evidence 
to prove discrimination in the outcome of a decision (and to estab­
lish emotional distress and punitive damages if liability is shown). 
All courts accept the racial remark as probative of the defendant's 
intent in taking the challenged action, 269 leaving the fact-finder to 
assess its evidentiary value in a given case.270 The discriminatory 
265. Delgado, Words That Wound: A Tort Action for Racial Insults, Epithets and Name· 
Calling, 17 HARV. C.R-C.L. L. REV. 133 (1982) [hereinafter Delgado, Words]. See also Katz v. 
Dole, 709 F.2d 251, 254 (4th Cir. 1983) (sexual epithets with "power to wound"). Profes· 
sor Delgado's article was followed by a comment and a response which focused, largely, on 
the first amendment issues raised by regulating all discriminatory language by means of a 
tort standard. See Heins, Banning Words: A Comment On 'Words That Wound,' 18 HARV. C.R.­
C.L. L. REv. 585 (1983); Delgado, Professor Delgado Responds, 18 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 593 
(1983). For another recent discussion of discriminatory language cases, see Richardson, 
Racism: A Tort of Outrage, 61 OR. L. REV. 267 (1982). 
266. Bailey v. Binyon, 583 F. Supp. 923, 925 (N.D. Ill. 1984). See also Imperial Diner, 
Inc. v. State Human Rights Appeal Bd., 52 N.Y.2d 72, 76, 417 N.E.2d 525, 527, 436 
N.Y.S.2d 231, 233 (1980) (owner tells waitress she is "[j]ust like all the other f-ingjew­
ish broads around here!"). 
267. Ledsinger v. Burmeister, 114 Mich. App. 12, 14, 318 N.W.2d 558, 560 (1982). 
See also Irving v. J.L. Marsh, Inc., 46 Ill. App.3d 162, 164, 360 N.E.2d 983, 984 (1977) 
(black architecture student required to sign slip that said "Arrogant Nigger refused ex­
change- says he doesn't like products."). 
268. Wiggs v. Courshon, 355 F. Supp. 206, 208 (S.D. Fla. 1973). 
269. See, e.g., Torres v. County of Oakland, 758 F.2d 147 (6th Cir. 1985); Miles v. 
M.N.C. Corp., 750 F.2d 867 (11th Cir. 1985); Whatley v. Skaggs Cos., 707 F.2d 1129 
(lOth Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 938; Benson v. Little Rock Hilton Inn, 87 F.R.D. 
447 (E.D. Ark. 1983), aff'd., 742 F.2d 414 (8th Cir. 1984); Krodel v. Young, 748 F.2d 701, 
710 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (age-based comment), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 62 (1985). See also supra 
note 24. 
270. Carter v. Duncan-Huggins Ltd., 727 F.2d 1225 (D.C. Cir. 1984). 
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language can also be used to prove the existence of a discrimina­
tory work environment. Courts have held that "a working envi­
ronment heavily charged with ... discrimination"271 that is "suf­
ficiently pervasive so as to alter the conditions of employment"272 
is illegal.273 In assessing "the totality of circumstances"274 to deter­
mine if the discrimination was sufficiently severe, courts have dis­
tinguished between "isolated,"2715 "infrequent,"276 or "casual" 
slurs,277 and remarks that are "'repeated,'" "'continuous'" and 
" 'prolonged.' " 278 Only by proving a pervasive pattern of such re­
marks can the plaintiff establish that a discriminatory work envi­
ronment exists. 
The consequence of the conventional employment law ap­
proach to the language cases-regarding racial slurs only as evi­
dence and not as unlawful per se-is clear: when the evidentiary 
inference of the racial slur is rejected, the discriminatory language 
is regarded as beyond the prohibition of the laws. The cases re­
peatedly state that: 
[t]he destructive effect of racial slurs on our society cannot be underesti­
mated, particularly when the statements are directed towards a member of a 
minority race by one of a majority. But such speech is not normally actiona­
ble unless it is connected in a cause and effect relationship with conduct that 
is unlawful.279 
271. Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234, 238 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 957 
(1972). 
272. Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 904 (lith Cir. 1982). 
273. The Supreme Court has recently recognized the validity of discriminatory work 
environment claims in a Title Vll sex discrimination case. Meritor Savs. Bank v. Vinson, 
106 S. Ct. 2399 (1986). For general discussions of the discriminatory work environment 
issue, see C. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WoRKING WoMEN 32-47 (1979); Note, 
Sexual Harassment Claims ofAbusive Work Environment Under Title VII, 97 HARV. L. REv. 1449 
(1984). 
274. Henson, 682 F.2d at 904. 
275. See NLRB v. Silverman Men's Wear, Inc., 656 F.2d 53, 58 (3d Cir. 1981) (re­
manding to NLRB for hearing by regional director on whether "stingy Jew" remark in­
fected union election). 
276. Johnson v. Bunny Bread Co., 646 F.2d 1250, 1257 (8th Cir. 1981). 
277. Cariddi v. Kansas City Chiefs Football Club, Inc., 568 F.2d 87, 88 (8th Cir. 
1977). 
278. Walker v. Ford Motor Co., 684 F.2d 1355, 1359 (lith Cir. 1982). Such remarks 
create a "pervasive atmosphere of prejudice," Taylor v. Jones, 653 F.2d 1193, 1199 (8th 
Cir. 1981 ), "so heavily polluted with discrimination as to destroy completely the emotional 
and psychological stability of minority group workers." Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d at 238. 
See also DeGrace v. Rumsfeld, 614 F.2d 796 (1st Cir. 1980). 
279. Nichelson v. Quaker Oats Co., 752 F.2d 1153, 1160 (6th Cir. 1985). 
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If the racial statements, together with other evidence, do not con­
vince the fact-finder that the outcome in question was discrimina­
tory, then they are simply "offensive, uncalled for" expressions,280 
"not to be condoned, " 281 but "not constituting unlawful . . . 
discrimination. " 282 
The theory of non-determinative discrimination offers a 
framework for addressing the discriminatory language claims re­
jected by current employment law doctrine. Grounded in the stat­
utory definition of discrimination as race-based different treat­
ment, it is much more reluctant to regard discriminatory conduct 
- like racial slurs - as lawful. As the Minnesota Supreme Court 
stated, this approach "cannot regard use of the term 'nigger' in 
reference to a black [person] as anything but discrimination 
against that [person] based on his race."283 However, it also recog­
nizes that the scope of the discrimination laws is limited. Such laws 
regulate only certain persons and activities. The issue with lan­
guage claims is whether the admittedly discriminatory conduct in 
a given case is covered by the laws. 
The theory of non-determinative discrimination suggests a 
general approach to the language discrimination claims: liability 
should attach when discriminatory statements are made by per­
sons who are covered by the law, in situations that are governed 
by the law. Other such statements, although discriminatory, are 
outside the boundary of prohibited conduct. This suggested ap­
proach permits a certain amount of discrimination. However, it 
extends the boundary from where it is presently drawn and lo­
cates it with explicit reference to the text and the competing poli­
cies which underlie the laws and with sensitivity to the first 
280. Grubb v. W.A. Foote Memorial Hosp., 741 F.2d 1486 (6th Cir. 1984), vacated, 
759 F.2d 546. (6th Cir. 1985). 
281. Johnson v. Bunny Bread Co., 646 F.2d at 1257. 
282. Torres v. County of Oakland, 758 F.2d at 152. 
283. City of Minneapolis v. Richardson, 307 Minn. 80, 88, 239 N.W.2d 197, 203 
(1976). This case involved a challenge to discriminatory treatment by police under the state 
public accommodations statute, MINN. STAT. § 363.03, subd. 4 (1983). The court went on 
to say: 
When a racial epithet is used to refer to a person of that race, an adverse dis­
tinction is implied .... The use of the term 'nigger' has no place in the civil 
treatment of a citizen by a public official. We hold that the use of this term by 
police officers coupled with all of the other uncontradicted acts ... constituted 
discrimination because of race. 
Richardson, 307 Minn. at 89, 239 N.W.2d at 203. 
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amendment issues that may be present.284 
284. Discriminatory language is a form of "offensive speech" which governments reg­
ularly try to control. Rutzick, Offensive Language and the Evolution ofFirst Amendment Protec­
tion, 9 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 1 (1974); Note, "Offensive Speech" and the First Amendment, 53 
B.U.L. REv. 834 (1973). The imposition of civil liability for such discriminatory remarks is 
government regulation of the content of speech and must be measured against the require­
ments of the first amendment. See Redish, The Content Distinction in First Amendment Analy­
sis, 34 STAN. L. REv. 113 (1981). Since the period during which the "fighting words" stan­
dard of Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942), prevailed, the Court has 
adopted both the more demanding substantive standard of Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 
15 (1971), and the stricter overbreadth test of Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518 (1972), 
and its progeny, Lewis v. City of New Orleans, 415 U.S. 130 (1974); Rosenfeld v. New 
Jersey, 408 U.S. 901 (1972); Brown v. Oklahoma, 408 U.S. 914 (1972). It is thus fair to say 
that the regulation of the content of speech can now be accomplished only by "a precisely 
drawn means of serving a compelling state interest." Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public 
Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 540 (1980). See generally Farber, Civilizing Public Discourse: An 
Essay On Professor Bickel, justice Harlan and the Enduring Significance ofCohen v. California, 
1980 DuKE L.J. 283 [hereinafter Farber, Public Discourse]. 
The societal interest in eradicating discrimination is compelling, Regents of the Univ. 
of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 307 (1978), particularly in the areas (such as employment, 
housing and public accommodation) regulated by the statutes under consideration. Roberts 
v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984). The content-based regulation discussed here 
is limited to prohibiting the use of discriminatory language by certain specified classes of 
people (employers, landlords, proprietors of places of public accommodations and the 
agents of all three), in certain specified situations. In the regulated areas, the victim of the 
racial epithet is a captive audience; he or she depends upon the defendant for employment, 
housing or services and cannot readily leave. See Richardson, supra note 265, at 284-86; cf. 
MACKINNON, supra note 273, at 43-56 (emphasizing power relationship between discrimina­
tor and victim). In that captive situation, the victim's "substantial privacy interests are be­
ing invaded in an essentially intolerable manner." Cohen, 403 U.S. at 21. Little can be said, 
as a constitutional matter, for protecting this speech. The racist utterance does serve one 
part of "the dual communicative function" described in Cohen, 403 U.S. at 26, conveying 
"otherwise inexpressible emotions," id., and in this respect may have some value. For ex­
ample, Professor Farber has observed that 
[l]imiting expression of racist views to the calm, heavily qualified statements of 
scholars would give a completely misleading view of racist thinking. The truth 
is that racism in our society is far more often characterized by the ugliest of 
emotions . . . . That truth is too important to suppress merely to maintain our 
mental equanimity .... As long as we live in an ugly world, ugly speech must 
have its forum." 
Farber, Public Discourse at 301-02. See also Magruder, Mental and Emotional Disturbance in 
the Law of Torts, 49 HARV. L. REV. 1033, 1053 (1936) (use of slurs provides one of the 
"safety valves through which irascible tempers might legally blow off steam."). But see A 
BICKEL, MoRALITY oF CONSENT 73 (1975) ("Where nothing is unspeakable, nothing is undo­
able."); Delgado, Words, supra note 265, at 140. However, Professor Farber is referring to 
the regulation of classic public expression, like the Nazi demonstration challenged in Col­
lins v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 916 (1978), and not to the 
racist epithets in the narrower area governed by the laws against discrimination. Farber, 
Public Discourse at 302 n.113, 303. The statements described in the cases infra notes 318-35 
are emotive only; the only idea conveyed is the obvious one that the speaker dislikes blacks. 
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While the specific boundary between prohibited and permit­
ted language discrimination will be shaped only through case de­
velopment and further discussion and criticism, several examples 
may illustrate the sharper focus and increased reach of the sug­
gested approach, first at the application stage and then in the gen­
eral workforce. 
In the application process, the laws against discrimination 
should be construed broadly to prohibit discriminatory language 
when a person is applying for a job, a loan, housing, or a service. 
Many laws explicitly do this. The Iowa civil rights statute, for ex­
ample, forbids any owner of a public accomodation to "directly or 
indirectly . . . indicate . . . that the patronage of persons of any 
particular race . . . is unwelcome, objectionable, [or] not accept­
able . . . . " 285 Title VIII makes it unlawful to "make . . . any 
Thus, the omnipresent risk that content regulation will have the effect of "suppressing 
ideas in the process" of permissibly regulating speech, Cohen, 403 U.S. at 26. 
Regulating offensive speech in an already regulated area is not novel. The constitution­
ality of an ordinance banning discriminatory advertising in newspapers was upheld against 
a first amendment challenge in Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Re· 
lations, 413 U.S. 376, 388, reh'g denied, 414 U.S. 88·1 (1973), a decision that has been 
favorably cited even subsequent to the decisions in Linmark Assoc. v. Township of Wil· 
lingboro, 431 U.S. 85 (1977), and other cases in which the Court has afforded greater 
protection to commercial speech. See Central Hudson Gas & Elec. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 
447 U.S. 557, 563-64 (1980). Traditional tort doctrine has long made an exception to the 
general rule and has permitted recovery for emotional distress caused by insults or indigni· 
ties inflicted by a common carrier. W. PRoSSER & P. KEETON, PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS 
57, n.26 (5th ed. 1984). While articulated more in the categories of the common law than 
in the concepts of first amendment doctrine, the cases express a recognition of the strong 
interest in preventing such abuse in certain narrow situations. This limitation to certain 
areas - both traditionaJly and under the modern statutes - also addresses the concerns 
of overbreadth. The regulation is tailored to prohibit speech only where its social and per­
sonal effects are most severe. The racist defendant who needs to vent his emotion can still 
do so, but not while performing the regulated function. Finally, it should be clear that the 
content regulation suggested here is different from, and narrower than, a ban on group 
libel. Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952). See T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM 
OF EXPRESSION 391-99 (1970) (criticizing Beauharnais); H. KALVEN, THE NEGRO AND THE 
FIRST AMENDMENT 7-64 (1966). But see Arkes, Civility and the Restriction ofSpeech: Rediscover­
ing The Defamation of Groups, 1974 SuP. CT. REv. 281 (supporting group defamation laws). 
285. IowA CoDE ANN.§ 601A.7(1)(b) (West 1985). These particular provisions of the 
Iowa statute were favorably mentioned in separate survey articles written two decades ago 
by Professors Bonfield and Aeurbach. Each author endorsed the Iowa statute and criticized 
the omission of similar protection from the 1966 Model Act. See Auerbach, The 1967 
Amendments to the Minnesota State Act Against Discrimination and the Uniform Law Commission­
ers' Model Anti-Discriminaton Act: A Comparative Analysis and Evaluation, 52 MINN. L. REV. 
231 (1967); Bonfield, The Substance of American Fair Employment Practices Legislation 1: Em· 
ployers, 61 Nw. U.L. REv. 907 (1967). 
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. . . statement . . . that indicates any preference, limitation or 
discrimination based on race . . . . " 286 Public accommodation 
statutes have similar provisions.287 
The policy reason for the explicit, per se approach of the 
housing and publ~c accommodation statutes is a practical one: 
most such discrimination occurs during the application process 
and may consist of the use of discriminatory language.288 In order 
to provide effective protection, the laws must prohibit this preva­
lent type of discrimination. Thus, in public accommodation cases, 
courts have held that "[a] single act of discrimination is all that is 
required to fix liability."289 No pervasive or repeated pattern need 
be proved; the single statement is sufficient. For the appli­
cant290-the person on the outside seeking to get in-that single 
statement may be all he or she may ever hear. It may be "iso­
lated" or "sporadic"; for that particular plaintiff, however, the 
language defines the experience.291 
The right to be free from discriminatory language in t~e ap­
plication process should be safeguarded under the employment 
statutes as well. While the prohibitions of Title VII are not as spe­
cific as those contained in other statutes,292 a fair reading of the 
law supports the suggested broader view. The statute cl.early pro­
286. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(c) (1982). 
287. See generally, Project, Discrimination in Access to Public Places: A Suroey ofState and 
Federal Public Accommodations Laws, 7 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 215 (1978) [hereinafter 
Project, Access]. 
288. Id. at 244 ("complaints of insulting or discriminatory treatment ... are common 
as complaints of outright refusals ....");H. Newburger, Recent Evidence on Discrimination 
in Housing, Office of Policy Development and Research, U.S. Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev. 
(1984). 
289. City of Minneapolis v. Richardson, 307 Minn. at 88, 239 N.W.2d at 203. 
290. Or, analogoasly, the person seeking goods or services in a public accommodation 
case. 
291. As one court expressed it, an "isolated incident could amount to a violation of 
the Public Accommodations Act because of the singular nature of the contact between the 
customer and the business." King v. Greyhound Lines, 61 Or. App. 197, 201 n.6, 656 P.2d 
349, 351 n.6 (1982). In King, a young black man was racially insulted when he tried to 
return his bus ticket for a refund. With respect to the actual service, the issuance of the 
refund, plaintiff was treated like everyone else. However, the defendant treated the plain­
tiff differently in the process of servicing his request, by using racially based language and 
saying to the plaintiff, "Nigger, where did you get this ticket?" He uttered the statement 
only once; the plaintiff did not prove a pattern; yet the court found liability and awarded 
$500 and $1,000 in general and punitive damages. Jd. at 200, 656 P.2d at 350. 
292. Compare the text of the prohibition of Title VII, supra notes 35 and 259 with that 
of statutes cited supra notes 285-86. 
158 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 35 
tects applicants as well as current employees.293 The separate sec­
tion specifically addressing employment agencies evinces a con­
gressional awareness of the importance of the application process 
and a desire to protect it.294 Soon after the enactment of Title 
VII, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission promul­
gated guidelines295 on preemployment inquiries, specifically regu­
lating employer conduct in the application process. 296 Addition­
ally, some courts have recognized the problem and have applied a 
strict standard. 297 
Discrimination at the application or initial-service stage 
strongly implicates both instrumental and intrinsic values. The 
prospective employee, tenant or customer, having been turned 
off, will turn away, thus depriving our economy and society of 
some measure of vitality. That person suffers indignity and degra­
dation at a time when respect and evenhandedness are required. 
293. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2) (1982) ("applicants"). 
294. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(b) (1982) makes it unlawful for an employer or employment 
agency: 
to print or publish or cause to be printed or published any notice or advertise· 
ment relating to employment ... indicating any preference, limitation, specifi­
cation, or discrimination, based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin, 
. except that such a notice or advertisement may indicate a preference, limita· 
tion, specification, or discrimination based on religion, sex, or national origin 
when religion, sex or national origin is a bona fide occupational qualification 
for employment. 
I d. 
295. By statute, EEOC is authorized to promulgate only guidelines, 42 U.S.C. § 
2000e-12(b)(1) (1982), which the courts at times regard with "great deference," Griggs v. 
Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 433-34 (1971), at times frankly reject, General Elec. Co. v. 
Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 142 (1976), reh'g denied, 429 U.S. 1079 (1977) ("The EEOC guide· 
line does not fare well ....") and on other occasions simply ignore. United Steelworkers 
v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979) (decision on voluntary affirmative action plan in which none 
of the four opinions mentions EEOC guidelines, even though 29 C.F.R. § 1608 (1985) was 
directly applicable). 
296. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.7 (1985). The guidelines provide that "[a]ny preemployment 
inquiry in connection with prospective employment which expresses directly or indirectly 
any limitation, specification, or discrimination as to sex shall be unlawful . . . . " Id. A 
similar restriction applied to job advertising, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.5 (1985). See also 29 C.F.R. 
§ 860.92(b) (1985) (similar restriction under ADEA guideline). Although not specifically 
prohibited by a guideline, there is no reason to treat a racist statement more leniently than 
sexist or age-based statements. 
297. See, e.g., Ostroffv. Employment Exch., Inc., 683 F.2d 302 (9th Cir. 1982); Banks 
v. Heun-Norwood, 566 F.2d 1073, reh'g and reh'g en bane denied, (8th Cir. 1977); Barnes v. 
Rourke, 8 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1112 (M.D. Tenn. 1973). CJ. Connecticut v. Teal, 
457 U.S. 440 (1982) (all significant steps in employment process are subject to challenge; 
Title VII protects intermediate procedures as well as the bottom line). 
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The countervailing forces, if any, are slight. The company or its 
agents have no legitimate autonomy interest in "expressing" their 
racist feelings in this setting. The important autonomy inter­
est-the decisional freedom to reject a black applicant or cus­
tomer-has been removed by statute, and the prohibition against 
making "rejection-like" statements in a defined and regulated 
area is appropriate.298 Insurance costs, those steps taken to 
achieve compliance with the new liability rule, will be modest in 
the application area. Companies already monitor their application 
process to avoid outcome discrimination and to accomplish other 
business goals. The marginal effort to prevent discriminatory lan­
guage at this stage-promulgation of a policy, specific training 
and additional supervision-should be minor.299 
As claims move from the application process to the general 
workplace itself, however, some racial statements may be beyond 
the regulatory reach of even the broader non-determinative dis­
crimination approach. The employment statutes govern only em­
ployers and their agents, and only "terms, conditions, or privi­
leges of employment;"800 they do not attempt to regulate all the 
conduct of every employee, and are not "clean language acts."801 
Thus, racial statements made by non-managerial employees and 
not related to the "terms, conditions or privileges" of employ­
ment will not violate the statutes. 
While there is little case law or writing on the problems of 
implementing a doctrine that treats discriminatory language as a 
substantive wrong, I suggest that the process of determining 
whether a given racial statement is prohibited or permitted by the 
laws against discrimination will involve several difficult and recur­
rent issues: 
1. Fact-finding Difficulties. Under current doctrine, where 
the discriminatory statements are only evidence of discriminatory 
298. The reasons that the prohibition of such statements passes muster under the first 
amendment are discussed supra note 284. 
299. If the employer promulgates a policy against the use of racial or sexist language 
and the employee violates it, the employer has just cause to dismiss the employee. See, e.g., 
Clark v. Board of Educ. of School Dist. of Omaha, 215 Neb. 250, 338 N.W.2d 272 (1983); 
Resetar v. State Bd. of Educ., 284 Md. 537, 399 A.2d 225, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 838 
(1979); State Dep't of Personnel v. Sealing, 298 Md. 524,471 A.2d 693 (1984); Thompson 
v. City of Minneapolis, 300 N.W.2d 763 (1980). 
300. See supra note 35 for the text of Title VII and Title VIII. 
301. Katz v. Dole, 709 F.2d 251, 256 (4th Cir. 1983). 
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intent and not actionable in themselves, courts frequently gloss 
over the conflicting evidence.302 However, if liability will turn on 
what was said, and by whom and under what circumstances, courts 
will need to make explicit findings and resolve what in many cases 
will be credibility disputes of the "He said/she said" variety. As 
with the many other factual determinations in discrimination 
cases, the task will be "sensitive and difficult,"303 as well as neces­
sary and within the capability of the judicial system. 
2. Definition of Racial Statement. After finding precisely 
what was said, courts will have to decide whether a particular 
statement constitutes a racial statement. Some cases, particularly 
those involving the use of well-known derogatory terms, will be 
easy; others will not. 304 The key concept in classifying the lan­
guage used in a particular case will be whether a statement consti­
tutes different treatment because of a person's race. If it does, 
then it is a racial statement. 3015 
3. Construction of Statutory Terms. Discriminatory acts by a 
company president and, say, a personnel manager will surely be 
discrimination by an "employer and his agents;" similar acts by 
non-managerial employees will ordinar!ly not be,308 unless they 
can be attributed to the employer by establishing that there was a 
discriminatory work environment or that the employer had actual 
or constructive knowledge of the statements and failed to take 
reasonable steps to prevent them.307 
302. See, e.g., Johnson v. Joseph Schlitz Brewing Co., 58 I F. Supp. 338 (M.D. N.C. 
I984), alfd, 765 F.2d I38 (4th Cir. 1985). 
303. United States Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 7ll, 7I6 (I983). 
304. See, e.g., King v. Greyhound Lines, 6I Or. App. I97, 200, 656 P.2d 349, 35I 
(I982) ("Nigger, where did you get this ticket?"); Johnson v. Joseph Schlitz Brewing Co., 
58 I F. Supp. 338, 343 (M.D. N.C. I984) ("that's just like a nigger"); and cases cited supra 
notes 266-68. As Professor Delgado observes, "[m]ost people today know that certain 
words are offensive and only calculated to wound. No other use remains for such words as 
'nigger', 'wop', 'spick' or 'kike.'" Delgado, Words, supra note 265, at I45. 
305. In defining his proposed cause of action for a racial insult, Professor Delgado 
required the plaintiff to prove that: "Language was addressed to him or her by the defend­
ant that was intended to demean through reference to race; and that a reasonable person 
would recognize as a racial insult.'' Delgado, Words supra note 265, at I79. 
306. See Silver v. KCA, Inc., 586 F.2d I38, I4I (9th Cir. I978) ("The specific evil at 
which Title VII was directed was not the eradication of all discrimination by private indi­
viduals, undesirable though that is, but the eradication of discrimination by employers 
against employees.''); see also Smith v. Pan Am. World Airways, 706 F.2d 77I (6th Cir. 
I983). 
307. See supra notes 27I-78 and accompanying text for a discussion of work environ­
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Racial statements should be considered discrimination in 
"terms, conditions or privileges" of employment, if made by or 
attributed to the employer. Thus, if a company president (or his 
or her agents) watched a black male employee do something on 
the job and then said to him, "You know, that's just like a nig­
ger," such a statement would impose a change in the condition of 
that employee's work environment because of his race and should 
be regarded as unlawful.308 
There will be fine and difficult distinctions to be made in ad­
dressing language discrimination cases directly as a type of non­
determinative discrimination. The legality of the statements will 
depend on a careful evaluation of who made the statement, what 
was said, and where and in what context it was made. There is no 
doubt that some statements should and will be outside the cover­
age of the statutes; others may be protected by the first amend­
ment.309 However, the theory of non-determinative discrimination 
recognizes the need for such distinctions and provides a frame­
work for developing and implementing the necessary balancing 
and accomodation. The distinctions must be drawn not only to 
avoid encroachment on statements that the laws against discrimi­
nation do not regulate but also to prevent the erosion of the inner 
boundary of the laws and their prohibition of race-based different 
treatment, through the failure to address discriminatory language 
as unlawful discrimination. 
D. Mixed Motive Discrimination 
The mixed motive category of non-determinative discrimina­
tion focuses on the class of decisions where the decision-maker 
had two or more motives, at least one of which was discrimina­
tory. As in the introductory example, D2 stated in writing that it 
ment claims. 
308. That statement was part of the record in Johnson v. Joseph Schlitz Brewing Co., 
581 F. Supp. at 343. The court did not address the discriminatory language violation. 
309. Some racial statements will arise in the context of personal discussions between a 
supervisor and an employee and will not be covered, because such statements will not be 
attributable to the employer. Some statements may involve expressions of opinion on mat­
ters such as foreign policy or affirmative action and thus may be protected by the first 
amendment. Cf. Wainwright v. Allen, 461 F. Supp. 293 (D.N.D. 1978). Unless the legal 
standard is an absolute one of either no liability for any language discrimination or total 
liability for all language discrimination, these determinations of coverage will have to be 
made in all cases. 
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was rejecting P6 for a sales position because she was: (1) inexperi­
enced; (2) twenty-fifth on the list; and (3) black (D2 already had 
"too many" black salespeople). The factual inquiry, made in ac­
cordance with the specified procedures, yielded the finding that 
the racial reason was not a determinative one. The decision not to 
hire would have been the same even without the racial factor. P6, 
therefore, loses her discriminatory outcome case. Race was a fac­
tor in the decision, however, and the precise problem in the non­
determinative mixed motive case is whether the presence of race 
as a non-determinative factor in the decision constitutes a form of 
different treatment prohibited by the laws against 
discrimination.810 
In assessing this problem, it is instructive to compare this ex­
ample of non-determinative mixed motive discrimination with the 
initially determinative discrimination case discussed in Section III 
A. At one level, the two types of discrimination are similar. Both 
defendants rejected a black applicant who would not have been 
hired even if she were white. In both cases, the fact that the plain­
tiff was not qualified, applied late and therefore supplied indepen­
dent, lawful reasons for the adverse decision can be seen as fortui­
tous. At another level, however, there is a significant difference, 
one that is rarely noted in judicial opinions, but that may explain 
some of the resistance to imposing liability in such cases. In the 
initially determinative discrimination example, D 1 rejected the 
three black applicants outright for racial reasons. In the mixed 
motive case, D2 considered both lawful and unlawful factors 
before rejecting the plaintiff for a determinative, non-racial rea­
son. With respect to the final decision, there is a difference be­
tween the two cases. D 1 did something for a racial reason; it re­
jected the black applicants, refusing even to consider them. 02, 
on the other hand, did not do anything.811 It might have done 
310. The mixed motive category of non-determinative discrimination. is a residual 
one, comprised not of every case in which a defendant acts with mixed motives, but only 
those cases in which the unlawful motive was non-determinative. Expressed on the drawing 
of the Revised Mixed Motive Continuum, supra Section II B, the non-determinative mixed 
motives cases are those between points N and D. 
311. For those who benefit from visual examples, it may help to picture the racially 
motivated act of rejection as Dl taking the applications of all three black applicants and 
putting them in the waste basket without looking at them. The comparable image in the 
mixed motive case is of D2 putting the application of the black plaintiff on the pile and 
reading it with all the others. The problem with D2 is that he devalues the black person's 
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something, if the hypothetical well-qualified PI had walked 
through the door. The fact-finder can permissibly infer that D2 
had a latent racial motivation, a state of mind that was ready and 
willing to discriminate if the opportunity arose. But the point is 
that, in the non-determinative mixed motive cases, the opportu­
nity did not arise. 
This difference between the behavior of D 1 and D2-the fact 
that, with respect to the final decision, D 1 did something racially 
motivated while D2 did not-suggests the most serious problem 
inherent in such claims. If D2 did not do anything racially moti­
vated with respect to the final decision, but liability is nevertheless 
imposed on the grounds that it discriminated in the final decision, 
then it appears that D2 is being punished not for its actions but 
for its racially biased state of mind.312 However, the laws against 
discrimination regulate only conduct, not thoughts or feelings 
that are not acted upon. 313 Their inner boundary distinguishes be­
tween discrimination, which is prohibited, and prejudice, which is 
not. The successful resolution of these cases requires the fashion­
ing of a liability rule that recognizes this inner boundary. 
There are three solutions to the non-determinative mixed 
application by a given amount; he assigns a negative score to her blackness. In a case of 
non-determinative discrimination, however, when the unlawful negative score is elimi­
nated, the application still is not ranked highly enough for the plaintiff to be selected. 
312. Professor Brodin recognized this point but did not adequately address it. He 
wrote, "[i]t is submitted, however, that the term 'motivating factor' as used in Mt. Healthy 
[and adopted by him] carries the clear implication that the discriminatory intent was acted 
upon, thus producing conduct tainted by it." Brodin, supra note 11, at 320 n.ll6 (emphasis 
in original). This statement is difficult to decipher, perhaps because Professor Brodin used 
"motivating factor" as his point of reference, a term, which neither he nor the Mt. Healthy 
Court defined. If the term is used to mean "determinative factor," then the statement that 
the determinative factor was "acted upon" is correct, but also tautological and unhelpful in 
resolving the non-determinative mixed motive problem. If, as is more likely, the term 
means "substantial factor" then the statement is incorrect, at least insofar as the "acted 
upon" is tied to the final decision, as it is in the above quotation. 
313. See supra note 47. See also Goodwin v. Circuit Court of St. Louis County, 729 
F.2d 541, 551 (8th Cir. 1984) (Bowman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
Unless the onset of an Orwellian nightmare is closer at hand than most of us 
have realized, in our society the law still punishes bad deeds, not bad thoughts 
or the expression of unfashionable opinions. Expression may color conduct or 
explain motive, where motive is in question, but expression that at most tends 
to show a general bias towards a protected group cannot be allowed to serve as 
a total substitute for direct proof of unlawful discrimination ... 
Scarbouough v. Arnold, 117 N.H. 803, 808, 379 A.2d 790, 796 (1977) (Bois, J., 
dissenting). 
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motive problem. The courts can: (I) find no liability, on the 
grounds that such claims do not present conduct prohibited by 
the laws; (2) determine liability on the basis of the "substantial 
factor" causation standard; or (3) determine liability on the basis 
of the non-determinative discrimination approach. This Article 
suggests that the third alternative provides the most satisfactory 
treatment of these claims. 
The evaluation of the three possible solutions may be aided 
by identifying the evidence that will be presented in the mixed 
motive case and the likely remedy if P6 prevails. There will be the 
letter that D2 wrote to P6, showing that she was rejected for two 
lawful reasons and one unlawful reason. The record may also con­
tain other evidence presented by P6, including evidence that D2 
had made other racial remarks, that the company had been found 
guilty of discrimination in other cases,814 that the racial composi­
tion of its work force is unbalanced,su or that it uses subjective 
selection procedures.816 All of this evidence, of course, is proba­
tive on the outcome claim; it tends to show that D2 was motivated 
by race in its decision not to hire P6. However, once the fact­
finder has decided that the racial reason was not determinative, 
this evidence, in the mixed motive part of the case, becomes both 
circumstantial evidence that race was a substantial factor and di­
rect evidence of particular behavior (like making a racial state­
ment) the legality of which can then be assessed. If liability is im­
posed on the basis of this evidence, the relief will be a standard 
314. Depending on the similarity between the previous incidents of discrimination and 
the present case, this evidence would probably be admissible under FED. R. Evm. 404(b) as 
prior acts evidence probative on D2's intent. See generally 2 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, 
WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE 'I! 404[11], [12], [18] (1980). 
315. A racial imbalance can be used as evidence of discrimination, see generally D. 
BALDUS & j. COLE, STATISTICAL PROOF OF DISCRIMINATION 33-44 (1980), but is not unlawful 
in and of itself. Martin v. Citibank, 762 F.2d 212, 218 (2d Cir. 1985). 
316. A claim of subjectivity alleges that the company's selection or evaluation criteria 
are vague and manipulable, something like "good personality" or "works well with peo­
ple." This claim could not be fairly used against the experience requirement in the P6-D2 
example, but has been raised in other mixed motive cases. See, e.g., Grubb v. W.A. Foote 
Memorial Hosp., Inc., 741 F.2d 1486 (6th Cir. 1984). Because of their possible use as a 
subterfuge for discrimination, subjective procedures are frequently suspect, see Rowe v. 
General Motors Corp., 457 F.2d 348 (5th Cir. 1972), but do not constitute "a per se viola­
tion of the law.'' Rogers v. International Paper Co., 510 F.2d 1340, 1348 (8th Cir. 1975), 
vacated and remanded on other grounds, 423 U.S. 809 (1977); Brooks v. Ashtabula County 
Welfare Dep't, 717 F.2d 263,267-78 (6th Cir. 1983); Ward v. Westland Plastics, Inc., 651 
F.2d 1266, 1270 (9th Cir. 1980). 
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non-determinative discrimination remedy. The court may issue a 
declaratory judgment, evaluate the appropriateness of a preven­
tive injunction, and award compensatory damages, nominal dam­
ages, and attorney's fees. Against this backdrop of the evidence 
and the likely remedies, the alternative solutions to the non-deter­
minative mixed motive case are next discussed. 
1. Denial of Liability. Two arguments against liability have 
already been discussed in connection with the initially determina­
tive discrimination claim. There is an initial, technical argument 
that the mixed motive plaintiff has not established a prima facie 
case.817 However, as shown in Section III A, this argument is not 
applicable in a case of direct discrimination and can be met, in 
other instances, by adjusting the elements of the prima facie case 
to fit the non-determinative discrimination allegations. 818 A sec­
ond objection is the Mt. Healthy remedial mismatch argument, that 
it is inappropriate to bestow upon the non-determinative plaintiff 
the job and back pay that he or she would not have obtained if 
there had been no discrimination. This objection lacks merit in 
this context, however, because the remedy in the non-determina­
tive discrimination case is tailored to the wrong and the injury.819 
317. Williams v. Boorstin, 663 F.2d 109 (D.C. Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 985 
(1981). 
318. The introductory example involves a case where there is direct evidence of the 
defendant's racial reasons and no need to rely on the McDonnell-Douglas methodology. See 
supra Section III A. In a case with no direct evidence, the prima facie case would be that: 
(1) the plaintiff was a member of a protected class; (2) that she applied; and (3) that her 
application was considered differently from the applications of similarly situated whites. 
This latter requirement would be met by evidence either supplied by testers or acquired 
through discovery. 
319. See supra Section III A. It should now be possible to appreciate that the Mt. 
Healthy decision addressed only a discriminatory outcome claim. The plaintiff advanced a 
classic outcome claim, asserting that he was not rehired because of his protected speech, 
and seeking and obtaining an order that the defendant reinstate him with backpay and 
with "a continuing contract." His reason for pursuing the outcome claim was clear, as was 
the basis of the school board's opposition: he had already worked as a teacher in the school 
system for five years, and the order had the effect not merely of reinstating him, but of 
reinstating him with tenure. Mt. Healthy, 429 U.S. at 286; Doyle v. Mt. Healthy City School 
Dist. Bd. of Educ., No. 8044 (S.D. Ohio 1974), Petition for Certiorari, Appendix 16(a). 
The remedy stakes were thus particularly high for both parties. 
The Court's concern about "plac[ing] an employee in a better position than he would 
otherwise have been in[,]" 429 U.S. at 286, was not hypothetical. In his five years at the 
school, the plaintiff had engaged in an altercation with another teacher, had argued with 
cafeteria workers over the size of his spaghetti serving, had called students "sons of 
bitches" and had displayed to two female students who refused to obey him "a two-fin­
gered sign signifying bull_." Brieffor Petitioner, at 7; Mt. Healthy, 429 U.S. at 281-82. 
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A third objection, raised in dictum by Judge Richard Posner, 
suggests that "[t]he absence of causation makes the [non-determi­
native, mixed motive] suit one purely for attorney's fees."320 Even 
The record before the Court presented the picture of an unstable teacher who was on his 
way towards dismissal but was saved and vested with tenure by the district court because of 
a constitutional misstep by the school board. The problem was an acute mismatch between 
the wrong and the remedy. By granting tenure, the order might have given the teacher a 
windfall that he did not deserve, and inflicted on the school board (and a generation or 
more of innocent schoolchildren) a teacher they did not deserve. As one school board 
member testified, they did not want to "retain for the rest of his teaching life a teacher 
who did not demonstrate the maturity ••. expected of a 29-year old." See supra Brief for 
Petitioner, at 7. The Court resolved the problem with a test which "protects against the 
invasion of constitutional rights without commanding undesirable consequences not neces­
sary to the assurance of those rights." Mt. Healthy, 429 U.S. at 287, and selected the but-for 
or "same decision" test to distinguish "between a result caused by a constitutional violation 
and one not so caused." Id. at 286. 
Applied to the outcome claim before it, the Court's ruling is sound. A careful reading 
of the Mt. Healthy opinion, however, suggests that its ruling and reasoning preclude a find­
ing of liability only on a discriminatory outcome claim and actually support the non-deter­
minative claim. The non-determinative discrimination theory meets the stated objectives of 
the Mt. Healthy Court: "[T]he constitutional principle at stake is sufficiently vindicated if 
such an employee is placed in no worse a position than if he had not engaged in the con­
duct[,)" id. at 285-86, and also "protects against the invasion of constitutional rights with­
out commanding undesirable consequences not necessary to the assurance of those rights." 
Id. at 287. In fact, the rejection of a non-determinative claim would be inconsistent with 
Mt. Healthy, because it would leave the employee in a considerably worse position. He 
would be left not only with a violation of his constitutional rights; he would also be denied 
any remedy and be told that his claim had no merit. 
The following term, in the procedural due process case of Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 
247 (1978), the Court also reversed an outcome-based order of the lower court and re­
manded for application of the same decision test. ld. at 264, 267. However, the Court in 
Carey explicitly stated that the plaintiffs could establish liability and recover damages even 
if the defendant could establish on remand that the same decision would have occurred 
without the violation. The damages would not be outcome-based; the plaintiffs could not 
"recover damages to compensate them for injuries caused by the suspensions." Id. at 260. 
Instead, the damages would be processed-based, if "actually • • • caused by the denial of 
due process itself.'' Id. at 263. And, in the event that the plaintiffs were not able to prove 
actual damages, they would still be entitled to recover nominal damages. Id. at 266-67. In 
language that is fully applicable to the non-determinative discrimination case, the Court 
wrote:· "Even if [the plaintiffs'] suspensions were justified, and even if they did not suffer 
any other actual injury, the fact remains that they were deprived of their right to proce­
dural due process.'' Id. at 266. The Carey decision makes explicit the approach that could 
only be implied from the carefully limited language of Mt. Healthy: that the determination 
of both liability and remedy depends upon the nature of violation claimed and the remedy 
sought. 
320. Shanley v. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co., 552 F. Supp. 4, 8 (N.D. Ind. 1982) 
(Posner, Circuit judge, sitting by designation). The discussion of the mixed motive problem 
is dictum because Judge Posner found as a matter of fact that the unlawful motive did not 
play "any role" in the plaintiff's dismissal. Id. 
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though this observation is not wholly accurate-as the laws 
against discrimination often authorize, and plaintiffs will fre­
quently seek, broader relie:£321-Judge Posner used it to buttress 
his conclusion that "[s]uch a suit [one that seeks only attorney's 
fees] places a burden on the courts that is disproportionate to the 
slight increment in compliance with the civil rights laws that such 
suits might bring about. "322 It is ironic that, in assessing the "bur­
den on the courts" of such suits, Judge Posner seems to refer to 
the total costs of such claims, and not their incremental or margi­
nal costs. 323 In the case over which he presided, as in !fiOSt cases, 
the mixed motive claim arose in the context of a discriminatory 
outcome case. The court and the parties had already incurred the 
cost of the outcome case, and the marginal cost of deciding the 
related mixed motive claim was minimal. 
However, Judge Posner may have been suggesting the follow­
ing related point. If the liability rule is changed so that non-deter­
minative mixed motive claims are allowed, more plaintiffs will 
bring discrimination lawsuits. This increase in lawsuits brought by 
new entrants, persons who would not have sued but for this 
broadening of the liability rule, will further burden the courts. 
This argument is a version of the floodgate argument, the evalua­
tion of which depends both on a prediction of whether the change 
in liability rules would effect behavior and on an assessment of 
whether that change would serve or disserve the purposes of the 
statutes. 
The imposition of liability for the mixed motive form of non­
determinative discrimination is likely to increase the filing of dis­
crimination lawsuits. Given the expense and difficulty of litigation, 
few people will file pure, non-determinative mixed motive law­
321. Judge Posner's statement appears to have been accurate about the particular case 
over which he was presiding. The plaintiff's claim alleged that he was forced into early 
retirement in retaliation for assistance given to a black former employee in a race discrimi­
nation complaint against the employer, in violation of the anti-retaliation provisions of Ti­
tle VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (1982). As a Title VII action, no compensatory damages 
were available under federal law. The state in which the alleged discrimination occurred, 
Indiana, probably has not authorized compensatory damages, see Indiana Civil Rights 
Comm'n v. Holman, 177 Ind. App. 648, 380 N.E.2d 1281 (1981), and it is unlikely that 
there was a pendent state claim. The plaintiff in Shanley did not request declaratory or 
injunctive relief, and there was no mention of nominal damages. 
322. Shanley, 552 F. Supp. at 8. 
323. SeeR. POSNER, EcoNOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE LAW 224-26, 251-54, 261-67, 357 (2d 
ed. 1977) (discussion and examples of marginal cost, as opposed to total cost, analysis). 
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suits, alleging only non-determinative discrimination violations 
and seeking only the more limited non-determinative discrimina­
tion remedies. Rather, the new entrants will likely come from that 
class of persons who strongly feel that they have been discrimi­
nated against, but have been dissuaded from filing a lawsuit under 
the existing liability rules. The attorney that they consulted evalu­
ated their discriminatory outcome case, correctly advised them 
that their probability of prevailing under the current, determina­
tive-factor standard was low, and said that he or she would accept 
the case only with a significant retainer fee, that the client was 
unable or unwilling to pay. For at least some of these persons, a 
broadening of the liability rule to recognize the non-determina­
tive discrimination claim would significantly alter the probabilities 
of prevailing. This change in the odds might make some attorneys 
willing to take the case for a reduced (or entirely contingent) fee, 
based on the expectation that attorney's fees will be awarded as 
part of the remedy for the prevailing party. To the extent that 
this scenario is accurate, Judge Posner correctly sensed that attor­
ney's fees may play an important role (even though he mis­
characterized such suits as "purely ... for attorney's fees."). 
The prediction that there will be some increased litigation as 
a result of the change of a liability rule is descriptive only, just the 
starting point for an assessment of the costs and benefits. Any in­
crease in litigation will add to the already burdensome caseload of 
the courts. However, Congress has expressly provided for these 
suits by private individuals, and has made clear that it regards 
such private suits as an important means of enforcing the require­
ments of the laws.324 Presumably, some plaintiffs in the newly filed 
suits will prevail on the outcome claims, others on the non-deter­
minative claims. If one accepts that non-determinative discrimina­
tion is a wrong that inflicts injuries, 325 and that the purposes of 
the laws against discrimination are to compensate the victims of 
324. See EEOC v. Associated Dry Goods Corp., 449 U.S. 590, 595 (1981) ("private 
lawsuits by aggrieved employees [are] an important part of [Title VII's] means of enforce­
ment."). Additionally, the role of attorney's fees is precisely to facilitate the filing of law­
suits to vindicate important public and private rights. See supra notes 158, 237-44. 
325. Not all courts do accept this notion. In dictum, in a case of explicit initially deter­
minative age discrimination, one court stated that a plaintiff who would not have been 
hired "has suffered no injury and is not entitled to any relief under the ADEA." Murnane 
v. American Airlines Inc., 482 F. Supp. 135, 151 (D.D.C. 1979), a.ffd, 667 F.2d 98 (D.C. 
Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 915 (1982). 
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those injuries and to deter the discrimination that causes them, 326 
then the increased burden on the courts is a necessary and appro­
priate price to pay. Additionally, control of the discrimination 
caseload by means of a no-liability rule is not cost-free. The denial 
of liability in cases of non-determinative discrimination is also the 
acceptance of discriminatory behavior. Requiring people to en­
dure such workplace indignities without redress undermines the 
intrinsic purposes of the laws. Where such discrimination is toler­
ated (and especially where the courts are required to declare that 
in the case before them there has been no discrimination, when 
such is clearly not the case), the legitimation function is not per­
formed. Given the express grant of jurisdiction to hear discrimi­
nation cases, the costs imposed by the marginal increase in the 
workload of the judiciary do not offset the costs incurred by deny­
ing liability and the benefits achieved by hearing these cases. 
There is a final argument that is not often articulated but that 
provides the strongest reason for opposing recognition of mixed 
motive claims. The argument is derived from the concern that 
such claims may overlook "the vast difference between a general 
bias and an act of intentional discrimination."327 This concern is 
real and responsive to the deepest problem of imposing liability 
where the defendant, at the decisional level, has not done any­
thing motivated by race. The imposition of liability for having 
mixed motives in such cases may be punishment, not for engaging 
in discriminatory conduct but for possessing a discriminatory state 
of mind, something that the laws against discrimination do not 
prohibit. 
A liability rule that dismisses all non-determinative mixed mo­
tive cases, however, is an overly rigid solution that exacts unneces­
sarily high costs . It would permit employers to tell applicants that 
they are not wanted because of their race. Placing such statements 
beyond the reach of the laws against discrimination is a solution 
that should be accepted only if no alternatives exist that can both 
326. The finding of liability and the imposition of even the narrower non-determina­
tive discrimination relief should have at least a modest deterrent effect. "Although pro­
spective relief may not be as costly to the employer as an award of back pay, compliance 
with a court's relief orders has some costs; these costs, and the finding of liability itself, 
undoubtedly deter the employer from unlawfully discriminating." Toney v. Block, 705 
F.2d 1364, 1373 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (Tamm,J., concurring). 
327. Goodwin v. Circuit Court of St. Louis, 729 F.2d 541, 551 (8th Cir. 1984) (Bow­
man, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
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address the special problems presented by the non-determinative 
mixed motive cases and at the same time enforce the prohibitions 
of the laws. 
2. Determination of Liability on the Basis of the Substantial Fac­
tor Causation Standard. One alternative solution to the non-de­
terminative mixed motive case is to use a causation standard more 
liberal than the current but-for test to evaluate the discriminatory 
nature of the decision. Under this approach, a court would impose 
liability if it found that race was a "substantial" factor in the deci­
sion, and deny liability if it was a "minor" factor.328 An examina­
tion of the attempted use of a revised causation standard, how­
ever, demonstrates its inadequacies in resolving the non­
determinative mixed motive case. 
The first step-the determination of whether race was a sub­
stantial or a minor factor in the decision-would require a further 
refinement of the fact-finding initially necessary to decide whether 
that factor was determinative. This additional fact-finding would 
be difficult, but not qualitatively different than that involved in 
making the determinative/non-determinative decision.329 How­
ever, even if a fact-finder were able to find that race was a sub­
328. A substantial factor is one that "of itself is sufficient to bring about" the decision. 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTS§ 3.14 (1972). See supra Section II B. The term "minor" 
is derivatively defined as one that is not capable of causing the decision by itself. On the 
revised continuum graph, supra Section II, substantial mixed motive claims are those that 
fall between points S and D; minor ones fall between points N and S. 
329. In determining whether the racial factor was substantial or minor, the factfinder 
must make the counterfactual estimation of what would have happened if the black plain­
tiff had been well-qualified and had applied early. If the defendant would have rejected the 
plaintiff in spite of his or her qualifications and early application, then the fact-finder could 
infer that race was "of itself sufficient to bring about the decision." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) 
OF ToRTS § 3.14 (1972). If the plaintiff could produce the comparative evidence supplied 
by black and white testers who were qualified and who applied early, see supra note 201, 
the evidence in a substantial factor case would show that the defendant had rejected the 
black tester and hired the white tester. 
If the substantial factor test were to be used, it would be helpful in jury cases to struc­
ture the factfinding with special interrogatories, modified from those suggested supra note 
123, for the determinative factor test, as follows: 
1) Was race a factor in the defendant's decision not to hire plaintiff? (YES/ 
NO) 
2) If yes, was race a determinative factor, in the sense that the plaintiff 
would have been hired if she had been white? (YES/NO) 
3) If no, was race a substantial factor, in the sense that even if she had been 
qualified and had applied early, the defendant would still not have hired her 
because of her race? (YES/NO) 
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stantial but non-determinative factor in the decision not to hire a 
plaintiff, there would still be serious problems in using that find­
ing at the remedy stage of a case. 
The unworkability of the causation approach at the remedy 
stage stems from the fact that the substantial factor test identifies 
the conduct found to be unlawful only in the most general terms: 
the use of race as a substantial factor in the decision.330 A judge 
would not be likely to enjoin something as vaguely defined as "the 
use of race as a substantial factor" or to issue a declaratory judg­
ment couched in such generalities. 331 Further, because the test 
does not specify the conduct that constituted the substantial fac­
tor, it would be difficult to parse the damages-excising the out­
come damages and compensating only the distress caused by the 
substantial factor-and virtually impossible to review any such de­
termination. Its use thus resurrects the Mt. Healthy concern of a 
remedial mismatch. 
There are several other disadvantages with the generality of 
the causation approach. Because the substantial factor test focuses 
only on whether a factor was substantial or minor, it cannot distin­
guish between cases with significant differences. If the factor is 
deemed substantial, the conduct is wrong, and equally wrong, 
whether it has been overt or covert, widespread or discrete. In a 
related manner, if the racial conduct was a minor, insubstantial 
factor in the decision, then liability never attaches, regardless of 
how egregious the specific conduct was. 
There is also a final problem, the one that began the discus­
sion of the non-determinative mixed motive case. Imposing liabil­
ity for using race as a substantial factor in the decision, when race 
was not determinative and the same decision would have occurred 
330. The substantial factor standard in this context is a "fictive formality", an abstrac­
tion that diverts attention from the real issues in the case. This pejorative term was used to 
describe and to criticize certain of the Court's standards for determining the legality of 
activities under the National Labor Relations Act. Christensen & Svanoe, Motive and Intent 
in the Commission of Unfair Labor Practices: The Suprpne Court and Fictive Formality, 77 YALE 
L.J. 1269 (1968). The authors suggested that the Court focus explicitly on the conduct 
alleged to be illegal and evaluate whether a determination of illegality would serve or dis­
serve the purposes of the Act, instead of using vague, general standards. They were partic­
ularly critical of standards that focused only on the mental states of the parties. I d. at 1326­
27. 
331. The declaratory order would presumably read: "The defendant used race as a 
substantial factor in its decision not to hire P6, and the use of race as a substantial factor 
was unlawful." 
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even if the plaintiff were white, is punishing a racist state of mind 
and not any identifiable conduct. The laws against discrimination 
do not permit the imposition of liability on this basis. The use of 
this inapt causation standard is not necessary, however, for the 
non-determinative discrimination approach provides a workable 
alternative. 
3. Determination of Liability on the Basis of the Non-Determina­
tive Discrimination Approach. The major strength of the non-de­
terminative discrimination approach is its identification of the 
conduct alleged to be unlawful. Particularly at the boundary of 
the law, where the concern is whether the statute governs the 
conduct in question, this explicitness is more effective than the 
generality of the substantial factor test. In the present example, 
the wrongful conduct was the racial statement in the letter, race­
based treatment of an applicant by an employer that should be 
regarded as unlawful language discrimination. 332 
At the remedy stage, the specification of the wrong as the ra­
cial statement in the letter permits a remedy that is carefully tai­
lored to the wrong and the injury: a declaration that such state­
ments are unlawful, an injunction against future written 
statements, the award of damages suffered as a result of the state­
ment, and the award of nominal damages and attorney's fees. 
While few mixed motive claims are as simple as the explicit 
case used in the above example, the non-determinative discrimina­
tion approach is helpful in identifying the major issues that need 
to be addressed in the more difficult cases as well. Frequently, a 
mixed motive case involves covert discrimination. For example, 
perhaps the racial statement was not communicated directly to P6 
but was contained in a file memorandum revealed during discov­
ery or made in an oral statement later reported by a witness. 
Under the substantial factor test, the explicit direct communica­
tion and the covert internal statement are not readily distinguisha­
ble; both are evidence of D2's state of mind, used to determine 
whether the racial reason was substantial. The non-determinative 
discrimination approach recognizes the difference between the 
two examples. In the case of the direct communication to P6, the 
employer presents its discriminatory preferences to the applicant 
332. See supra Section III C for a discussion of the discriminatory language violation at 
the application stage. 
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and possibly to others, thus more directly implicating both the in­
strumental and the intrinsic concerns of the laws. The internal 
memo or statement has a reduced effect on the outside world as 
well as an arguable claim to some autonomy protection. The iden­
tification of these differences does not produce the answer to the 
problem; there is. still the need to decide whether such internal 
comments should be actionable under the laws against discrimina­
tion. However, the specification of the conduct permits the judg­
ment to be made after an evaluation of the real differences be­
tween the two cases and a careful assessment of the allegedly 
unlawful conduct and the text and the purposes of the laws. 
A second variation further illustrates the advantages of the 
non-determinative discrimination approach. In most cases, the 
record does not include a direct, decisionally related racial state­
ment such as "I don't want you because you are black," made at 
the time of the decision. Rather, the evidence more often consists 
of a variety of racist statements, made on different occasions. A 
recent mixed motive discharge case provides a typical fact pattern. 
A hospital terminated the employment of a sixty-one year old 
black man who had worked for twenty years as the manager of 
the hospital laundry, stating that the consolidation of two hospi­
tals necessitated the elimination of his position. His outcome claim 
alleged race and age discrimination. 333 
The record in the case contained evidence of a number of 
racial statements made by hospital management. The plaintiff's 
supervisor, the key person in the termination decision, had earlier 
told the plaintiff to fire several black employees. When the super­
visor learned that the plaintiff had not done so, he said to the 
plaintiff, "When are you going to fire those nigg~rs?"334 He also 
told the plaintiff to discontinue supervising a white female 
subordinate, stating, "A black man has no place supervising a 
white woman."3311 These statements were, of course, evidence of 
whether race was a determinative, substantial, or minor factor in 
the outcome case.336 However, wholly apart from their probative 
333. The case is Grubb v. W.A. Foote Memorial Hosp., Inc., 741 F.2d 1486, 1497 
(6th Cir. 1984). 
334. Id. at 1497. 
335. Id. See also Grubb v. W.A. Foote Memorial Hosp., Inc., 533 F. Supp. 671, 674 
(E.D. Mich. 1981). 
336. The trial court found for the plaintiff on the race discrimination claim, Grubb, 
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value on the effect of the racial motivation on the final decision, 
the statements also constituted race-based different treatment of 
the plaintiff by his employer. The non-determinative discrimina­
tion approach both allows and requires the decision-maker explic­
itly to evaluate all the discriminatory conduct in the case, includ­
ing racial statements, and to impose liability when the conduct is 
covered by the statute. 
This examination leads to a conclusion that may be mildly 
surprising. When subjected to careful scrutiny, the non-determi­
native mixed motive claim disappears. It collapses into either a 
finding of liability on a specific non-determinative discrimination 
violation (most likely, process or language discrimination), or a 
finding of no liability. The determinative mixed motive claim still 
exists, of course, and the battle to prove that race was a determi­
native factor will continue to be a major focus of contemporary 
disparate treatment litigation. 
This Article suggests that if plaintiffs lose that battle, courts 
should neither dismiss cases with a finding of no liability nor reas­
sess facts under a different causation standard. Instead, the courts 
should explicitly address the non-determinative discrimination 
claims presented in each record. If the plaintiffs prove race-based 
different treatment that is covered by a statute, they should pre­
vail. They will not be discriminatory outcome winners, nor will 
they be entitled to the more ample outcome remedies. However, 
since they will have established that they were victims of discrimi­
nation, the courts should impose liability and award relief, for 
there is "no acceptable place in the law for partial racial 
discrimination. " 387 
533 F. Supp. at 675-76, but a divided panel of the Sixth Circuit ruled that the trial judge's 
findings were "clearly erroneous" and reversed. Grubb, 741 F.2d at 1496-97, 1501. With 
respect to the statement that no black man should supervise a white woman, the appeals 
court culled the record to show that "this statement had no effect on [the plaintiff's] position 
or his supervisory status over [the white woman) since [the white woman] continued to 
report to him ••.•" Id. at 1497 (emphasis in original). Even if true, and even if the Sixth 
Circuit was correct that the termination decision was not racially motivated, the fact that 
offensive and demeaning work-related racist statements were made by a supervisor to his 
subordinate is "lost in the shuffle." Wholly, supra note 124, at 399. The .discriminatory 
language claim was neither presented nor evaluated in the case. 
337. Smith v. Sol D. Adler Realty, 436 F.2d 344, 350 (7th Cir. 1970). 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
This Article has presented several forms of non-determinative 
discrimination that are not fully recognized by current doctrine 
and that should be accorded protection in order to fulfill the pur­
poses of the laws against discrimination. In particular, it has ar­
gued that the same decision and but-for tests, when mechanically 
applied, immunize conduct that is discriminatory and under­
enforce the laws. A vocabulary for the different forms of non-de­
terminative discrimination-initially determinative discrimination, 
process, language, and mixed motive discrimination-has been 
suggested with the hope that a more descriptive lexicon will assist 
in the discussion and evaluation of these claims. This Article has 
also identified several problems that non-determinative discrimi­
nation claims present and has developed an approach to accom­
modate those concerns without weakening the prohibition against 
discriminatory conduct. 
Once the theory of non-determinative discrimination has 
been identified and understood, initially determinative discrimina­
tion and process discrimination claims are likely to be readily rec­
ognized as clear instances of prohibited discrimination. For the 
language and mixed motive cases, however, and particularly for 
claims of racial statements in the workplace, acceptance will come 
more slowly. These cases straddle the inner boundary of the laws 
against discrimination; they approach (although most do not 
reach) the barrier of the first amendment. It will take both prac­
tice and persistence to understand and to overcome the difficulties 
these claims present and to establish the appropriate boundary. 
This Article is an attempt to demonstrate that these difficulties 
are not beyond our capacity to resolve. 
